611.41/3–553
No. 380
United States Delegation Minutes
of the First Meeting of Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign
Secretary Eden at
the Department of State, March 5, 1953, 10:15 a.m.
1
UKPT MIN–1 (Special)
Participants:
-
U.S.
- Secretary Dulles
- Ambassador Aldrich
- Mr. Matthews
- Mr. Allison
- Mr. Bonbright
- Mr. MacArthur
- Mr. Robertson
- Mr. O’Connor
- Mr. Beale
-
U.K.
- Foreign Secretary Eden
- Ambassador Makins
- Sir Pierson Dixon
- Sir Christopher Steel
- Mr. Shuckburgh
- Mr. Tomlinson
- Mr. Henderson
Korea
Foreign Secretary Eden said that he would like to know the thinking in connection with Korea.
Secretary Dulles said that the program was not as yet clearly formulated. He explained that the thinking went along the following lines: (1) It is believed that the principal advantage that the Soviet has gained out of the continuance of the war in Korea is that they see large advantages in keeping the U.S. tied down in Korea and the French tied down in Indochina. It is felt that the United States ought to have its military power unengaged in the form of a mobile central reserve. He pointed out that when the U.S. is deeply involved in Korea it is out of position and is in a [Page 905] position of weakness. He said that this was an element that must be taken into account when considering other positions around the world. He noted that the French engagement in Indochina weakens, distracts and divides France politically. He said that this was the principal reason for French weakness in the creation of the European army. He noted that if our enemies could prevent the use of German power in Europe it would be of tremendous benefit to them. Secretary Dulles continued by noting that the Administration thinks in terms of ultimate disengagement of the forces of the United States and France in Asia and the substitution of native forces. He noted that much had been done along these lines in Korea and that we are trying to get the French to do something comparable in Indochina. He expressed the view that if people in Indochina felt they were fighting for their own country it would help. He said that there would also be an advantage in providing technical information to the French. He noted that there were no immediate results to be expected from these measures, that it would be a question of a year or two, that the process was slow, but that the fact of its slowness was not a reason for failure to push as rapidly as possible.
Secretary Dulles said that we are faced with two other problems. The first problem is the desirability of creating a threat against the center of the line of which Korea and Indochina are the two flanks. He said that aside from the moral reasons for ending the order to the Seventh Fleet, there was a strategic advantage in recreating somewhat more of a threat which would tend to freeze Chinese forces on the mainland and prevent reinforcement of Chinese forces in Korea, particularly in terms of equipment. He said that there were about 250,000 Chinese forces massed on the border of Indochina and it would be very serious if they entered Indochina. He said that it was believed that the action we have taken will tend to tie down Chinese forces at the center. He noted that we do not have in mind any actual operations from Formosa against the mainland but we wanted to create threat conditions.
Secretary Dulles said that the second problem with which we are faced was that of morale in South Korea. He said that there is a question as to whether morale will be sustained to the degree necessary for the South Koreans to carry the cruel burden of war. He noted that in his conversation with General Van Fleet yesterday the latter had expressed concern about morale if the South Koreans have to lose men and see their economy weakened merely in order to hold the present line. Secretary Dulles said that he himself has long believed that it was never possible for free world forces to remain in the northern reaches of Korea where on the one hand they would be close to Port Arthur and on the other to [Page 906] Vladivostok. He said that he felt that it would be impossible to meet the forces that would be hurled against UN forces in that area. He said that he would not expand on the subject since such views would encroach on the field of the military.
Secretary Dulles said that although no clearly defined conclusion had been reached he felt it was desirable for Secretary Eden and his colleagues to hear the considerations operating in our minds and perhaps accept those same considerations or add factors of their own.
Foreign Secretary Eden said that he knew that Mr. Churchill would share the views expressed about its being a mistake to go forward to the Manchurian border. He said that all that he would ask was that when a decision was taken his government should have a chance to talk it over. He explained that he did not mean a personal conference between himself and Secretary Dulles, but that discussions should be carried on at the staff level.
Secretary Dulles said that he assumed that there was some mechanism to provide for such consultation. He noted that we do have informal exchanges which in fact often lead to understandings but that both governments were involved in awkward situations in that often they were not in a position to say anything about consultations. He noted that Mr. Eden was often attacked in Parliament and that the U.S. was also attacked for its position.
Foreign Secretary Eden said that he had survived the last time.
Secretary Dulles replied that he had read with interest the minutes of the debate and he noted that the U.S. News and World Report had published a full text of the debate.
Foreign Secretary Eden said that the only point he wished to stress was that if there is any big decision obviously they would want to know about it.
Sir Roger Makins asked whether, in connection with the use of the word “disengaged”, the U.S. had in mind complete UN disengagement.
Secretary Dulles said that he thought it would always be necessary to have the UN flag flying in Korea. He said that it would be desirable to have more UN strength even if it were not a material addition to the fighting effectiveness of UN forces. He said that additional strength would help to meet criticism directed at the UN. He said that a program of the sort he had outlined would probably result in a negotiation of an armistice in Korea, perhaps a year from now. He did not believe that the Russians would want to keep up the strain of supplying Communist forces in Korea if what they were doing was helping North Korea in keeping a stalemate against South Korea. He said that as long as the U.S. is involved we need a victory, but so long as the South Koreans can hold back [Page 907] the North Koreans, with some help from the U.S., then it is a moral victory for the South Koreans.
Foreign Secretary Eden expressed the hope that the U.S. would talk with the U.K. before taking action in Korea.
Secretary Dulles said that he would assume so.2
- The meeting took place in Secretary Dulles’ office. For a record of the subjects other than Korea, which were discussed at the first meeting, see UKPT MIN–1, supra.↩
- A summary of UKPT MIN–1 (Special), prepared by Allison and dated Mar. 6, was transmitted to President Eisenhower. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 139)↩