611.41/6–1553
No. 414
Memorandum by the Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to
the Secretary of State1
Subject:
- US–British Relations
In thinking about Bermuda I have naturally been concerned over the fissures which exist between British policy and our policy in both the Far East and the Near East. The strength of Churchill’s reply to the President’s recent message on Egypt underlines the depth of the fissure in that area. Ambassador Aldrich confirmed to me today the almost unanimous Parliamentary and public support which the Prime Minister has for this position.
The importance of Great Britain (not least as leader of the Commonwealth) to the United States is axiomatic. The British are our strongest and most reliable ally. I do not think that a durable relationship can be based on complete surrender to us on every point which Great Britain considers important to its security and world postion.
I suggest that there is a way out. This is to insist that the British give us complete support for our policies in the Far East. For our part we would recognize that not only do the British have widespread interests and responsibilities in the Middle East but that they in fact control the only western military forces in the area. We should, therefore, support them in the execution of jointly agreed policies in the Middle East and thereby avoid finding ourselves [Page 992] trapped in the unwelcome role of mediator between native regimes and Great Britain. In a sense it seems to me that we are following a hard policy in the Far East, harder than the British relish. On the other hand, in the Middle East the British policy seems to me harder and based to a large extent on force. I think in reaching jointly agreed policies in the Middle East with the British we should give greater weight than we have to their theses.
I realize this would involve losing our independent influence (if in fact we possess or can develop it) with Egypt and much of the Arab world. I think notwithstanding this we could still count on Turkey and Pakistan. It would further complicate our problem with India but I have the impression that Nehru’s education has been notably advanced by the combination of your visit and the Prime Ministers’ meeting in London during the Coronation.
I believe we must get whole-hearted British support for our policy with respect to Communist China. I believe we must cement our alliance with British which is in a disturbing state of disrepair. The foregoing suggestion seems to me the direction we should take to accomplish both objectives.
- The source text bears the handwritten notation by O’Connor “Sec saw and will discuss with you further—17 June.” Copies of this memorandum were also sent to Smith, Matthews, MacArthur, Bowie, Robertson, and Byroade.↩