EUR files, lot 59 D 233, “Chiefs of Mission Conference—1953”

No. 306
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State 1

top secret

Subject:

  • Report of Chief of Missions Meetings in Luxembourg and Vienna2

A meeting of Chiefs of Mission to countries in the Coal and Steel Community was held at Luxembourg on September 18–19. Mr. Bruce, and Ambassadors Hughes, Aldrich and Bohlen also attended. The main topic of discussion was the EDC. This discussion is summarized in the telegram attached as Tab A.3 Psychological warfare was also covered in considerable detail. A memorandum of the discussion and recommendations is attached as Tab B. A telegram summarizing the discussion and recommendations regarding United States foreign trade policy is attached as Tab C.4

After Luxembourg, I went to Vienna and held a meeting on September 22–24 with our Chiefs of Mission in Eastern Europe. Dr. Conant, Cecil Lyon from Berlin, and Ambassador Thompson were also present. The principal conclusions of this meeting are attached as Tab D.

[Page 678]

Summary minutes of both meetings, including the country-by-country reports, will be available in a day or two if you or General Smith would like to glance through them.5

I am also attaching a Memorandum to the President for your signature (Tab E), transmitting the paper on psychological warfare and the principal conclusions of the Vienna meeting, in case you think he would be interested in seeing them.

I believe both meetings were very useful for everyone who attended. I myself returned encouraged with the progress in achievement of our policies in Europe, optimistic over the prospects for early ratification of the EDC and impressed by the high quality and effectiveness of all of our Chiefs of Mission.

[Tab B]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State 6

top secret

Concept and Ideas for Psychological Warfare in Europe Developed by the Chief of Mission Meeting at Luxemburg on September 18–19, 1953

i. basic considerations

A.
Psychological or political warfare is the reflection of policy and political objectives. It can be a useful handmaiden to attain and support such objectives. Actions are the best propaganda, for Washington is under a world microscope and everything we do or say is subjected to close analysis and world press coverage. Our position in the world is therefore based on what we do rather than what we say about ourselves.
B.
Western European countries have developed a high degree of immunity to propaganda from whatever source. United States information programs should be as quiet and subtle as possible and the United States label should generally not be omnipresent.
C.
Our psychological warfare effort should never be allowed to run ahead of carefully considered political objectives as there is always the danger if this is allowed to happen that psychological warfare can start to make policy rather than serve it.
D.
Before any psychological warfare operation is undertaken it should be carefully examined to determine whether it is calculated to serve both short term and long term political objectives. Political warfare operations should be kept under day-to-day review with the view to assuring that they are in timing and purpose linked with political policy.
E.
“Propaganda begins at home”, i.e. the American domestic scene and our actions on the world scene are the basis of our psychological warfare effort abroad. Our country is open for the world to observe. The best persons to present our case abroad to their respective countries of origin are those who visit us and observe our institutions and our national character. The Cultural Exchange Program should be increased and visa procedures liberalised in order particularly to permit intellectuals and publicists to visit the United States and to return and inform their own people what they have observed.
F.
President Eisenhower’s world prestige is enormous and his April 16 speech as a basic statement of American policy was carried in all newspapers of any consequence throughout the world. His address had a reassuring and salutary effect. The President’s great prestige should be availed of in carefully considered pronouncements on American foreign policy objectives.

ii. western europe

A.
Western European countries are generally distrustful of what they consider to be American policy objectives vis-à-vis Eastern Europe. Pronouncements by important Americans officials about the “liberation” of Eastern Europe causes fear and anxiety in Western European capitals. It is generally believed that American impatience and implacable hostility to Communism might result in hasty and ill-considered action and… might set up a chain reaction leading to military conflict, which Western Europe desires to avoid under almost any circumstances.
B.
How hot should be the cold war? Western Europeans will go along with keeping the Eastern European pot lukewarm or even simmering but they fear that American political warfare is inclined to keep the pot at a constant boiling point.
C.
The United States should coordinate its psychological warfare operations (i.e. its policies) more closely with its Western European allies both to reassure them and to insure their support and participation. American unilateralism in this field is dangerous and [Page 680] serves devisive forces within the Western alliance, which in turn serves the Kremlin’s objective to break the Western Alliance. (The East Berlin riots of June 17 and American psychological warfare operations related thereto caused serious difficulties with our principal allies who also have responsibilities and vital interests involved. It would have been better to have consulted with them with a view to enlisting their support and cooperation.) Our psychological operations at times serve to increase fears on the part of our allies that we were prepared to break in the windows; to bring the pot to a boiling-over condition, the grave consequences of which we have perhaps not weighed and carefully considered.7

. . . . . . .

iii. eastern europe

A.
Our psychological warfare operations directed against Eastern Europe should never be allowed to run ahead of our political and military policies. One basic long term objective of American policy is to work toward the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from the eastern zone of Germany and from the Eastern European satellites.…
B.
The Russians will probably eventually consider it in their interests to withdraw their military forces from Eastern Europe satellites. There is little we can do by political warfare operations to advance the date of such withdrawal. Stirring up resistance elements or incitements to revolt might have the long range effect of retarding a Soviet military withdrawal. Our operations in this field should be very carefully studied with the view to insuring that they forward rather than retard this objective.
C.

The spirit of resistance in Eastern Europe will not die out. Our psychological warfare effort should be tailored to assist in keeping this spirit in existence but should never incite to rebellion or revolts which could only have the effect of destroying the healthiest and best resistance elements within the satellite countries. Psychological warfare plans and programs should be constantly checked for their efficacy and desirability by the American diplomatic missions within the target countries.

. . . . . . .

F.
Our information and propaganda output should cease referring to the Russian “peace offensive”. Even if this phrase is used [Page 681] within quotation marks, these quotation marks have a tendency to disappear. The end result tends to be that the Kremlin is identified in many minds somehow with peace. The obverse of this coin is that the West not being identified with peace is somehow identified with war, an important Soviet objective.
G.
We have apparently given the impression that we are afraid to sit down and meet with the Russians. Actually, the principal meetings between the Russians and the Western allies have resulted in propaganda victories for our side and we should abandon any general reluctance to confer and exploit our position where strong, as is the case regarding Germany. The view was expressed that the Kremlin does not want such a meeting which would certainly bring out further for the world to see Russia’s inflexibility and its disinclination to abate world tension, except on the Kremlin’s terms.

iv. “resistance”

Resistance elements, historically, have proved effective only on the eve of liberation by military force, i.e. the F.F.I. in France just before and after the Normandy landings. During the occupation of France thousands of persons who attempted active resistance were shot, deported or imprisoned. The resistance elements who survived were the quiet organizers and the pamphleteers.

. . . . . . .

[Tab D]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State 8

top secret

Principal Conclusions

Chief of Mission Meeting in Vienna

September 22–24, 1953

The following conclusions and estimates were arrived at in the full realization of the dangers of attempting to predict future developments, particularly where the Soviet Union is concerned:

(1)
There has been no change in the essential character and structure of the Soviet system, but there have been possibly far-reaching changes in the USSR and its satellites (except Poland) in economic policies, and some relaxation of pressures on the individual. [Page 682] There is evident no willingness to concede on important points to achieve a negotiated settlement with the free world; but there are signs that some easing of international tensions is sought by the Soviet leaders for domestic reasons if such a relaxation can be achieved at the cost of only minor concessions. The Soviet rulers are dismantling the Stalin one-man despotism and reestablishing the supreme role of the Communist Party. They appear to be moving in the direction of a Leninist-style dictatorship.
(2)
The United States should maintain existing policies of building its defensive strength, maintaining cohesion with its allies, and refusing to compromise on principles. We should push ahead on EDC and should cast aside any fear of negotiating with the USSR. In fact we should recognize our own strength and seek opportunities for conference when it will serve our aims.
(3)
Long-term Soviet policy regarding Germany is possibly uncertain or undecided, but for the immediate future the USSR is giving full support to its puppets in East Germany, making unification impossible and attendance at a conference embarrassing to them. They will probably refuse to come to Lugano, but will stall in the reply to our note in an attempt to cause confusion.
(4)
Berlin is the outstanding danger point, where a chain reaction leading unintentionally to conflict could arise at any time. It is also a showcase for the West behind the Iron Curtain, and as long as it continues to be a western island the Soviets will probably not be able to completely satellitize Eastern Germany.
(5)
Apart from Eastern Germany, there has been little evidence of incipient revolt or active unrest in the satellites. The idea of freedom and hope of ultimate liberation remains, but the hold of the police and presence of the Red Army make revolt at present an impossibility.
(6)
We should avoid actions which might incite revolt under existing conditions behind the Iron Curtain and enable the Soviet and satellite leaders to deflect on us the blame for their own crimes and errors. The pressure of events and the shortcomings of the Communist system will contribute to the disintegration of the Soviet Empire more inexorably than we can through psychological warfare activities which are essentially uncontrollable and whose results may too often prove the opposite to those intended.
(7)
An upset of the regime in Albania, even if it were so rapid as to forestall Soviet reaction, would, under existing relationships in the area, clearly complicate the situation in the Adriatic, even though a turnover would be a permanent loss to Soviet prestige. However, we should be alert to find suitable opportunities to discuss Albania with our allies and Yugoslavia.
(8)
The return of Yugoslavia to the Soviet orbit is highly unlikely. The recent normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav relations is rather an indication that USSR recognizes that Yugoslavia is irretrievably in the other camp.
(9)
The events of June 16–17 in East Berlin confirmed as a fact the bankruptcy of the puppet regimes. The Red Army action revealed the impossibility of a successful revolt in a satellite as long as the Soviet Army is present and reliable.
(10)
It is necessary to clarify US policy more precisely with respect to the individual satellite countries. We tend to fall into the error of treating them all alike.
(11)
Opinion was divided regarding the advisability of renewing relations with Bulgaria, but it was agreed that the timing of such an action was important in order to avoid a misunderstanding regarding its significance.
(12)
The new policy on East-West trade (NSC 152/29) was generally approved.
(13)
It is impossible to predict the ultimate result of developments within the Soviet orbit, but the general trend seems favorable to the interests of the free world.

[Tab E]

Draft Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President 10

top secret

Subject: Conclusions of United States Chiefs of Mission Regarding Psychological Warfare and Eastern Europe

Assistant Secretary Merchant met in Luxembourg on September 18–19, 1953, with our Chiefs of Mission to the countries in the Coal and Steel Community, as well as David Bruce, and Ambassadors Hughes, Aldrich and Bohlen. I think you will be interested in the attached summary of the discussion and recommendations of this group regarding psychological warfare.

Mr. Merchant then met in Vienna on September 22–24 with our Chiefs of Mission in Eastern Europe, well as Dr. Conant and Ambassador Thompson. I think the attached conclusions of this meeting will also be of interest.

The discussion at the Vienna meeting throws some interesting light on conditions behind the Iron Curtain as observed by our own [Page 684] people. Some of the conclusions likewise have a direct bearing on our conduct of psychological warfare.

  1. Drafted by Millar. None of the documents described as tabs in this memorandum was found attached to the source text, except for the draft memorandum to the President (Tab E); copies of the documents listed as Tabs B and D are in file 611.00/10–853.
  2. Documentation concerning the preparations for these meetings and the drafting of background papers is in EUR files, lot 59 D 233, “Chiefs of Mission Conference—1953”.
  3. Tab A is telegram Colux 3 from Luxembourg, Sept. 20; for text, see vol. v, Part 1, p. 808.
  4. Tab C is telegram Colux 4 from Luxembourg, Sept. 19, not printed. (850.33/9–1953)
  5. A 10-page record of the Chiefs of Mission meeting in Luxembourg, Sept. 18–19, is in EUR files, lot 59 D 233, “Chiefs of Mission Conference—1953”, and PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Regional Conferences”; 19 pages of summary minutes of the Chiefs of Mission meeting in Vienna, Sept. 22–24, are in EUR files, lot 59 D 233, “Chiefs of Mission Conference—1953”, and PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Regional Conferences”.
  6. The drafter of this memorandum is not identified, but presumably it was drafted in the Bureau of European Affairs. On Sept. 8, Thurston sent Merchant a memorandum describing various objectives for psychological warfare as background for the proposed discussion of this subject at the Vienna Chiefs of Mission meeting; a copy of Thurston’s memorandum is in file 120.1463/9–853.
  7. In the margin of the source text next to this paragraph was the following handwritten note, presumably made by C.D. Jackson: “Not true—not even the Germans knew this was coming.”
  8. The drafter of this memorandum is not identified, but presumably it was drafted in the Bureau of European Affairs.
  9. For text of NSC 152/2, see vol. i, Part 2, p. 1009.
  10. A copy of this memorandum, signed by the Secretary of State and dated Oct. 8, is in file 611.00/10–853.