Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

641.42/1–1452: Telegram

No. 357
The Ambassador in Canada (Woodward) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Ottawa , January 14, 1952—7 p.m.

114. Summary arranged by topics UK–Canadian discussions various levels given Bliss by Heeney fullest possible through Monday¹ nothing more expected.

1. Brit unanimous unreserved expressions satisfaction Wash talks.² Churchill particularly pleased make acquaintance President and liked him. This also his first personal contact St. Laurent.

2. Raw materials position discussed in terms steel, tin, aluminum as in Wash and Canadians readily agreed. No discussion copper or nickel which Canadians believed can best be handled IMC. TCC not discussed.

3. Churchill expressed satisfaction and concurrence with US views FE and stated UK cld support US attitude all respects. Eden qualified somewhat expressing view Japan should not be pressed recognize China or make agreement with Chiang before treaty ratified. Eden also felt difficult to draw in Japanese relations with Chiang but accepts US view including Dulles point regarding assurance to Senate that Japan will recognize Chiang after ratification and is not disposed to care provided such action follows ratification.

4. Little on ME but Churchill quoted as recognizing US paramount interest FE and hoping US will recognize special burdens UK in Middle East. Oratorical flight re regiment US marines at Suez and indicated practical possibility US cruiser to assist with Canadian traffic problems.

5. Churchill obsessed with SACLANT problem arguing mainly on basis principles strategy in terms of (a) killing submarines, (b) reception convoys at other side. Maintained UK understands reception problem better having handled it for generations. Expressed himself not interested in existing agreement maintaining question is matter Brit life blood as against US and Canadian inconvenience. Promised to return to charge in Wash and asked for Canadian support. Canadian Naval Chief and Joint Chiefs believe in unified command for technical military reasons and support US view particularly under war conditions. Churchill’s Atlantic admiral idea does not appeal. However Pearson and other Canadian political leaders believe Churchill may have compromise to propose and expressed hope that we cld accept or find one ourselves to give Churchill his desire for political and sentimental reasons. They feel political benefit might offset technical loss.

6. Policy toward Russia discussed general terms along familiar lines. Churchill referred to great and continuing problem but estimated five to four against war in 1952. Expressed belief cold war shld concentrate on Soviet regime rather than on Russia also that war will not break out as result of incident but by deliberate calculation.

7. In discussions relation UK to Eur community Canadians expressed concern that UK give maximum support to Eur integration. Like US they do not expect UK to participate EDF and Churchill orated on subject Brit troops in neutral uniforms defending area six. Canadians want UK to encourage Eur to unite in the Atlantic community and expressed satisfaction UK undertaking to use influence with Benelux.

8. UK econ position described in much same terms as in Wash. Canadians noted no suggestion econ aid for UK and regarded this as wise.

9. Apparently Korea not discussed in detail but UK expressed agreement with US on declaration after possible armistice.

10. Little on latest Vishinsky move³ but Churchill hopes that it will not be regarded as proposal which we wld be compelled to accept.

11. Subject discussed at greatest length between FonMins and officials was reform of NATO. UK expressed general agreement with US proposals which Canada regards as particularly important. However, Canada does not believe that reform can be completed at Lisbon⁴ although possibly four decisions might be made at that time:

a. Concentration of one place on argument that it is important establish NATO in position dominate EDC and avoid danger of divergence from Atlantic community plus practical considerations plus added confidence to continent. Canadian preference for Paris not popular with UK but UK had no arguments except their own prestige and convenience. Canada will not take lead but go along with US–UK–Fr decision.

b. Secy General and possibly who might fill position. UK presented paper already left with US.⁵ UK divergencies not strong and Canada agrees with US views.

c. Council to be in permanent session at seat of organization which Canadians regard as important.

d. Future of FEB and DPB and agreement to abolish to be worked out by deputies.

12. UK brought up question of relationship between military and civilian organizations maintaining US and Canada too much concerned with civilian side. If SG kept in Wash more effective link with NATO civilian group required. Possibilities include strengthening SG with civilian staff to point up politico-econ problems and avoid unreal military program but this raises question of divided civilian responsibilities as between NATO and SG. Another possibility stronger military group attached to NATO representing SG. In effect if either course followed we wld be applying TCC techniques to NATO by coordinating military with politico-econ aspects. Pearson feels TCC ad hoc operation shld not be repeated but that provision be made for same result through normal NATO operations.

Woodward

1. Jan. 14.
2. On Jan. 14 Perkins and Raynor discussed Churchill’s visit to Ottawa with Ambassador Wrong who stated that he also had received the definite impression that the Prime Minister was “extremely pleased with his reception in Washington and the results of his visit in Washington.” (Memorandum of conversation, Jan. 14; 741.13/1–1452)
3. The proposal under reference here has not been identified further.
4. For documentation on the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, held at Lisbon Feb. 20–25, 1952, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 107 ff.
5. Presumably this is the same paper referred to in footnote 6, Document 333, which has not been identified further.