Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 363
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)1
Subject:
- The Handling of Mendes-France at London
The 9-Power Conference at London must succeed. The degree of success will be determined largely by the extent to which firm agreement can be reached on a wide variety of fairly detailed arrangements and by the absence of agreements on “broad principles” and on formulas which do not represent true meetings of minds and which would open up possibilities of disagreements among the experts in their work following the conference.
The elements of difficulty, including the lack of detailed preparatory work, are obvious. There are, however, the following encouragingly positive factors: the British willingness to participate in continental arrangements to a greater extent than previously; the generally reasonable German position; and the fact that, in his talks with Eden and his subsequent acceptance of the terms of reference of the conference, Mendes-France has come a remarkably long way toward meeting the ideas of the other members of the Atlantic Alliance.
We must recognize that Mendes-France is in a difficult parliamentary position. Not the least of his difficulties in this respect is the necessity of getting the votes of the MRP and other pro-EDC deputies. The principal task in dealing with him will be to hold him firmly to his commitments and to prevent him from introducing into the agreements factors which can be exploited to produce delays in the subsequent meetings of the experts and in the final accomplishment of our objectives.
We have, since the EDC vote of the Assembly, sought to chasten and to educate Mendes-France and the French by mild shock treatment. Though he contributed to and exaggerated it, the fact is Mendes-France was in a position of relative isolation at Brussels. That he exploited this isolation for political purposes in the EDC debate does not remove the basic fact that he is keenly aware of what he feels is general—and, particularly, an American—distrust in him. There is considerable doubt as to the efficacy of relying exclusively upon the use of the stick in dealing with Mendes-France. We must at London use [Page 1262] the carrot also and encourage and fully recognize the positive constructive action which, despite his difficult parliamentary position, he has already taken since Brussels and which we hope he will take at London.
Fortunately, we appear to be to some extent in a position to arbitrate between Mendes and the British with respect to their apparently conflicting desires as to which powers go to NATO and which to the Brussels Treaty—subject, of course, to our conviction that there should be no derogation of the military powers of NATO and that, in fact, certain strengthening of those powers is desirable. We can afford, in other words, to side with Mendes on certain issues.
The principal source of our concern and reservations about Mendes-France has been his ambivalent attitude toward the USSR which appears to stem from a different appraisal of the nature, extent and imminence of the Soviet threat. Fortunately, this issue will not arise per se at London. A firm agreement at London will, in fact, limit his capacity to make mischief in this respect.
Our conviction that Mendes-France must receive sympathetic treatment at London rests on two judgments. First, his full cooperation is a requisite to the success of the conference. Secondly, by giving him support at London we will assist him in his task of selling the agreement to the National Assembly. To the extent that we have administered slaps to Mendes, we have, as a corollary, encouraged certain pro-EDC elements hostile to Mendes to seek his downfall. Solidarity at London will render more difficult for the deputies in question a decision to vote against a 9–Power agreement and the subsequent NATO Council endorsement thereof.
Recommendation
While holding Mendes firmly to the road he has committed himself to follow, we should take all appropriate occasions to encourage him by showing sympathetic consideration for his problems and giving him positive support when he seeks arrangements not contrary to our interests. We should also assure him that we will do all we appropriately can to help him in his difficult task of selling to the National Assembly the package agreed upon at London.
- Drafted by West. According to a cover sheet attached to the source text, this memorandum was circulated as NPT Memo 21 to officers engaged in the forthcoming Nine-Power Conference.↩