Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, “Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower”
Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower
secret
[London, September 17, 1954.]
My Dear Friend: Thank you very much for your message of September 15.1 I am glad I was a good reporter. I made my living as a journalist. I believe you have them in your country too.
- 2.
- Foster lunched with me and Anthony today and we had an agreeable and helpful talk. As you know, E.D.C. was very different from the grand alliance theme I opened at Strasbourg in August, 1950. I disliked on military grounds the Pleven European army plan which began with mixing races in companies if not platoons. At that time when I saw you in Paris I was talking of it as “sludgy amalgam”. However, when I came to power again I swallowed my prejudices because I was led to believe that it was the only way in which the French could be persuaded to accept the limited German army which was my desire. I do not blame the French for rejecting E.D.C. but only for inventing it. Their harshness to Adenauer in wasting three years of his life and much of his power is a tragedy. Also I accepted the American wish to show all possible patience and not to compromise the chances of E.D.C. by running N.A.T.O. as a confusing rival.
- 3.
- All this time I kept one aim above all others in view, namely a German contribution to the defence of an already uniting Europe. This, I felt, was your aim too, and I am sure we both liked the plan better when the intermingling was excluded from all units lower than a division. But it was to get a German army looking eastward in the line with us that commanded my thought, and also I felt yours, with all its military authority. Although the French have rejected E.D.C. I do hope and pray that you and I will still keep the German contribution as our No. 1 target and also to get them on our side instead of on the other.
- 4.
- When Anthony recently proposed taking the Brussels Treaty of 1948 turned upside down, as a model for preserving the cause of European unity, coupled with a variant of N.A.T.O. to include Germany, I thought it was a first rate plan. I hope earnestly that it will commend itself to you. It may lead on as time passes to United Europe and also gain for us both what we have tried for so hard, namely, the German comradeship. Now Foster tells me that there is a widespread feeling in America that it has not got any, or at least enough, “supra-national” characteristics. I hope this will not prevent you giving it all the help you can. European federation may grow but it cannot be built. It must be a volunteer not a conscript.
- 5.
- After all if the realities can be achieved and if Gruenther can form a front including French and German armies by whose side we and you stand, we need not worry too much about the particular theories which are favoured or rebuffed. Above all, we should not lose more time when what we have worked so long and hard to win may now be within our grasp.
- 6.
- I have been distressed to hear talk (not from Foster) about the withdrawal of American forces from Europe and even that a German contingent might fill the gap. If the U.S. loses or seems to lose its interest in Europe there might well be a landslide into Communism or into a kow-towing to Soviet influence and infiltration which would reduce the continent to satellite status. I really do not see how we British could stay there by ourselves.
- 7.
- Forgive me burdening you with all this, but I feel it a great comfort when I am sure our thoughts are marching along the same roads. You may imagine how pleased I was by your applying the word “perfect” to my message to Adenauer.
Kindest regards,
Winston