Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 100

No. 354
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Williamson) of a Meeting of Secretary of State Acheson and Foreign Secretary Eden at the Department of State, January 10, 1952, 4:30 p.m. ¹

top secret
TCT CONV–5

January 10, 1952, 4:30 p.m.

Present:

• U.S.

  • Secretary Acheson
  • Ambassador Gifford
  • Mr. Matthews
  • Mr. Perkins
  • Mr. Williamson

• U.K.

  • Secretary Eden
  • Ambassador Franks
  • Mr. Shuckburgh
  • Mr. Burrows

I opened the discussion of the Austrian Treaty by recalling our previous conversations in Paris and Rome and called Mr. Eden’s attention to the report of the British, French and U.S. High Commissioners in Vienna which had been prepared at our request.²

I stated that there were problems of both procedure and substance involved in the forthcoming meeting of the Deputies³ and that we should be guided by the recommendations of the High Commissioners concerning the tactics in dealing with the Soviet Union. In terms of procedure the chief problem was contained in paragraph two of the High Commissioners’ report concerning the acceptance of the Soviet versions of the unagreed Articles in order to obtain the conclusion of the present draft treaty. I pointed out that the High Commissioners had recommended acceptance of the Soviet position only “as a last resort” to achieve conclusion of the treaty during the forthcoming meetings. The issue presented in this recommendation is clear; namely, should we make further concessions to the Russians to obtain the conclusion of the Treaty? I stated that I considered this to be a dangerous move in our negotiations because we did not have any assurance that the Soviets would conclude the Treaty even on their own terms. If such an offer were made and the Russians continued to block the conclusion of the Treaty by raising extraneous issues, the Western Powers would have given up their position on these articles without obtaining any tangible results. In subsequent negotiations, therefore, we would be forced to start by accepting the Soviet terms of these articles as the basis for discussions. I stated that we felt that such action would make it difficult to introduce at any time in the future a new basis of discussion, such as the abbreviated Treaty.⁴ It would also be difficult to answer public criticism that we had given away a great deal without getting anything in return. The second procedural question involved the problem of withdrawal of the old draft Treaty as the basis of discussion if the abbreviated Treaty is presented to the Soviets. I called the attention of Mr. Eden to paragraphs 13 and 14 of the report of the High Commissioners and said that we should accept this recommendation.

In terms of substance a real problem would be presented if the Soviets indicated a willingness to accept the present draft Treaty and negotiate the unagreed articles. I stated that the United States would find itself in a difficult situation in so far as ratification is concerned since the present draft placed on Austria a heavy obligation to the Soviet Union. If the Senate refused to ratify the Treaty, the Austrians would then blame the United States for their failure to obtain their independence as they now blame the Soviet Union. In 1949 there would have been no difficulties in obtaining ratification if the Treaty had been concluded at that time. The situation at the present time, however, is different. The chief problem which would face the administration would be in justifying the settlement on German assets, particularly the lump sum payment which the Austrians would be required to pay to the Soviet Union. This payment could not be made without direct assistance by the U.S. Government. The administration would find it extremely difficult to justify the payment of this sum to the Soviet Union. I emphasized, however, that if the Treaty is concluded the administration would make every effort to obtain its ratification, stressing that no matter how bad the agreement might appear, it had succeeded in obtaining the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria. I added that as a personal view, the present Treaty could be accepted as the price of obtaining the rollback of Soviet military forces in Europe. However, I did not believe that there was any possibility of obtaining any settlement at this time since the Russians have obviously made the conclusion of the Treaty a part of a general European settlement. In any event, the Austrian Treaty would not be concluded pending some settlement of the German question. I expressed the hope, therefore, that Mr. Eden would recognize our position and would agree that we should not make a direct offer to the Soviets to accept their terms for the unagreed Articles. I stated that we should follow the recommendations of the High Commissioners, that we would “go a long way” to meet the Soviet position, in the hope of obtaining from the Soviet Deputy a statement that he was not prepared to conclude the present draft Treaty at this time. At that point we could proceed to establish a new basis for continued negotiations for an Austrian settlement.

Mr. Eden replied that he understood our position and that he agreed with it. He felt, however, that if we could present to the world the statement that the Soviets would not conclude the Treaty even on their own terms, we would gain definite propaganda advantage. Mr. Eden stated that he still did not understand what the Western Deputies were supposed to say about the old Treaty and he felt that the situation would be somewhat “blurred”. I replied that it might be well to keep it blurred.

I stated that our objective should be to get the Soviet Deputy to refuse to discuss the present draft even on Soviet terms rather than to start the negotiations by making a direct offer to accept the Soviet terms. I felt that this could be achieved by the negotiating skill of our Deputies. Since it is quite likely that the Soviet Deputy will raise extraneous issues and will refuse to discuss the present draft, we could then proceed with our plan to introduce a new basis for discussion. After this new basis has been proposed it would be up to the Soviet Government to revive the old draft Treaty if they wished to make it a basis for an Austrian settlement.

Mr. Eden agreed with these views.

1. Drafted on Jan. 14.
2. For documentation on the tripartite High Commissioners report on the Austrian Treaty, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iv, Part 2, pp. 1176 ff.
3. For documentation on the resumption of the meetings of the Austrian Deputies of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, see vol. vii, Part 2, pp. 1717 ff.
4. For documentation on the abbreviated draft Austrian Treaty, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iv, Part 2, pp. 1123 ff.