Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417, “5/14/1952”

No. 535
Substance of Discussion at a State Department–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Wednesday, May 14, 1952, 11 a.m.¹

top secret

May 14, 1952, 11 a.m.

Present:

• General Bradley
• Admiral Fechteler
• General Twining
• General Bolte
• General Thomas D. White
• Admiral Fife
• General Ruffner
• General Cabell
• Admiral Wooldridge
• Admiral Lalor
• Colonel Carns
• Mr. Matthews
• Mr. Nitze
• Mr. Bohlen
• Mr. Allison
• Mr. Hickerson
• Mr. Ferguson
• Mr. Alexis Johnson
• Mr. Geoffrey Lewis
• Mr. Stelle
• Mr. Kenneth Young
• Mr. Schwartz
• Mr. Gleason

Berlin

General Bradley: You want to talk about Berlin first?

Mr. Matthews: Yes. It is pretty clear that with the signing of the Contractual Agreement and the EDC there will be some increase in the tension and harassment. The length to which the Russians might go depends in part on the effect of such measures on the Germans and on Soviet estimates of the risks of general war. Recent indications are the speech by Ulbricht, an East German official, and perhaps the stopping of the M.P. patrols.² These are indications that they may be getting ready for more serious steps. We thought it would be useful if we could have a discussion as to how to meet this problem and a picture of the actual position in Berlin—the stockpile and the degree to which we could have an airlift and their ability to interfere with it.

General Bradley: My understanding is that they have a 160-day coal supply and a 120-day food supply. You could stretch the food supply to 125 days.

Mr. Matthews: Are we all agreed that at the first sign of harassment and interference with our rights we should take a firm stand and protest to the Soviet Government?

General Bradley: Well, that is really your business but after you protest, if they don’t stop these measures, it would raise a question for us as to our capabilities. I believe we could bring in by air up to 1500 tons a day with present capabilities. It takes 9400 tons a day, however, to keep them going on the present basis and 5500 tons a day to prevent starvation. If we increase the number of planes, we jeopardize our transport planes and if they get knocked down it will affect our atomic offensive. This relates to the consideration as to whether you would go in by force. We were opposed to it before, but it should be reconsidered now. We have four divisions there now. The Commies have built a railroad and are getting the canals fixed and have put up a power plant, so we can’t interfere as well as we did before.

Mr. Matthews: They could cut off West Berlin trade.

General Bradley: I believe that the two railroads have been joined together.

Mr. Matthews: I assume there is no difference between us as to the vital importance of remaining in Berlin.

General Bradley: We all agree that if you give it up you are getting in very deeply.

Mr. Bohlen: I think they are putting on the squeeze to stop things in West Germany, but it won’t end there. They will copper rivet their zone and completely Sovietize it. This fact alone will mean that it will probably become worse rather than better if we succeed with the Contractual Arrangements and begin to get German forces.

In 1949, at the Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting,³ I sat next to Chuikov and he said, “You don’t realize how intolerable to us it is having you in Berlin where you can prevent us from consolidating that area.” So it is not just to stop what we are doing. They particularly object to the Germans in our sector who can get on soapboxes and denounce the Soviets.

General Twining: We have a lot more big transports now so we could step up the airlift, but if we lose them it really would affect our atomic capabilities.

General Bradley: They also have greater ability to interfere with an airlift.

What is the present status of negotiations with the British and French about a four-power meeting?

Mr. Bohlen: We sent a note yesterday saying first there must be an investigation of the conditions for free elections and when the report of that investigation is in we could meet.⁴

Mr. Matthews: We feel the chances of getting initials on the Contractual Arrangements and the EDC Treaty are pretty good, but there will be trouble before ratification.

General Bradley: Is there any point in holding up the signing until you have a meeting?

Mr. Matthews: No, we are against that. Adenauer is too.

General Twining: They have more capability of impeding an airlift now than they had in 1948, but I don’t think they could stop it.

Mr. Lewis: There was some talk about the use of smoke.

General Twining: We could get through that.

Today, on short runs we can carry 25 tons in a C–124.

Mr. Matthews: We submitted a paper to the NSC yesterday on the subject of Berlin, which I don’t suppose you have had an opportunity to read.⁵ We think it might be useful to have a small State–Defense Working Group.

General Bradley: We have talked to General Cabell about drawing up a plan, say on the basis that the thing broke on May 20, and then keeping the plan up to date by 15-day periods.

General Twining: We are all set to go ahead on that.

General Bradley: Do you need anyone beside Admiral Wooldridge on a State–Defense Working Group?

Mr. Matthews: This paper could go through the normal course with the NSC, but we had in mind a group that could meet on what you might have to do fast.

General Bradley: Did you have in mind a different group than the Senior Staff?

Mr. Bohlen: There are quite a lot of people involved in the Senior Staff. If you are trying to plan for an emergency you want a smaller group.

Mr. Gleason: The Steering Group of the Senior Staff could do it.

General Bradley: I am just trying to avoid setting up a new group.

Mr. Matthews: All right.

Mr. Nitze: The NSC Steering Group will want to call in special people.

Mr. Matthews: On Berlin, we have nothing further.

General Bradley: We will go on with the job of bringing plans up to date, but if you want to take in more than 1500 tons a day we would have to call planes in from Korea and elsewhere.

Mr. Bohlen: Well, the stockpile is better today so even 1500 tons a day might replace the stockpile.

General Bradley: It would prolong the period.

Mr. Matthews: We are all clear that we must stay in Berlin?

General Bradley: Yes, we agree that it would be very serious to get out.

[Here follows discussion of Korea.]

1. The meeting took place at the Pentagon. The source text was prepared by the Department of State, but was not cleared with any of the participants.
2. Regarding Ulbricht’s speech and the stopping of the MP patrols, see footnotes 4 and 2, Document 145.
3. The Sixth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers was held at Paris, May 23–June 20, 1949.
4. For the tripartite note of May 13, see Document 101.
5. Regarding the paper before the NSC, see footnote 1, Document 547.