Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

740.5/2–2653: Telegram

No. 377
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State¹

secret

London, February 26, 1953—5 p.m.

4800. Following background information about Eden and Butler and current British attitudes towards US may be useful to Department in forthcoming Washington discussions.

Eden and Butler.

Eden still regarded as eventual successor to Churchill. However, his standing in Conservative Party has suffered somewhat in past few weeks as result strong back-bench Tory criticism Sudan agreement² and fears by few Tory die-hards “empire” will be further “scuttled” on Suez Canal negotiations. Eden may hope Washington trip will result restoration this slight impairment his party standing.

Butler’s political star has continued to rise and his standing within Conservative Party is high. He is in self-confident frame of mind and feels “on top of his job”. Butler has told us he regards trip in part as opportunity establish closest possible relationships with his opposite numbers, particularly Secretary Treasury. He has said to us many times that, after 15 months in office, he regrets not having established these relationships.

Attitudes Toward US.

British public attitudes towards US (as distinct from attitude HMG) have quieted down since flare-up over Formosa decision. Secretary’s visit here,³ scotching of rumors re imminent decision blockade China and various actions economic field (decision seek renewal trade agreements act, President decision re briar pipe tariff, etc.) have all been helpful this regard. Nevertheless, British still feel uncertain and somewhat apprehensive re possible new policies by administration particularly as regards Far East and Soviet Union.

Although British no longer seem to feel US Far Eastern Policy will shift in near future without consultation with UK and others, there is strong undercurrent of concern that US may propose or take actions which risk “spreading war” in Korea or which may make eventual Far Eastern settlement more difficult.

This undercurrent of opinion could quickly erupt to surface and become extremely difficult from our point of view, unless evolution our policy re FE as it affects British is handled with greatest care. Eden will doubtless be most conscious of this parliamentary and public opinion problem in any discussions this subject.

British are also apprehensive over suggestions and rumors that new administration may regard “containment” as insufficient and may be embarking on stepped up psychological warfare and more “positive and dynamic” policy towards Soviets. British fears in this respect are fears of the unknown and of the as yet undefined. They still believe our real foreign policy objectives are same as theirs, and they do not question our motives, but they do fear we may act rashly and impulsively and thus heighten danger of war. They tend to regard possible “get tough” policy in international field as complementary to measures taken domestically in US against CP members, fellow travellers, etc. This entire area of opinion is an extremely sensitive one here since it is regarded as touching vital and fundamental issues of policy. So far as we know Eden does not intend to discuss question policy towards Soviets although it might be useful from our point of view if this area could at least be explored with him.

Apart from economic talks Eden will want to discuss following matters with Secretary:

1. European Defense Community.

A. Will exchange information on latest developments affecting ratification EDC and agreement on protocols.⁴ Will raise question of what United States and United Kingdom can do to give final necessary push to achieve action.

B. Will discuss British reply to French proposals for British association with EDC.⁵ Key point of French request is that British maintain forces on continent at present level for some undefined period. British reply being considered today by Cabinet which it is hoped will settle issue on which Foreign Office views reported divided, namely, whether British should agree to any form of consultation before withdrawing forces from continent. Foreign Office has promised furnish copy to Department through Makins and copy to us possibly tomorrow.

C. He will want to learn our attitude on question of extending NAT to 50 years, which would entail extension of British guarantee to EDC to same period. British are favorably disposed to such action and Foreign Office believes Parliament would ratify extension overwhelmingly. British believe French have not agreed such action because it would be too easy for British to reply by raising question of attitude United States of America and other NATO powers.

D. He will want to learn our reactions to French proposal for tripartite declaration for joint high level policy formulation, text of which transmitted Paris 4618 February 17 to Department.⁶ Foreign Office understands text given State Department few days ago and initial American reaction unfavorable. British do not like this draft. They are uncertain whether French motives are primarily to gratify their aspirations to preserve great power status or whether ulterior motives predominate such as strategic objectives in Indochina and other areas. British believe smaller powers such as Netherlands would object strongly to such declaration.

They also point out that on some subjects like atomic energy Canada is more qualified than France to be included as third great power. British favor continuation of periodic meetings on lines hitherto followed without setting up formal relationship. They point out that under terms of draft French could call highest level meeting at any time.

E. It is not expected that questions about NATO except as stated above or EPC will come up.

2. Middle East.

On Middle East, Eden expects to thank Department for supporting principle arbitration United Kingdom/Saudi boundary dispute⁷ and express hope Department would continue support. Eastern Department has prepared briefs for Eden on Alton Jones and Arab refugees in case Department raises these questions. Extent to which Eden will want to discuss Egyptian problem will depend on developments between now and his arrival, and same is true for Persia.

3. Far East.

Eden plans give only minor emphasis to Far East questions. He unlikely raise any specific problems but has of course been briefed on such current British worries as United States plans re denunciation secret agreements, revised orders to Seventh Fleet, and talk of blockade of China. If United States does not initiate Far East discussions he will probably make short general statement emphasizing British views current Far East issues and stressing desirability prior consultation with British before any drastic new steps taken by United States. This desire for prior consultation holds of course for other areas as well.

4. Trieste.

Eden desires to renew conversation with Secretary about Trieste at point reached in their London talks early this month. One reason is he must prepare for talks with Tito who visits London mid-March. Foreign Office is gratified at lessening Italian pressure on this subject. British are convinced any provisional settlement would be mistake and they think it better to leave decision until after Italian election.

5. Balkan treaty.

He will want to discuss its influence on NATO and on eventual Trieste settlement.

Aldrich

1. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Paris. Ambassador Aldrich presented his letters of credence and assumed charge of the Embassy on Feb. 20.
2. Under reference here is the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of Feb. 12, 1953 which provided for Sudanese self-determination at the end of a period not to exceed 3 years.
3. Regarding Secretary Dulles’ conversations in London, Feb. 4, see telegram 3654, Feb. 5, and a letter from Dulles to Eisenhower in vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1564 and 1567.
4. For documentation on the five French protocols to the EDC Treaty, presented on Feb. 11, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 719 ff.
5. For documentation on the French proposal for closer British association with the EDC, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 730 ff.
6. Not printed; it reported that the French were circulating the text of a draft tripartite declaration for joint high level policy formulation on problems of major strategic implications. (740.5/2–1753)
7. For documentation on the Anglo-Saudi dispute over Buraimi, see vol. ix, Part 2, pp. 2458 ff.