Eisenhower Library, James C. Hagerty papers
Diary Entry by the President’s Press Secretary (Hagerty)
Friday, December 24 1954
I told the President about the vote at 8:15 in his office.1 His immediate reaction was, “Those damn French! What do they think they’re trying to do? This could really upset the apple cart in Europe.”
The President asked me to call Foster Dulles and have the Secretary call him back with a full report on the situation. This I did from the President’s office at about quarter of 9. Dulles called back at eleven o’clock to tell me that he had just received reports from Ambassador Dillon in Paris. Dillon reported to Dulles that the situation was very serious and that he and the British Ambassador to Paris thought that drastic action was necessary to impress upon the French Deputies over the weekend, and the French people themselves, how concerned America and the United Kingdom were over the adverse vote. Dulles said that Dillon also proposed—although he, Dulles, did not agree, that a formal statement be issued jointly by the President and Churchill which would say in effect that despite French ratification or not, the United States and Britain were going ahead with the rearmament of Germany.
Dulles said that he did not think that was necessary but that he did believe that both the President and himself should issue statements expressing their grave concern about the matter.
Dulles also said that the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Roger Makins, was coming to his house for a conference at noon, and he thought he should talk to the President prior to the arrival of [Page 1521] Sir Roger. I told him I would have the President call back within fifteen minutes and went out to the Club to get him.
The President was on the ninth green, practicing putting with Ed Dudley. When I came over, he said to Ed, “Excuse me, Ed, but I’ve got to go to work. The French have not only disturbed the whole free world but they’re cutting in on my lessons.”
As the President and I were walking to the office, I told him of Dulles’ conversation, of the British suggestion of a joint statement and Foster’s opposition to it. He said that he did not believe that a strong formal joint statement was in order. I told him about the British Ambassador calling on Dulles and recommended that if Dulles would approve, it would be a good thing for me to announce from here. He said to remind him to ask Dulles that when he got on the phone.
When the Dulles call came through, the President and I were alone in his office. He opened the conversation with, “Well, Foster, they surely have gotten things in an awful mess, haven’t they?” The President agreed with Foster that we should not issue a joint statement and gave Foster the task of relaying that to Churchill through Makins.
Dulles gave the President the Dillon report and filled him in with other details. The President told the Secretary that he should get the State Department busy on putting out some information and we would do the same thing down here. “What is needed here I think, Foster, is a stern expression of the seriousness of the situation, but I think we must leave the door open to the French, and particularly to Mendes-France so that he can operate over the weekend and get a majority vote on Monday or Tuesday. We must let them know that we don’t like this one bit but we must also tell them in effect that we are sure they will vote right on Monday.”
Dulles then apparently told the President that he was meeting with the British Ambassador, and the President told the Secretary that he would talk to him on the phone anytime Dulles returned the call.
When the President got off the phone, I talked with Dulles and agreed that I would say first that this was viewed as a very serious thing; that the Secretary of State was conferring with the British Ambassador; and that the Secretary would call the President later on and report back to him. Dulles particularly emphasized the necessity for getting something out today because the French have no Sunday papers and the deadline for making the French Saturday papers was four o’clock this afternoon.
When the phone call was concluded, the President briefly discussed this situation and said, “You know, here this plan like EDC was devised to protect all of Europe, the French included. They are really endangering the whole safety of Europe by such votes, but you see, I honestly believe what they are trying to do is this: They know we are going to have to keep bases and troops on the continent of Europe for a [Page 1522] long time. They know we must work somehow or other to get a strong alliance of free nations of Europe. Now, what the French would like would be to act in that concert of nations in Europe very much like we do and like the British do. We are not a member of the European union and neither are the British. The French would like to be part of it without having the responsibility of being in it. It’s the old French game of diplomatic doodling to see how much they can get out for themselves and never mind the rest of the world.”
I left the President’s office at quarter till twelve and had a press conference at twelve o’clock. I deliberately made it as somber as I could and told the newsmen to stand by for the afternoon.
Dulles called back shortly before one and I took the call at the office at the Bon Air Hotel. He told me that the British had put out a really rough statement which said in effect that the question of arming Germany had been agreed on in Paris and that if the French didn’t want to go along, Germany would be armed nevertheless. Dulles said he did not think we should join with that statement and that it was a good idea anyway for them to make a strong official protest since they were nearer the French than we were and since they would, in ease of war, be subject to attack just as fast as France.
I told the Secretary that the President could get to the phone within five minutes and I called Ann Whitman to tell her that the Secretary wanted to talk to the President again. Then I drove out to the Club and arrived there just as the President took the call from Dulles.
Dulles reported that the British Government had issued the strong note and was still requesting that we join them. The President firmly disagreed with that step, and we agreed then and there to the language of the statement that I would put out. It read as follows:
The Paris agreements are still in the process of debate in the French Chamber of Deputies. The President regards the adverse vote of yesterday as one of utmost seriousness. However, we cannot believe that this represents the final French decision in this matter.
I then returned to the Bon Air Hotel and had another press conference at about 1:45.
The British are a determined people and about ten o’clock that night Dulles called the President again. Churchill had sent a message to the President urging him to join personally with Churchill in a joint declaration.2 The President told Dulles that he had his authority to get in touch with the Prime Minister and tell him what we would put out and that was as far as we were going to go.
Dulles had also called me at 4:30 and said that he had just talked to Dillon by long distance phone. Dillon had had a private meeting with Mendes-France and Mendes-France had strongly urged the President [Page 1523] not to go into any formal statement with Churchill on this situation. Mendes-France, who wants pressure from the United States and Great Britain put on the French over the weekend, said that a formal statement from the President and Churchill along the lines of the tough British attitude would do more harm than good. Dulles said he did not want to talk to the President on this but merely asked me to give him the report and I told him I would, that I was seeing the President at six o’clock when we were going out with the newsmen and photographers to get the usual Christmas pictures.