No. 274
Editorial Note

The National Security Council discussed mutual security policies at its 137th meeting on March 18. President Eisenhower had already indicated, at the NSC meeting on February 11, his determination to make formidable reductions in national security spending and “to figure out a preparedness program that will give us a respectable position without bankrupting the nation”. Eisenhower had received strong support from Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, but Stassen had “pointed out the capacity of the American economy to expand and to meet the obligations imposed upon it”. Stassen briefed the NSC on March 18 on the proposed cuts in the Mutual Security program and “his conclusion as to the effect of the proposed cut was extremely gloomy. He felt that a cut of these proportions might well, for example, spell the end of the French effort to save Indo-China and might also result in French refusal to ratify the EDC treaties. Similar grim repercussions could be anticipated in other crucial areas of the free world.”

On March 31 the National Security Council met with a group of civilian consultants to assess once again basic national security policies. At this time, Stassen “stated his belief that we could accomplish our objectives with respect to assisting our allies in the context of the new United States policy that seemed to be evolving.” Stassen further stated “that he felt that the forthcoming program [Page 535] should have the following new emphases: (1) on modern weapons; (2) on sound economies, both for ourselves and for other nations; (3) private capital; (4) increased international trade. Governor Stassen felt that in the future our programs should involve lessened expenditure of funds but a longer period of commitment for U.S. assistance”. If such an emphasis was to be followed in the Mutual Security programs “Governor Stassen believed that we could taper off and cut back on the NATO force goals”. Stassen added that it would be impossible to lead other nations down the road the United States wished to follow if the United States was unwilling to put its own economy in order. A more stable economy and a drastic diminution of inflationary pressures were mandatory prerequisites to a program in which “we could subtract $1.5 billion in expenditures for the FY 1954 budget, and subtract $1 billion from the appropriations figure for FY 1954.” For memoranda of discussion of the meetings of Feb. 11 and Mar. 31, see vol. II, Part 1, pp. 236 and 264; for a memorandum of discussion of the meeting of Mar. 18, see vol. I, Part 1, p. 592.