Conference files, lot 59 D 05, CF 158

McBride Minutes1
ST MIN–1 (Draft)

[Here follows a list of subjects discussed by the Foreign Ministers.2]

Secretary Dulles asked if there were any suggestions as to procedure. Lord Salisbury suggested that the Secretary speak first, followed by Mr. Bidault and himself. Secretary Dulles stated:

Soviet Problems and Policies

The first of the topics which we may discuss relates to Soviet policy, the situation in the satellite countries and the related problem of Germany and European unity. This subject is dramatized by the official revelation regarding Beria.3 This event and the Pravda editorial dealing with it are reminiscent of the purges of 1936 and 1937. Some of the language of the Pravda editorial repeats almost verbatim Stalin’s report on the purges.

The accusation that the leaders to be purged were the spies and agents of foreign capitalists may be again, as it was then, the forerunner of a more nationalist, aggressive policy. The report of Stalin which I mentioned was made to the Eighteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party of March 10, 1939 that shortly preceded the Non-aggression Pact with Hitler, the seizure of the Baltic States, and the move to divide the world with Germany and Japan, a plan which collapsed with the Hitler attack of 1941. It is difficult to see how anti-foreign charges such as were leveled at Trotsky and Bukharin, and now are leveled at Beria, can be reconciled with policies which we identify with the “peace offensive.” If the past is a guide to the present, we may have to anticipate some hardening, rather than a general softening, of Soviet policies. On the other hand, we should not count upon [Page 1610] the future being a precise repetition of the events of fifteen years ago. For one thing, there does not appear to be any personality comparable to Stalin to carry on. Also, there is some reason to surmise that Beria and the police forces he controlled could not have been successfully challenged unless the challengers felt confident of the support of the army. This may presage greater influence of the army in political affairs. This, in turn, might mean a greater emphasis upon Russia as a national state and less emphasis upon Communism as a world revolutionary movement.

It would doubtless be premature today to attempt to arrive at any conclusions. What we can say is that the policies which the free world has been pursuing have stood up and proved their worth, whereas the Soviet policies of the same period seem to have ended in failure, a failure which is admitted and most conspicuously dramatized by the Beria affair. But this affair I feel was, in turn, caused by the growing unrest in the Eastern European areas controlled by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has been unable to consolidate its position in these areas. That has been primarily due to the inherent patriotism and religion of the captive peoples. It has been in part due to the fact that the captive peoples have been impressed by the growing vigor and solidarity and military and economic power in Western Europe. These act as a magnet. Also the constant propaganda, which primarily through radio, has been carried to the captive peoples, has undoubtedly been an important element in keeping alive their hopes and their aspirations. We have asked Ambassador Bohlen, who had given us advance advice re Beria, to return and we hope he will be here tomorrow.

If there is any one lesson to be learned from the events of recent weeks, it is that we should not abandon the basic policies which have served so well. We should pursue, and pursue with increased vigor, the policies represented by NATO, EDC, the OEEC and our efforts to unify Germany and to free Austria from occupation. We should also, I suggest, adhere strongly in all that we say, keep alive the hope of captive peoples and not accept Soviet domination of the Eastern European nations as a permanent fact. Of course, we should not, indeed we have not, sought to promote any open rebellion which would lead to massacre. We have kept hope alive and we should continue to seek to keep alive the love of God, the love of country, and respect for personal dignity which are incompatible with Soviet Communism. I feel confident that by passive action perhaps even more than by affirmative action on the part of the captive peoples the Soviet rulers will be taught that they are over-extended and that they must grant genuine independence to the historic countries of Eastern Europe.

Already the developments in the satellite areas give a large measure of assurance to Western Europe. It seems that there is today less risk than ever of an armed invasion of Western Europe because it is now [Page 1611] apparent to the leaders of Russia that any such invasion would involve long lines of communication in territory that was hostile. We are now getting dividends from our policies.

I note this point not to suggest that we can now relax. We have proved our policies are right. We should press with renewed vigor the past policies which by strengthening it must have as an important by-product prevented such a consolidation of the Soviet bloc as would make further aggression seem to be a tempting adventure.

M. Bidault said that he had nothing to contradict what Secretary Dulles had said regarding the correctness of the policies which we have pursued and the dividends which they are paying. He noted that these were the agreed policies of the free world and of the NATO countries, but cautioned that we had not made important gains in the military field as yet. We must continue to assume that there existed the greatest danger, though we must not be immobilized by fear. He added that even if we overcome our fear, however, we should not think that the danger was any the less.

He said it was coincidental that we should meet today when such important events in the Soviet Union had just been announced. Some months ago we covered somewhat the same ground, and Foreign Minister Bidault noted that at that time he had said little change in Soviet policy was to be expected since all of their leaders had had 37 years of Soviet training, adding that perhaps he had been somewhat dogmatic. The Beria case was not the first purge, however, nor the first time an important Soviet leader had fallen from grace, but it was the first time events had moved so fast, and already in the six months since Stalin’s death fissures had begun to appear in the Soviet monolith. Nevertheless there was no substantial change in Soviet policy though a few prisoners had been released and a few wives of foreigners had been permitted to leave Russia. It is possible the Soviet structure might crumble but we cannot really predict this.

Mr. Bidault said we were all glad Ambassador Bohlen was returning to the United States, and noted that the French had the same warnings which we had received regarding Beria’s absence from recent important events. Even rumors, which were not usually present in the Soviet Union, had been heard about this, and there had been other echoes and echoes of echoes from various diplomatic sources.

The Foreign Minister said that Soviet policy followed many twists and turns. He noted that it had toughened between the Mayer talks in March and the NATO meeting in Paris.4 He said that Soviet responses had been negative to the appeals of President Eisenhower and Sir Winston Churchill, though the tone had been polite for the first [Page 1612] time. He said the month of June had been characterized by an accentuation of good manners on the part of the Soviet. He said he felt the relatively moderate tone which the Soviet Union had taken and certain other steps were due to internal and public opinion problems.

Mr. Bidault said he didn’t know whether the recent events in Russia meant an increase in the army’s role or not. He said we have no proof of this kind, though previous experiences, such as with the Vichy Government, did not appear particularly happy precedents for having the Army take over. He thought Beria had reached the point where he could no longer trust his own appointees, and that his downfall might be partly due to a revenge by the Communist Party. He said that, insofar as could be ascertained, there had been some enthusiasm in Russia for the new policy of moderation but that the more extreme elements felt things had gone too far so brakes must be applied. He said that while we can neither set aside nor confirm speculation regarding the army’s role, neither can we entirely ignore the part public opinion plays.

He reiterated that changes were occurring at an unprecedented rhythm for a Communist state, and predicted we would see more purges. He agreed with Secretary Dulles that we might expect a harder policy from the Russians, and indicated that because of the speed of developments we must work together to take the best advantage of opportunities created and constantly keep our Soviet policy under revision.

Lord Salisbury opened his remarks by agreeing with Secretary Dulles in his assessment of the new Soviet developments and said that this was the biggest of many big question marks. He said that many important changes had occurred in the Soviet Union since Stalin’s death—both internal and external. The internal were less spectacular but may prove to be more important. He characterized these changes as giving greater incentive to the people and lessening repression. He said a policy of this type once started was hard to reverse, and noted that the same policy shift had occurred in the satellites. The immediate result had been an evolution of feeling, later leading to disturbances in East Germany. Even after the revolt, the milder policy had been continued, presumably with an eye on the German elections and 4-power talks. He said that in the Soviet Union it was impossible to tell where ultimate authority might eventually lie. In any event, he thought the Soviets might be weakened by the results.

It was too soon to know why Beria had been arrested, but the bad results of the milder policy might have been responsible, or domestic considerations, or both. Anyway we know this is an important development but it should not, as Secretary Dulles had already pointed out, [Page 1613] cause us to alter our policies. On the contrary we should take advantage of changes in the Soviet Union, and our policy should continue to be flexible.

When the British Prime Minister on May 11 had discussed the 4-power talks, his purpose had been to make contact with the new Soviet leaders whose aims were unknown to us.5 He thought this contact would help us to know what is happening in the Soviet Union. However, events since May had caused delays, bringing us near the point of German elections; therefore it was agreed that immediate 4-power talks would provoke uncertainty in Germany which might impair Adenauer’s chances. Lord Salisbury repeated that Great Britain was firmly attached to such talks after the German elections. However, as of today the UK was not pressing for talks on Germany, particularly since the Beria incident and the increasing uncertainty of the whole situation.

Lord Salisbury urged that in the communiqué which might follow this conference, we should reaffirm the desirability of holding 4-power talks at the right time as a policy objective. He said this point was of basic importance in Europe. He proposed that the communiqué also announce a higher-level 3-power meeting in about three months to study the post-election situation in Germany, and to see if we should not make firmer plans at that time for an announcement of a 4-power meeting. He thought an announcement at this time along these lines would prevent a feeling of frustration in Europe, and retain the initiative for the Western powers.

He agreed with Secretary Dulles that we of course desired to have freedom for the states of Eastern Europe, and that we should keep alive the hopes of the captive peoples but not stir up a revolt which would lead to a massacre. Above all, he concluded, we must continue to build up the material strength of the West so that we can negotiate from strength not weakness. Faltering would undo all, while on the other hand the growing strength of the West has already helped to change Soviet policy.

Four-Power Talks

Lord Salisbury summed up the British proposal as (1) an announcement that 4-power talks would be held when practicable, and were accepted in principle, (2) we should announce a high-level 3-power meeting for early autumn to firm up our policy on this point, and (3) continue to strengthen the defense of the West as much as possible.

M. Bidault, in commenting on Lord Salisbury’s proposals, said that he had nothing definite to say at this time since he must consider and reflect on these suggestions. He recalled that the 4-power talks had [Page 1614] originally been proposed in the House of Commons by the British Prime Minister, and that the French Government crisis had delayed France’s taking a definite position. He recalled that in April he had proposed that we should suggest disarmament talks with the Soviet first, not because this was an easier problem to solve, but because it was the key one. He felt that this would be an effective blow to Communist propaganda. He admitted that an arrangement on Germany had also always been a key to an agreement on other problems, and noted that German neutralization was an idea which had certain popular appeal in Germany and France, though it was rejected by the French Government. He said the German problem was the most difficult of all but that the situation was now such that unfortunately we must now tackle it first because of the events of the past few months. He said that public opinion felt that a détente was possible because of events that were occurring in the Soviet Union, and therefore would not accept a passive approach to the Soviet problem, but would want 4-power talks. He said there was a childish feeling that an agreement could always be reached around a table.

Mr. Bidault said that, if there were not the problem of public opinion, i.e., if we were still in the days of Metternich, we might be able to wait until later to have discussions with the Soviet Union, and that such a delay might be advantageous to the West. However, because of the strong pressures in Western Europe for having these talks and because it was difficult to continue with rearmament of the West until after all possibilities had been exhausted in this field, we should hold talks with the Russians.

However, Mr. Bidault pointed out that the following dangers existed in going ahead on this line: it would crystallize the Soviet position and perhaps force them to take a harder line; the European press and public opinion would expect an agreement on Germany and the Russians would presumably propose neutralization; and finally an abyss existed between the September 23, 1952 declaration6 of the three Western Powers and the Russian position, as well as between Adenauer’s five points and the Russian view. However, in spite of those disadvantages, the psychological attraction is so strong that it would be desirable to have the talks. The political-military integration of Germany into the West will not be accepted until the Soviets are faced squarely across the table and it is evident that a solution cannot be reached by negotiation. He noted that the problem of the German frontiers on the east and the Saar on the West remained, and that France had both a solution of the Saar question and the Indochina problem on her hands. He thought [Page 1615] that substantial progress on all of these problems was required before EDC ratification could occur. He stressed that he is strongly for the EDC, and that the project is not buried even though the recent action of the Socialist Party Congress had not been favorable. Therefore, it is not believed there will be a European army before the date is fixed for 4-power talks.

Mr. Bidault said that the new French Government remained firmly committed to European integration. He added there remained considerable skepticism as to whether 4-power talks will settle the German problem, but added that no French Government could successfully oppose the talks. He said that this does not mean any decline in French sympathy for EDC, but rather that the talks were essential to prove to the French people that they must accept the EDC. He said the new Soviet policy worked both ways, and caused difficulties in the West as well as in the East, the public opinion demand for 4-power talks being one of the results in the West.

Mr. Bidault thought we could not determine now the time when 4-power talks should be held, but that as a first step the three powers should establish an agenda, and propose to the Soviets a conference of fixed duration to cover only questions that were “susceptible of settlement,” as outlined in the September 1952 note, which incidentally is still unanswered. He said that a second and later step should cover a German peace treaty, including of course free elections in Germany and a free German Government, as well as eventual disarmament, and freedom in the satellites. He said that any united Germany should of course be integrated with the West.

He said we should not leave out Austria, but noted that the Russians will not, in his opinion, ever settle the Austrian question separately. He concluded noting that Lord Salisbury’s proposal would require further reflection and that we must also discuss the question of how to keep the Germans, as well as the Brussels Pact and NATO countries, fully informed of this meeting.

Secretary Dulles said that the statements of the British and French delegates had opened the way to getting down to concrete problems which require agreement. He said that this complex of problems comprised the following: 1) an estimate of Soviet intentions; 2) our attitude toward unrest in the satellites; 3) the unification of Germany; 4) an Austrian treaty; 5) the EDC; and 6) 4-power talks, perhaps preceded by another high-level 3-power meeting. The Secretary said he would take up these problems one by one, and of course all of us reserved the right to discuss these questions further later on. He asked if there was agreement that recent developments in the Soviet Union should more than ever make us continue the policies we have pursued in the past. Lord Salisbury and Mr. Bidault agreed.

[Page 1616]

Captive Peoples

The Secretary repeated his earlier remarks that we should show the captive peoples they are not forgotten, and thus help to prevent the consolidation of the Soviet position. However, we should not promote any open disturbances. Lord Salisbury agreed that we should keep alive the hopes of these people, without fostering any open revolt. He thought that the constant restatement of our aims and continuing evidences of Western strength, plus avoiding irritating the Russians needlessly, represented the best policy to follow. Mr. Bidault said that the continuation of the propaganda campaign to the captive peoples was probably desirable even though probably only a small number of people heard our radio programs. He thought a better form of propaganda was the factual situation in the world. He noted that the Soviet softer policy had been intended for export but that within the Soviet Union the fall of Beria had resulted as an internal repercussion of this policy.

The Secretary said he could not minimize the desire of these peoples in the satellite countries for a better life and for freedom. A few weeks ago, he noted, the recent German events would have seemed impossible but people react to the frustrations of tyranny. He thought we should continue the methods which we have been using, and should utilize the tremendous potential attraction of freedom. Lord Salisbury agreed that it was encouraging that at the present time Communism did not seem to be advancing in Europe but rather that the wise policies of the West were forcing it to withdraw. Mr. Bidault agreed that it would be most unfortunate to stir up a revolt which could fail.

German Question

Secretary Dulles said we might now pass to the German question which was of first importance and bears on the 4-power talks. He said we must not go into any 4-power talks with the Soviets without an agreement on the German question, which would certainly be raised there.

Lord Salisbury said that the British Prime Minister had thought of the 4-power meeting as largely aimed at establishing contact, since the new Russian leaders were unknown to us, and we wanted to find out about them. He said it should not be a conference with a detailed agenda, to which it would be difficult to obtain agreement. He said the three powers must of course agree in advance on some basic things, and he admitted that Germany must be one of these. However it would not be a conference with everything arranged in advance, since we didn’t know what the Russian reactions would be. In closing, Lord Salisbury concurred that there could be no conference until after three-power agreement on Germany had been reached.

[Page 1617]

Secretary Dulles said that our provisional views were not wholly in accord, but we could leave this until later since Germany was one of the most important things to reach agreement on. He noted that Mr. Blankenhorn had arrived today in Washington, having been sent by Chancellor Adenauer, but stressed that he had not been invited by us.

The Secretary said we all believed we must strengthen the forces in Germany which favor European integration, and the non-nationalist elements in that country. He said Chancellor Adenauer has a difficult problem because his opponents have said that he subordinates German unification to European integration. He said the problem had been made more difficult because of the revolts, and the possibility that the Soviets might propose a united neutral and de-militarized Germany in order to keep West Germany out of the EDC. He said he would circulate a paper which we have prepared giving the general lines of what we might say and noted that the French and British delegates might also have concrete ideas.

Secretary Dulles agreed that, while we certainly could not have a 4-power conference before the German elections, it might be desirable to announce before the German elections that we would hold such a meeting. He asked whether the French would limit the 4-power meeting to the disarmament question or whether they would also discuss Germany. He noted that such a meeting should be at the Foreign Ministers level.

Mr. Bidault said that the idea of having a four-power talk on disarmament was an earlier one, and that it was no longer current since Germany was now the number one problem and accordingly the one which we could not avoid discussing at a four-power meeting. He thought now that the problem of German unification would have to be faced before any progress could be made on disarmament. Mr. Bidault was displeased by Mr. Blankenhorn’s arrival, since at the recent meeting of the Schuman Plan Foreign Ministers in Paris the six representatives had given him a message to bring to the Washington Conference. He said he was not the representative of the six countries, but he was at least their messenger. Blankenhorn’s trip therefore showed lack of confidence in him, though he thought it was a result of the election fever in Germany. He noted that another meeting of the Schuman Plan countries would be in Baden-Baden on August 7. He added his original message had included the five points in the Bundestag resolution, stating the Germans had apparently now added six new points all of which did appear, however, to be reasonable.

Lord Salisbury indicated that he interpreted the U.S. idea as being that before the German elections we should let it be known that we are thinking of a 4-power meeting. He wondered if this would be helpful to Adenauer and thought it was not necessary since the policy of the three powers on Germany had so often been reaffirmed. He said that [Page 1618] German unification could best take place on the basis of the September 1952 note which represented an agreed Western policy and had been accepted by Adenauer. He said we should reaffirm our previous statements, but should not indicate that we would hold 4-power talks on Germany on some unspecified basis. He noted that he realized Blankenhorn had not been invited but had merely turned up. He said this was unfortunate, and that we should continue to inform the Germans of this meeting through the normal channels.

Mr. Bidault said that he thought it was correct to ignore Blankenhorn, and that the French also hoped publicity could be avoided on this visit. He confirmed that he also thought we should continue to deal with the Germans in the regular way through our Ambassadors in Bonn.

Returning to an earlier point, Mr. Bidault said that he was perplexed by Lord Salisbury’s indication that if we announce we will discuss the German problem with the Soviets, the Germans will be upset. In this event, what could we say we would discuss? It would be obvious that in fact Germany will form the cornerstone of such discussions; therefore, we should so state. Furthermore, if it is not publicly announced that we will discuss the German problem, how can he convince the French Assembly that there is no alternative to the EDC. He indicated he would submit the French thoughts on this point in greater detail at a later time.

Secretary Dulles stated that he had just received a letter from Chancellor Adenauer saying that a 4-power conference on Germany should be held this fall on the basis of the five points of the Bundestag resolution, and that the EDC should be a starting point for a European security program which ideally should later include other states, including the Soviet Union. Secretary Dulles noted that this indicated that Chancellor Adenauer was in favor of 4-power talks. (See Attachment A for text of Adenauer letter.7)

Lord Salisbury said there was no objection to a meeting of the four powers on Germany since if we did not discuss this problem, we would leave out the principal European difficulty. He continued to think that if such a meeting were announced before the German elections, it would create difficulties in Germany. Thus he believed it essential to reaffirm our present policy, which was accepted by Adenauer.

Secretary Dulles agreed that the basis should be the five points of the Bundestag resolution and added that we would circulate a paper on our views, noting that our present draft did not reflect the points in Adenauer’s letter, and therefore does not refer to 4-power talks.8

[Page 1619]

Mr. Bidault said there were discrepancies in Adenauer’s position and that furthermore, while he was entirely desirous of helping Adenauer with his political problems, there were other things on the French mind as well. He noted that we would continue with a further discussion on Germany tomorrow.

Congressional Restriction on MSA Funds Until EDC Ratification

Secretary Dulles stated that we would also circulate a paper on the problem of European unity which was of course related to the German problem. He noted the strong congressional insistence on tying part of the military aid under MSA to the completion of the EDC. He said the Administration opposed this idea but that he believes a law will emerge from the House-Senate conference which will provide that half of the 1954 military part of the MSA appropriation for the six EDC countries may be obligated but may not be delivered when it becomes available (a period of 18–24 months) until the EDC is ratified.

Mr. Stassen added that the first proposal of the House would have permitted the obligation of these funds only to the EDC, but that the present proposal was an improvement in that the funds could be obligated and that it was the future deliveries which could only be made to the EDC. Therefore he said there would be no operating restriction for 18 months. If the EDC were still not in operation, the Executive Branch would have to go back to Congress regarding the disposition of the material and the Funds involved.

Mr. Bidault thanked the Administration for trying to avoid these restrictive measures. He said his own problem with the Assembly was somewhat similar in that he was trying to get an unfavorable majority to vote favorably. He said that if the majority of the Assembly were favorable, we would have the pleasure of having Mr. Schuman here instead of himself. He said he still hoped after a reasonable delay to get the EDC ratified, along with the additional protocols, which he said, coupled with UK association with the EDC, as was now provided for, would help. He said that the Administration had performed a good service for the EDC in getting the restrictive legislation modified.


Secretary Dulles asked if it was the feeling that Austria should be discussed at a 4-power conference, noting that Mr. Bidault had not been hopeful that this problem could be settled separately. Mr. Bidault said he was entirely in agreement that Austria also should be taken up but that there was no hope for a prior solution to a German settlement. Lord Salisbury also agreed that Austria should be discussed during a 4-power conference. Secretary Dulles said there had been a Soviet suggestion for discussing Austria through diplomatic channels, but he thought that this was merely a dilatory move.

[Page 1620]

He added we had hints the Soviets were proposing the unification and neutrality of Austria and that this would be a forerunner of their ideas on Germany. Mr. Bidault said that the French had likewise received reports that the Soviets were thinking of proposing some such move regarding Austria, as a precursor to a similar solution on Germany. He added the latest information was that the Russians wanted “benevolent neutrality,” more “neutrality” not being sufficient. Lord Salisbury said that the British had received similar rumors but he still believed we must discuss Austria in the 4-power talks though the conclusion of an Austrian treaty should not be a pre-condition for having the meeting.

Secretary Dulles said that it was of course most undesirable that the Austrians should start negotiations directly with the Russians and we should try to prevent their reaching an arrangement in desperation to end the occupation which would undermine the Western position and set a bad example regarding Germany. Lord Salisbury said that the UK has already made this clear. Mr. Bidault also agreed and said that all Soviet good-will gestures were merely divisive in purpose, but have brought some results as can be seen by the recent statement of the Austrian Chancellor.


Passing to a discussion of the EDC, Lord Salisbury said he appreciated the French domestic problem, and the fact that 4-power talks must be held, but added that the UK could not accept the fact that EDC ratification must await talks with the Russians. On the contrary he thought if we meet with the Russians before EDC ratification, the Russians would discuss this very problem and we would never get any further. He said that this remained an important gap in our defenses and that no alternative thereto had been found. Since talking with the Russians before EDC ratification would represent weakness, he felt the UK must reserve its position on this point.

Mr. Bidault said the French also reserved their position but that unfortunately the idea of a 4-power meeting has now captured Europe. He noted both that this had originally been a British proposal, and that if there were any way to ratify the EDC before meeting the Russians, he would do so. Unfortunately this was impossible.

Secretary Dulles said we would discuss EDC more fully tomorrow but he wanted to say we were fully convinced of the French sincerity on the EDC, and particularly Mr. Bidault’s determination to carry it through. He realized the difficult political problem which only French leaders can solve, but felt he should point out the situation in the US if we do not get an EDC solution and no alternative is found. He said the result would be great discouragement in this country. Accordingly, he wished to strengthen Mr. Bidault’s position by telling [Page 1621] him candidly of the problem here. He admitted it was easier for the US and UK who were on the sidelines, and said we would of course be patient but felt that serious efforts to go ahead must be made in this connection. He said that the President’s prestige was committed to the EDC while elements in Congress and elsewhere remained skeptical there would be a European army. He concluded that a failure in this field would be very serious indeed, and that the US, and he was sure the UK also, would be of every possible assistance.

In concluding it was agreed that each of the Ministers would name a representative to discuss briefly the press in order that the same story might be handed out by all three participants. It was noted that the three Ministers would call at the White House at 10:00 a.m. on Saturday and would meet for another plenary session at 10:30.9

  1. Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which stated that these minutes had been prepared by McBride and checked with notes taken by Knight and Kitchen, but that they had not been cleared or approved. No copies of these notes have been found in the Department of State files. A summary of the first tripartite meeting was transmitted to London in telegram 197, July 11 (396.1 WA/7–1153). This telegram was repeated to Paris, Bonn, Vienna, The Hague, Moscow, Brussels, Rome, and Luxembourg.
  2. According to the Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1953, p. 72, each Foreign Minister made a statement at the opening of the first meeting. No mention of these statements is in the source text, but it does state that the meeting began at 2:30 p.m. (rather than the 3 p.m. ascribed at the start of the minutes), and, presumably, these statements were made in the interval. The texts are printed ibid. A photograph of the three Foreign Ministers at the beginning of this meeting is printed on p. 567.
  3. On June 28, Beria’s name had been omitted from the list of eminent Soviet officials attending the opening of the opera, Dekabristi, but the first official acknowledgement of his fall appeared in an announcement in Pravda, July 10, which stated that he had been removed from his posts as Deputy Chairman and Minister of the Interior, and that the subject of his criminal activities was being submitted to the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union. Further documentation about the fall of Beria is presented in volume viii .
  4. Documentation on Prime Minister Mayer’s visit to the United States at the end of March 1953 is presented in volume vi ; for documentation on the NAC Ministerial meeting at Paris at the end of April 1953, see pp. 368 ff.
  5. Regarding Churchill’s speech in the House of Commons on May 11, 1953 concerning a four-power meeting, see footnote 3, p. 1596.
  6. Documentation on the tripartite note to the Soviet Union, Sept. 23, 1952, is presented in volume vii .
  7. Not printed.
  8. Presumably Dulles is referring to the draft transmitted in telegram 80, July 8, p. 1601.
  9. No record of the meeting at the White House on July 11 has been found in the Department of State files; regarding the Foreign Ministers meeting at 10:30, see ST MIN–2 (Draft), infra.