Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Truman Library, David D. Lloyd files

No. 344
United States Delegation Minutes of the Fourth Formal Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill, The White House, January 8, 1952, 5:30–6:28 p.m. ¹

top secret

Washington, January 8, 1952, 5:30 p.m. to 6:28 p.m.

At 5:00 o’clock there was a special meeting in the President’s office attended by the President, the Prime Minister, and the following officials: General Bradley, Secretary Lovett, Secretary Acheson, Admiral Fechteler, Lord Ismay, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, First Sea Lord McGrigor and Air Marshal Elliot.²

This meeting concluded at 5:30 and the participants moved into the Cabinet Room where the attendance was as follows:

• The President
  • Dean Acheson—Secretary of State
  • Robert A. Lovett—Secretary of Defense
  • John Snyder—Secretary of the Treasury
  • W. Averell Harriman—Director for Mutual Security
  • Walter Gifford—Ambassador to the United Kingdom
  • H. Freeman Matthews—Deputy Under Secretary of State
  • George W. Perkins—Assistant Secretary of State
  • General Omar Bradley—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
  • Charles E. Bohlen—Counselor of the Department of State
  • Ridgway Knight—Department of State
  • Henry A. Byroade—Department of State
  • Charles S. Murphy—Special Counsel to the President
  • Joseph Short—Secretary to the President
  • David D. Lloyd—Administrative Assistant to the President
• Prime Minister Churchill
  • Anthony Eden—Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
  • Lord Cherwell—Paymaster General
  • Lord Ismay—Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations
  • Sir Norman Brook—Secretary to the Cabinet
  • Sir Roger Makins—Deputy Under Secretary of State
  • Sir Leslie Rowan—Treasury
  • Mr. Shuckburgh
  • Mr. Pitblado
  • Mr. Gore-Booth
  • Mr. Mallaby
  • Field Marshal Sir William Slim
  • Admiral Sir Roderick McGrigor
  • Air Marshal Sir William Elliot
  • Sir Kenneth McLean
  • Sir Christopher Steel

To this group was added the raw materials working group headed by Mr. Charles B. Wilson, Director of Defense Mobilization. Mr. Wilson left before the meeting convened at 5:30, leaving Mr. Manly Fleischmann, Administrator, Defense Production Administration, to make the report. This group included Mr. Willard Thorpe, Assistant Secretary of State, and on the British side, Mr. Rickett, Mr. McDougall, Mr. Hall, Mr. Powell, and Lord Knollys, though it is not clear that all these gentlemen were in the room.

The President called the larger meeting to order at 5:31 p.m. He asked if the Prime Minister would agree to calling on the raw materials working group to make their report, which he said he believed was ready at this time.

Mr. Manly Fleischmann reported for the group. He said that agreement had been reached on three matters.

The first was tin. It had been agreed that the United Kingdom would sell to us ten thousand tons of tin at $1.18 a pound. It had also been agreed that an additional ten thousand tons of tin would be made available to us in 1952 at prices within a range from $1.18 to $1.25 a pound. The price at which the additional tin would be purchased would depend on cost to the United Kingdom. We agreed not to let the United Kingdom take a loss on this tin. It was also agreed that a formal agreement would be entered into and made public only with respect to the first ten thousand tons. It had been felt that the second ten thousand tons would have serious price repercussions if it were announced at this time.

With respect to aluminum, it had been agreed that the United States would be supplied with five thousand tons per quarter during 1952 on a loan basis. We on our part had agreed to repay this aluminum in kind by July 1953, provided our new production comes through on schedule. The British would make this aluminum available by the diversion of Canadian contracts, which the United Kingdom would forego.

With respect to steel, it had been agreed that the United States would supply to the United Kingdom 1,250,000 long tons in the calendar year 1952. The forms and types of this steel and the time of the deliveries were to be under United States control. We were aiming at providing approximately 100,000 tons per month if we can. As to shapes and types, we cannot provide the particular kinds the United Kingdom likes the best. We were short of structural steel. Our shipments would be heavily loaded in the early part of the year with sheets and ingots, shapes to come later. From this total of 1,250,000 tons, would be deducted all that has been delivered in 1952, amounting to around 100,000 tons.

Mr. Fleischmann asked Lord Cherwell if these agreements had been correctly stated and if he had anything to add.

Lord Cherwell said there was one qualification with respect to aluminum. If the British got into trouble on it, they would have to reconsider it at the end of the year. The problem of ore (tin?) raised questions. He believed the agreements would be a great help to the strength of the free world.

The Prime Minister then raised the question of copper.

Mr. Fleischmann said that we were receptive to copper but there wasn’t any.

The Prime Minister asked why not. He said there was copper in Africa, lots of it. He said a bigger effort was needed in producing copper and that they would have to provide inducements for its extraction.

Secretary Eden said that getting more copper was a coal problem.

Mr. Fleischmann suggested that perhaps the United Kingdom could provide us with some brass strip for making cartridges, in place of copper. Even if it was only a token shipment of brass strip, it would help us with Congress.

The President agreed.

Lord Cherwell said they would like to do it, pointing out it would help their dollar position.

The President said that we had to anticipate great trouble with the Second Session of the Eighty-second Congress. This was an election year, with the whole House and a third of the Senate running for office. The question of foreign aid was sure to be a political one. He had no doubt, as he had told the Prime Minister before, that he, the Prime Minister, would be running for President at least in the Congressional debates.

The Prime Minister said that he would not run for President even if the Consitution were amended.

The President said he hoped the British would do what they could to help him put these things before the Congress.

The Prime Minister reverted to the question of copper. He said he was sure they could get copper. If it was a coal problem they would get more coal.

Secretary Eden said that it was very complicated—that it was a question of transporting the coal. There was some little interchange on this problem which was concluded by the Prime Minister saying they would do their best and Lord Cherwell saying that they wanted to “help on the Hill.”

The Prime Minister then asked about nickel.

Mr. Fleischmann said that we got nickel from Canada and had no request to make of the British. He thought we should urge in the International Materials Conference that greater recognition be given to military needs. He thought the United Kingdom and the United States should have a bigger share of the nickel supply than they are now allotted since they are carrying the major part of the defense production burden.

The Prime Minister said he understood nickel was very important—that it was used in hardening steel and things like that.

Lord Cherwell said yes, it was very important as an alloy.

The Prime Minister said that these agreements on metals gave him a great feeling of relief. This was a big thing that had been arranged. Britain could now press on with its rearmament production and its exports.

Concerning aluminum, the Prime Minister suggested it might be good for him to have a meeting with the Canadians about it when he goes to Canada, or to set up such a meeting.

Mr. Fleischmann said that he would not anticipate any difficulties with the Canadians.

The Prime Minister pressed the idea that there might be talks with the Canadians about it, and that he would like to mention it in Canada.

Mr. Fleischmann said that there would be no objections to having a talk about it.

The Prime Minister concluded this point on the agenda by saying that we had made a great advance.

The President then brought up the next item, which he said consisted of three related topics concerning European defense. He invited the Prime Minister to express his views on these subjects.

The Prime Minister said that he had not been inconsistent on this matter in the various statements he had made in recent years. He believed he had been consistent and also right.

It was his purpose, he said, to help develop a European Army, but he did not want to send six English Divisions into action on the Continent without their ever seeing their pals again or being in touch with each other. The Army question had been all mixed up with the talk about unity. The aim was to have a grand alliance of forces which might lead ultimately to fusion and similar matters.

He asked the President to tell them if there is anything we want them to do. Recently in Paris, he said, they had said something significant on this subject.³ General Eisenhower had been satisfied with the statement. General Eisenhower did not think the British ought to go into a European Army. They had not been asked to do anything beyond what was stated in this Paris communiqué which they intend to uphold honorably. They would do their part.

The French, he said, were not doing their part because of Indo-China. The French were fighting like tigers in Indo-China and this ruins their chances of building up a strong European Army. This emphasized the fact that we must have the Germans in the defense of Europe.

The President agreed. He said we must have the Germans. Acheson and Eden were working on it and he knew they would continue.

Mr. Acheson said that he had talked with Secretary Eden on the matter at length.⁴ We were not urging the United Kingdom to join the European Army. We have, however, asked them for help on the Benelux thing.

Secretary Acheson said he wanted to explain the Benelux problem. At Paris, there had been a very important agreement between the French, Germans and Italians on the European defense. The Foreign Ministers of these three nations took the view that there was no alternative to a European Army if we are to get German participation. Therefore, we must bring the Benelux countries along so that they agree to this European Army.

The Dutch, Secretary Acheson said, had sincere objections to the European Army idea, but they were misguided. The Belgians were objecting but their objections were not sincere. What they feared was the possibility of an election in Belgium by 1953.

Secretary Acheson went on to explain the erroneous views held by the Dutch. These, he said, could be corrected.

1. The Dutch thought that if the European Army were set up, the United States would be less interested in Europe. As a matter of fact, of course we would be more interested in Europe. If the European Army were set up, we would send more supplies and troops. The Congressional attitude would be very favorable.

2. The Dutch thought that the European Army would be dominated by the bigger powers. The remedy here was a plan for voting, such as that in the Schuman Plan, which would give the Dutch a vote larger than their material contribution.

3. The Dutch thought that if the three small countries (Benelux) could water down the European Army, they could get the British to join in. They hoped to bring in more British troops by weakening the European Army. Here Secretary Acheson said the British could help.

4. Another objection from the Dutch was their belief that if Germany were not brought into the European Army, there would be more rearmament business for the Dutch. On the contrary, if this were the case, the rearmament business would probably go to the United States.

5. The Dutch preferred bi-lateral deals with the United States, thinking they would get more that way. But, as Mr. Acheson pointed out previously, they would in fact get more through a European Army set-up.

6. The Dutch fear that their aid program will be cut down if there has to be a community review by the other European powers under the European Army set-up. This was not so, since the review of the aid program would be controlled ultimately by NATO. Secretary Acheson concluded by saying the worries of the Dutch could be met in these ways and by asking the United Kingdom to press the Dutch Government to join in this European Army. If they don’t, he said, we won’t get the Germans in.

Mr. Eden said that the British realize that the very possibility of this European Army is due not only to General Eisenhower but to the great work of the President and Secretary Acheson. They realized further, he said, that the European Army was the only way to get the Germans in. By the time of the Rome Conference, he said, it was clear to him that it was this European Army scheme or no scheme. There was no use of the British or anyone else devising a new scheme. He should have seen it before but he had not been in office.

With regard to the Dutch, he said, Secretary Acheson had made a good analysis of their position, and the United Kingdom would help. The Dutch want a loose scheme, he said. But if it is made looser, the French will be frightened of the Germans and the Germans will lose their equality in the scheme. This was the situation in a nutshell.

However, Mr. Eden said he wished to bring up another aspect. During the last few months, all the emphasis had been on the European Army and nothing was being said about NATO. The Dutch, he said, look to the sea. They are Atlantic animals. They need to be reassured that the European Army is within the Atlantic thing and part of it. The same reassurance is also needed for the United Kingdom, for they too are more Atlantic animals than they are European animals. He hoped we would strike that note in the communiqué.

The Prime Minister said we should bear in mind what is the object of this activity.

The question, he said, was, if there is Russian aggression, will there be an army to stand in the line against them? Are there loyal, brave divisions, he asked, that will stand and fight and die together? The United Kingdom, the Prime Minister continued, was sending four divisions, three of them armoured, and the same was true of the United States. The substance of the thing in this sense was more important than the organizational set-up. They would all be under General Eisenhower’s tactical command, and if he sends the United Kingdom divisions to fight among French divisions, or anywhere else, they will go there. The thing is to get as strong a force as we can to meet aggression.

The President said that if we get it, there will be no aggression.

The Prime Minister agreed. He said they would do all they can to encourage a European Army. But he did wish to say to all around the table that it was, in his opinion, the national spirit that inspired troops to fight. National spirt was a very important factor.

The President interrupted to say that the international army idea has worked in Korea and proved itself there. It has not interferred with nationality or fighting spirit. In Korea we feed the Turks as they want to be fed, and treat the other nationals in accordance with their customs, and they all get along very well together and fight well.

The Prime Minister said that the British would help all they possibly could. He said the Foreign Secretary will have his full blessing and support for a European Army. He said that he was also interested in greater unity in air forces. He thought there was a greater possibility of unified control there, by the nature of things, than there was when it came to pushing divisions around on the ground.

The Prime Minister continued, “Let the communiqué sing out that we are all in favor of the European Army. The British will help and mingle with the others and die if need be.”

The President said, “That clears the air and covers the situation.”

The Prime Minister asked the President whether he might call on General Bradley to express his views about the value of national spirit to fighting men.

The President assented.

General Bradley said that fighting for one’s country is an inspiring thing, but that in Korea sixteen different national units had fought together very well. He thought it could be done if the army was united and if the national units were of division size. In his opinion, fighting as a European Army would not injure morale. Indeed, fighting for Europe might also be a helpful factor.

The Prime Minister said that in Korea they had a simple command situation. There was no federation superstructure with a lot of politicians on top of the army. That kind of thing was not good.

The President asked if there was any more business to bring up at this meeting.

Secretary Eden asked whether the NATO working party had any results to report on plans for the reorganization of NATO.

Secretary Acheson said they had been working on it and he thought they were agreed on all the necessary points of the reorganization with the exception of where the headquarters should be.

Secretary Eden said that he thought it would not be necessary to go into the matter fully now, and the next step would be to instruct the deputies to put forward their suggestions for discussion by NATO. Secretary Acheson agreed to this.

Secretary Eden said of course he still clings to London as the headquarters. London, he said, was subject to fewer fluctuations than Paris.

The Prime Minister said that Mr. Harriman had a bias for Paris.

Mr. Harriman said he had some leanings that way.

The Prime Minister said it was a bit foggy in London but it was really the most appropriate Atlantic capital.

Secretary Eden threatened to lobby for London.

The President said he would be glad to furnish some expert lobbyists.

The Prime Minister brought up the question of “Operation Dovetail” which he said had been discussed after dinner yesterday.⁵

Mr. Harriman explained what “Dovetail” was. The idea was to spread out and discuss the military programs and the production programs of both countries. Mr. Wilson had been talking about it yesterday. We knew very little about each other’s production programs. In this way we could find what part of the British program was most essential and what was least essential. We should determine what the other NATO countries could do, what they could produce, etc. He thought the project should be talked over while Mr. Eden was here. He pointed out that in the last war we had dovetailed our production programs with great success.

The Prime Minister said that when he was a child, they often cut children’s hair by putting a bowl on the child’s head and cutting around it, but there was a more artistic way of doing it. He was in favor of the fitting of it in. He would nominate Lord Cherwell, Sir Leslie Rowan, Mr. Powell and Mr. Hall on his side to undertake discussions of “Dovetail.”

The President said he thought that Mr. Wilson and Mr. Harriman on his side should take it up with them. It was a matter that Mr. Wilson was very much interested in and that he, the President, was very much interested in.

Lord Cherwell said it would help on the brass strip question.

The President then said to the Prime Minister that he understood that he would have the honor of boring the Prime Minister with the forty minutes of his State of the Union speech tomorrow. The President said he would have to work on this speech this afternoon and evening. He said he wished he could invite the whole British party to attend the joint session, but this was not possible.

The Prime Minister said it would be an honor and he would not be bored. He said that as an old politician and public speaker, he greatly appreciated the time and consideration the President had given to them all when such an important event as the State of the Union Address was impending.

The President explained that in addition to the State of the Union speech, the law now required him to send up an Economic Message and a Budget Message at the same time, and that he had been working on these things since September. He said that, nevertheless, he was glad to have the British here and to have such a successful conference.

The Prime Minister said he was glad too. He said, “Just give us a pat on the back, that’s all.”

The President adjourned the meeting at 6:25.

1. Another set of minutes, drafted by Knight and designated TCT MIN–4 which are the same in substance, but lack the detail present in this text, is in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 100.
2. A memorandum on this meeting is printed supra.
3. For the text of the Churchill–Pleven communiqué, issued at Paris, Dec. 19, 1951, see the New York Times, Dec. 19, 1951, p. 24.
4. Regarding the Eden–Acheson discussion on this topic, see Document 336.
5. For a record of the discussion during and after dinner at the British Embassy on Jan. 7, see Document 339.