Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

740.5/9–1354: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

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Bonn, September 13, 1954—11 p.m.

755. Limit distribution. Murphy and I had long conversation with Chancellor this afternoon and will see him again tomorrow morning before Murphy departs for Belgrade.¹ Chancellor gave us report of his talks with Eden, re which he appeared completely satisfied, but throughout discussion ran thread of his concern re French attitude.² Murphy began by saying that Department had naturally been giving much thought to German question, but that Secretary had not wished to take final position until he had received Chancellor’s views.

Adenauer replied by reiterating concern re Mendes-France’s motives which he had expressed to me so often in past. He then turned to his talks with Eden, and asked Hallstein to give summary of position in which he and Eden had reached agreement in principle.

Hallstein thereupon gave lengthy exposé, in which Chancellor joined from time to time, pointing out two main aspects of problem were restoration of sovereignty and German defense contribution.

Re sovereignty, he said British agreed with German viewpoint that problem could be settled by simple declaration by each of three occupying powers to effect that occupation status had been ended. Hallstein seemed at first to be arguing that no specific reservation re Berlin and German reunification would be needed in such declaration, but in course of discussion admitted that appropriate language to maintain Western powers’ position on these questions vis-à-vis Soviets might be included in declaration. He said it was further agreed status of forces convention would be required along lines of NATO model, but appropriately modified to take account of special situation of troops in Germany, i.e., special facilities arising from stationing in NATO forward area, financing of support costs, etc. It was recognized that negotiation of this convention would take time, and would come into force only with formal German entry into NATO (see below), hence Germans were prepared to accept commitment that in meantime and until Germany membership NATO finalized, allied troops should continue to enjoy rights and privileges presently available to them, as, for example, requisitioned housing. He went on to say that Germans felt declaration and forces convention, taken together, would cover substance of Bonn conventions which had not already been overtaken by events, such as decartelization, restitution, etc., but implied that Germans were prepared to be reasonable re allied desires and insisted that negotiation of this new convention would not be difficult.

Turning then to problem of German rearmament, he said there was agreement on German entry into NATO with self-imposed “safeguards” on nature and character of German rearmament which would reassure Germany’s neighbors and at same time preserve as much as possible of EDC. This would mean that Germany would enter NATO with the contingents envisaged under EDC, and would undertake not to change this contribution without the consent of SACEUR, this control being exercised in fact by NATO Council through annual review procedure. (He was explicit that there could be no French veto over initial raising and equipment of German contingents.) As to future questions, he seemed to set great store on power of SACEUR and assumed he would always be an American. He went on to say that Germans were likewise prepared to accept a liberalized version of EDC restrictions on armament production, which would not be discriminatory under “strategic area” concept.

It was also envisaged, Hallstein continued, that mutual guarantee as contained in EDC Treaty would be preserved. On assumption US would not, for constitutional reasons, be party to such guarantee, it could be achieved for six EDC countries and UK by special treaty within NATO framework.

Turning then to time-table, Hallstein said British had insisted on nine-power conference. Germans had given in, and agreed therefore that this meeting should be proposed for end of next week, with NATO meeting to follow in early October. In this connection, he argued that restoration of sovereignty and first practical steps towards rearmament could not await formal approval of German entry into NATO by all Parliaments concerned, as this ratification process would probably take twelve months. Therefore, it was agreed that steps for restoration of sovereignty should be taken immediately after agreement in principle had been reached by NATO conference, and that at this same meeting agreement should be concluded for early commencement on first essential steps of German rearmament such as infrastructure construction, training of cadres both in Germany and abroad, etc.

In conclusion, Hallstein emphasized need for information as given above to be held most closely until Eden had been able to present to Mendes-France proposals which had been agreed in principle by UK and five EDC powers. He said Benelux and Foreign Ministers had already accepted NATO solution as outlined above, and that Chancellor anticipated Eden would have no difficulty in obtaining Italian concurrence.

Murphy thanked Chancellor for opportunity for discussion, which he said would be most helpful to Secretary. Adenauer then said there were three points which he wished to make. First, acceptance of a NATO solution did not mean that he was giving up on European integration. French rejection of a European Army meant that this concept must be postponed but he would be prepared, and indeed would strive, to merge the German contingents under NATO into a European Army at the earliest opportunity. Secondly, he said Eden had told him of Francois-Poncet’s query re Saar this morning (see my 754³). He had thereupon assured Eden that he remained prepared to settle Saar problem on European basis as agreed with Teitgen. He continued to feel that European integration achieved to date, notably CSC, must be preserved and that further steps, including political community and ultimately European Army must be pursued without pause. Thirdly, he wished to emphasize again his concern re French attitude. He felt, he said, it would be important for French to realize that US was “in earnest” as concerns our recent statements of policy. Discussions will be continued with Hallstein and Blankenhorn tonight after dinner. It was evident from conversation that Anglo-German discussions had not gone into great detail on many of points enumerated above, and Murphy and I plan to question Hallstein more closely on German thinking re obvious difficulties in solution of these problems. Moreover, Chancellor’s reiterated concern regarding French attitude raises question whether he really expects French to accept NATO solution, and we shall therefore endeavor to develop further information on this point.

Conant

1. In telegram 684 from Bonn, Sept. 4, repeated to Manila as telegram Tedul 9, Conant recommended that Dulles consider returning from the Manila Conference by way of Bonn because Adenauer was disturbed by his feeling that he was isolated from the source of U.S. foreign policy (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 350). The Department of State replied that neither Dulles nor Merchant would be able to travel to Europe in the near future but that Murphy was on his way to Europe primarily in connection with the Trieste negotiations. Since the Department did not want this reason revealed, Murphy would visit Bonn and elsewhere as a cover; the press would be informed that his trip was planned to discuss problems arising from nonratification of the EDC (telegram 672 to Bonn, Sept. 8; 662A.00/9–354). For a summary of his meeting with Mendès-France, see telegram 1254 from Paris, Sept. 24, p. 1256; documentation concerning Murphy’s role in the Trieste negotiations is presented in volume viii.
2. For a summary of the Eden–Adenauer meeting provided by the British Foreign Office, see telegram 1309 from London, Sept. 14, p. 1188.
3. Not printed; it summarized Conant’s conversation with Eden during which Eden expressed how disturbed he was that François-Poncet should raise the Saar issue as a serious obstacle to any action by the French Assembly on alternatives for the EDC (740.5/9–1354).