Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Camp files, lot 55 D 105, “Schuman Plan—1952”

No. 67
Memorandum by the Acting Director of the European Regional Staff Mutual Security Agency (Hulley), to the Assistant Director for Europe, Mutual Security Agency (Cleveland)¹

secret

[Washington,] July 21, 1952.

Subject:

• The U.S. and the Schuman Plan.

1. This memorandum advances the thesis that we ought to raise our sights a little in our dealings with the Schuman Plan, on questions of aid, on questions of U.S. representation to the Coal–Steel Community and on questions of other operating relationships. There are some good arguments against as well as for this thesis, which are discussed below.

2. The Schuman Plan was originated in Europe, not here. It could hardly have originated here, given our then current appraisal of the political and economic realities in Europe. As soon as it was announced, however, the U.S. proclaimed its strong support. During the ensuing two years we provided every kind of public and private support that seemed appropriate. It is a difficult matter to judge, but I believe most European and American observers would agree that the plan would not have been ratified without that steady U.S. support. (It is also true that it would not have been ratified without fairly widespread, if sporadic, European support.) Following the Schuman Plan came the EDC, and there is now increasing probability that the Schuman Plan Assembly will be assigned the task of drawing up a political constitution. The whole project has steadily increased in importance. And we now hear Messrs. Acheson and Harriman at Lisbon, before Congress and in other places, asserting that this federative development may prove to be the most historic event in European history for the last several centuries. (Persons like Eisenhower, Hoffman and Dewey have taken a similar line.) Congressional sentiment has grown stronger each year. In this year’s legislation, we were sufficiently concerned that the Congress go too far and make economic aid conditional on unification, that we drafted and submitted some legislation designed to avert this danger, but instructing the agencies in charge of the Mutual Security Program to administer it in such fashion as to give maximum support to the federative movement. The Congress accepted this legislation (Section 102), by adding specific mention of the Schuman Plan, as well as the EDC and NATO.²

3. Now, as we find ourselves faced with the actual existence of the Schuman Plan and the actual evidence of a constitutional movement, our reponse is slight. Concerning economic aid to this historic institution, we are (naturally) impressed with alternative demands including defense support and productivity drives. Concerning representation to the Schuman Plan we are inclining to the system which would make Draper the nominal representative (as he is to the ECE) and appointing a relatively low level representative on the spot. Concerning other operating relationships, we have listed a few possibilities, but it is indeed still too early to plan them in detail, even though they may be substantial in degree.

4. An important argument in favor of assigning this relatively minor importance to the Schuman Plan within the scale of American organizaton and activities, is that excessive U.S. attention to European developments constitutes a “kiss of death”. There is continuing European resentment against U.S. interference in Europe, against the “satellization” of the European countries and against the large number of U.S. representatives present in Europe. It is argued that active and public U.S. support for the Schuman Plan could turn away some European support. It is further argued that the Schuman Plan, if it has merit, should stand or fall on those merits. If it is so weak that active U.S. support will make an important difference, then it isn’t worthy of support.

5. These arguments, perhaps oversimplified in summary, appear to me to be wrong. Though continued European support is the main essential for further federative progress, U.S. support is likely for a few more years to be a crucial factor. To plagiarize from Ray Vernon (who may not agree with the rest of these comments), the Schuman Plan will be caught in a three-way power play: its own dynamic drive in the direction of unification; the contrary drive of nationalism and entrenched national bureaucracies; and the danger of opposition from the industries. Some degree of real financial power will be essential to the success of the Schuman Plan in this battle.³ Even though the average European may desire unification and change, the elimination of national structures, so long and so fixedly entrenched, will be a major piece of surgery. It has been argued that a European government cannot be substituted for a set of national governments without war or revolution. If the evolutionary process is to succeed, the minimum requirement is that the nascent central institutions dispose of the maximum actual power. For the first years of the Schuman Plan, the EDC and other institutions, they will need the greatest support in terms of power if they are to carry out their revolutionary purposes.⁴

6. As to the concern about European reactions against American support, we have learned that these difficulties can certainly be surmounted.⁵ If we took the argument seriously, we could certainly accomplish none of our defense objectives, productivity objectives or other major American objectives in aid-receiving countries. But through multilateral agencies, such as NATO and OEEC, and through many other arrangements we have learned to press our objectives fairly successfully, with compromises here and there. In this instance the Coal–Steel Community might itself request assistance from the U.S. (and perhaps from other sources). The Community might request or discuss with SRE the need and character of U.S. representation to it. Through these or similar procedures, I recommend that we make every effort (a) to establish a strong politico/economic representation to the Schuman Plan, with an active and high level leader (and a clear line of authority to Draper); and (b) that we do the best we can in making available financial, programming and other powers to the new institution.

1. Besides distribution within the Mutual Security Agency, copies of this memorandum were also sent to the Department of State. The source text, which was circulated in the Office of European Regional Affairs, had the following handwritten notes, presumably made by Parsons, written in the margins: “M[iriam] C[amp]. This isn’t too good—proves you were right re settling this at the top. JGP.” “Response? Does it require one—must we reward them.”
2. For documentation concerning the Mutual Security Act of 1952 and its approval by Congress, see vol. i, Part 1, pp. 460 ff.
3. The following handwritten notation, presumably made by Parsons, was in the margin of the source text at this point: “Not v. convincing. Success depends on willingness of nations to implement the treaty, not on am’t of money in the till.”
4. The notation “Money talks!” appeared in the margin at this point in the source text.
5. The following notation appeared in the margin at this point: “He has twisted it—point is vol. Eur coop. in Eur org., not something American induced.”