Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 338
No. 460
Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower
1
My Dear Friend: I have always thought that if the French meant to fight for their Empire in Indo-China instead of clearing out as we did of our far greater inheritance in India, they should at least have introduced two years’ service which would have made it possible for them to use the military power of their nation. They did not do this but fought on for eight years with untrustworthy local troops, with French cadre elements important to the structure of their home army and with the Foreign Legion, a very large proportion of whom were Germans. The result has thus been inevitable and personally I think Mendes-France, whom I do not know, has made up his mind to clear out on the best terms available. If that is so, I think he is right.
I have thought continually about what we ought to do in the circumstances. Here it is. There is all the more need to discuss ways and means of establishing a firm front against Communism in the Pacific sphere. We should certainly have a S.E.A.T.O., corresponding to N.A.T.O. in the Atlantic and European sphere. In this it is important to have the support of the Asian countries. This raises the question of timing in relation to Geneva.
In no foreseeable circumstances, except possibly a local rescue, could British troops be used in Indo-China, and if we were asked [Page 1070] our opinion we should advise against United States local intervention except for rescue.
The S.E.A.T.O. front should be considered as a whole, and also in relation to our world front against Communist aggression. As the sectors of the S.E.A.T.O. front are so widely divided and different in conditions, it is better, so far as possible, to operate nationally. We garrison Hong Kong and the British Commonwealth contributes a division to Korea. But our main sector must be Malaya. Here we have twenty-three battalions formed into five brigades. You are no doubt aware of the operation contemplated in the event of a Communist invasion from Siam. I will bring detailed plan with me. Alex,2 who I understand is coming over in July, will discuss it with your Generals. The question is whence are we to draw reinforcements. There are none at home; our last regular reserves are deployed. It would be a pity to take troops from Germany. On the other hand we have what are called 80,000 men in the Egyptian Canal zone, which means 40,000 well-mounted fighting troops. Here is the obvious reserve.
Now is the time the Middle East front should be considered together by the United States and Britain. I had hoped more than a year ago that the United States would act jointly with us in negotiating an agreement with the Egyptian military dictatorship in accordance with the terms already agreed between the British and American staffs. It was, however, felt at Washington that America could not go unless invited. The negotiations therefore broke down. Since then there has been a deadlock though the area of dispute is limited.
As time has passed, the strategic aspect of the Canal Zone and base has been continually and fundamentally altered by thermonuclear developments and by a Tito–Greek–Turco front coming into being and giving its hand to Iraq and by America carrying N.A.T.O.’s fingertips to Pakistan. I like all this improvement in which you and the power and resources of the United States have played so vital a part.
These events greatly diminish the strategic importance of the Canal Zone and base, and what is left of it no longer justifies the expense and diversion of our troops, discharging since the war, not British but international purposes. As far as Egypt is concerned, we shall not ask you for a dollar or a marine. I am greatly obliged by the way you have so far withheld arms and money from the Egyptian dictatorship.
The general theme of completing and perfecting in a coherent structure the world front against Communist aggression, which I [Page 1071] suppose might in current practice be described as N.A.T.O., M.E.A.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O., is of course one, but only one of the topics I am looking forward to talking over with you.
The other two have long been in my mind. One is the better sharing of information and also perhaps of resources in the thermo-nuclear sphere. I am sure you will not overlook the fact that by the Anglo-American base in East Anglia we have made ourselves for the next year or two the nearest and perhaps the only bull’s eye of the target. And finally I seek as you know to convince Russia that there is a thoroughly friendly and easy way out for her in which all her hard-driven peoples may gain a broader, fuller and happier life.
You know my views, already publicly expressed in October 1953, about Germany.3 If E.D.C. fails, we ought to get her into N.A.T.O. or a revised form of N.A.T.O. under the best terms possible.
I would not have tried to put all this on paper but for your direct request. So if there is anything in it which you do not like, let it wait till we are together for our weekend meeting, to which I am so keenly looking forward.
With kindest regards,
-
This message is a response to one from President Eisenhower, dated June 18, which reads:
↩“Dear Winston: Do you interpret the elevation of Mendès-France and the pledges he has made as evidence of a readiness on his part to surrender completely in Southeast Asia? If this is so, can you give me some idea of your solution to the resulting problems? If you have formulated any thoughts on these delicate matters, I should like to have them so that I can give them some contemplation before we meet.
“I understand that you and Anthony reach here about 10 a.m. on Friday. This will be spendid, as both Foster and I are looking forward eagerly to our talks.
“With warm regards,
“As ever, Ike” (033.4111/6–1854)
- Field Marshal Alexander of Tunis, British Minister of Defense.↩
- On Oct. 10 Churchill, in addressing the annual conference of the Conservative Party, stated that in default of French ratification of the EDC the British Government would have no choice but to support German membership in NATO as a means of adding German strength to the Western alliance.↩