Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

The Secretary of State to the President ¹

Washington, November 12, 1954.

Dear Mr. President:

I

I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to transmission to the Senate for its advice and consent to the ratification thereof,² (1) a Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, to which are annexed five schedules; and (2) a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty providing for the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954.³

II

The protocols above referred to are a part of a series of interconnecting arrangements designed to solidify the security structure of Western Europe. Because of such interdependence, I also submit herewith the other arrangements, although they do not themselves require Senate action. I recommend that these documents, which are listed in the annexed schedule, be submitted to the Senate for its information.

III

The foregoing arrangements, when they become operative, will, in combination, establish basically new conditions in Western Europe. They will realize a result for which the United States has long hoped.

The two world wars of this century have made it evident that western civilization, with its dedication to human liberty, cannot survive if the members of the western world continue to make war on each other. Already they have so expended their blood and treasure in fighting that they have gravely depleted their strength, and they have brought upon themselves the moral condemnation of all humanity because of their failure to establish, even as between themselves, a peaceful order.

Realization of the foregoing brought the Western European nations to seek such a measure of unification, particularly in terms of military establishments, as would make it hereafter both militarily impractical and politically unlikely that their military forces would be used against each other, or indeed against anyone else for other than clearly defensive purposes.

The need for this coincides with new dangers born out of the expansionist policies of Soviet Russia, inspired by the worldwide ambitions of Soviet communism and backed by a vast Red military establishment. This creates for Western Europe a threat which can only be effectively deterred by the achievement of a large degree of practical unity among the European nations themselves, including the Federal Republic of Germany, and, we hope, a unified Germany.

It was originally sought to achieve these objectives by the establishment of a European Defense Community, consisting of six continental countries—Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. They would have created an international organization having supranational powers in defense matters. This would have constituted a hard and dependable core at the critical center of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

This plan had been proposed on October 24, 1950, by Mr. Pleven, the then French Minister of Defense. After about a year and a half of negotiation, it was embodied in two interconnected treaties—the Bonn Convention on Relations with the Federal Republic of Germany of May 26, 1952,⁴ designed to restore sovereignty to the Federal Republic, and the Paris Treaty of May 27, 1952,⁵ designed to establish the European Defense Community.

The Bonn convention was signed by the United States, and on July 1, 1952, the United States Senate advised and consented to its ratification. The Senate at the same time consented to an extension of the North Atlantic Treaty area to include that of the European Defense Community, the significant addition being Western Germany. However, the Bonn convention and the related Paris Treaty never became effective because they were not ratified by all the signatories.

This failure to realize the European Defense Community and to restore sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany created a highly dangerous situation. It seemed that Europe might be doomed to continue divisions which would be disastrous both because such divisions would perpetuate the cycle of recurrent war as between the Western European countries themselves, and because a divided Europe would automatically be dominated by Soviet despotic power.

IV

I desire at this point to refer to the action which the United States Senate took on July 30, 1954. It was then predictable that the French Chamber of Deputies might fail to ratify the Bonn and Paris Treaties, above referred to, and the consequences of that failure could measurably be foreseen. In anticipation of that situation there occurred consultations between the Executive and the Senate, as a result of which the Senate, by a vote of 88 to 0, adopted a resolution which asked you in your discretion and within the limits of your constitutional powers to seek—

to restore sovereignty to Germany and to enable her to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

This act of cooperation between the Executive and the Senate, and the unanimous bipartisan action of the Senate itself, had a steadying and sobering effect at a time when there was much confusion and division of counsel. The Senate action enabled me, as your representative, to speak with authority in the subsequent negotiations which I conducted on your behalf.

The forward-looking “advice” thus given by the Senate in pursuance of its constitutional prerogative has in fact been successfully transmuted into Executive action. The first protocol referred to in I above will “restore sovereignty to Germany” and the second protocol referred to in I above will “enable her to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.”

V

The Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany is not linked to the entry into force of the arrangements for a German defense contribution, as was the case of the original Convention on Relations with the Federal Republic. It could come into force before it becomes possible to bring the arrangements for the German defense contribution into force. If there is an intervening period, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States will retain their existing powers in the field of disarmament and demilitarization in the Federal Republic. These powers will be exercised through a Joint Commission, consisting of representatives of the three powers and the Federal Republic, who will function by majority vote. These arrangements will be reviewed at the end of 1954 in light of the situation then existing with regard to the entry into force of the protocol and, at the same time, the four Governments will review the exercise of the controls with a view to permitting preparation by the Federal Republic for its future defense contribution.

In addition to the differences above mentioned, several changes of substance have been made in the Convention on Relations with the Federal Republic, as concluded in 1952. However, these changes neither increase the obligations of nor diminish the benefits to the United States as against those reflected in the Bonn convention which was approved by the Senate on July 1, 1952. The changes, which are significant primarily from the standpoint of the Federal Republic of Germany, may be summarized as follows:

(1) In article 2 of the convention as originally concluded, the three powers retained their rights relating to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security, to Berlin, and to Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement. These powers were to be held in reserve for special use, related to the Soviet position in Eastern Germany, and were not intended for exercise in ordinary German affairs, either domestic or foreign. It seemed preferable, therefore, that insofar as the territory of the Federal Republic was concerned, the arrangements for the stationing of foreign forces should be put on a contractual basis. Accordingly, the forces in the Federal Republic after the entry into force of the arrangements for the German defense contribution will be governed by a separate convention under the terms of which the Federal Republic agrees to the stationing of forces of the same nationality and effective strength as may be stationed in the Federal Republic at that time. Any increase in the effective strength of these forces may be made only with the consent of the Government of the Federal Republic.

The German representatives recognized that the three powers should preserve their rights to protect the security forces stationed in the Federal Republic until the Federal Government itself were able to take the necessary measures. This depends on the Federal Government obtaining new legislative powers. The termination of the general right of the three powers in this field will not affect the right of a military commander, if his forces are imminently menaced, to take such immediate action (including the use of armed force) as may be appropriate for their protection and as is requisite to remove the danger.

(2) A second change in the Convention on Relations relates to the Arbitration Tribunal to be established for the settlement of disputes arising between any one of the three powers and the Federal Government. Under the Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal as originally concluded, the Tribunal was given power to take action directly on legislative and administrative measures or judicial decisions applicable within the Federal Republic. These powers, which are not normal to a body created to arbitrate disputes between sovereign states, have been eliminated from the charter.

(3) A third change in the Convention on Relations relates to the situation which will arise on the reunification of Germany. The Convention on Relations as concluded in 1952 provided for its review in the event of reunification (art. 10). The new protocol provides for review of the convention and the related conventions not only in the event of actual reunification of Germany, but also in case an international understanding is reached with the participation and consent of the four Governments parties to the conventions on steps toward bringing about the reunification of Germany. The Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in Germany will also be subject to review in these circumstances. There must, of course, be agreement by all the signatory governments to any changes made in the conventions.

(4) Changes have also been made in the related conventions. These changes for the most part involve bringing the conventions up to date by eliminating clauses referring to the EDC Treaty, by taking into account the lapse of time since the conventions were concluded, and by taking into account progress made toward the completion of certain Allied programs in Germany. They also alter certain clauses in the conventions which were not felt to be in harmony with the status of equality being accorded the Federal Republic. Finally, the arrangements for the financial support of foreign forces stationed in Germany have been brought into harmony with more recent agreements with the Federal Republic in this field.

The related conventions were executive agreements implementing the Convention on Relations. For these, Senate action was unnecessary and, furthermore, recognized by the Committee on Foreign Relations to be undesirable, inasmuch as it was foreseen that they might require technical revision from time to time to meet changing conditions. The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate (Ex. Rept. No. 16, 82d Cong., 2d sess.), stated:

Some of the technical provisions in the [related]⁶ conventions are temporary in nature and as the situation in Germany changes, it may be necessary to make modifications in them from time to time. Under such circumstances it would seem impractical to require resubmission of the conventions to the Senate before each such modification could go into effect.

The ratification of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany will not change the nature of those related conventions.

VI

The arrangements for the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic do not affect the status of Berlin. In a declaration made by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France at the London Nine Power Conference of September 28–October 3, 1954, they reaffirmed the declaration made by them in Paris on May 27, 1952, that they would maintain armed forces in Berlin as long as their responsibilities required and that they would treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves. In addition, the three powers issued a statement in Paris on October 23, 1954,⁷ in which they affirmed their determination to insure the greatest possible degree of self-government in Berlin compatible with Berlin’s special situation and stated that they had instructed their representatives in Berlin to consult with the German authorities in the city with a view to implementing these principles jointly and to the fullest degree possible.

VII

The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty Providing for the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, referred to in I above, has no precise counterpart in the documents which were submitted to the Senate in 1952, although, as mentioned, there was then a protocol, approved by the Senate, which extended the treaty area to include that of the EDC. It was, however, not then contemplated that the Federal Republic of Germany would itself become a party to the North Atlantic Treaty. The German defense contribution would have been made solely through the European Defense Community. Under the arrangements now contemplated, it is essential that the Federal Republic of Germany should become a party to the North Atlantic Treaty and participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A protocol to that effect was signed in Paris on October 23, 1954, by the representatives of the 14 nations now parties to that treaty, and is one of the two documents referred to in section I hereof which it is recommended should be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The protocol is framed so that its entry into force is tied to that of the other arrangements relating to German participation in the common defense.

VIII

One of the documents above referred to in section II hereof, is a resolution concerning the powers of the supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR) approved by the North Atlantic Council on October 22, 1954.⁸ The general effect of this resolution is to strengthen the role of SACEUR over the forces under his authority. One result of these changes will be to enhance the effectiveness of the NATO forces in Europe, with consequent benefits to the entire NATO effort. Increasing the authority of SACEUR will also mean that the national forces assigned to SACEUR will become integrated and interdependent to an extent that will minimize the possibility of individual nations exercising an independent military initiative in Europe.

IX

Another of the resolutions of the North Atlantic Council suggested to be submitted to the Senate for its information is that of October 22, 1954, which took note of an exchange of declarations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France on October 3, 1954, in London and associated all members of the North Atlantic Treaty with the tripartite declaration issued by the three Governments last named.⁹

In its declaration, the Government of the Federal Republic declares that it has agreed to conduct its policy in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and accepts the obligations set forth in article 2 of the charter. The Federal Republic also declares that, upon its accession to the North Atlantic and Brussels Treaties, it will refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of the treaties. In particular the German Federal Republic undertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal Republic.

In the tripartite declaration, the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and France respond appropriately to this declaration, reaffirming in relation to this situation the principles of article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, condemning the use of force as between nations.

X

A major element in the new arrangements signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, are the four protocols designed to modify the Brussels Treaty.¹⁰ This treaty, signed on March 17, 1948, by France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, was the first major step toward the military integration of postwar Europe, antedating the North Atlantic Treaty by more than a year. Under the terms of the Brussels Treaty all countries were pledged to give full and immediate military assistance to any party against which aggression might occur. The treaty also provided for consultative machinery for the development of common defense plans. With the advent and growth of NATO, the organizational machinery under the Brussels Treaty became relatively inactive, but the treaty remained in full force and has now afforded a basis for realizing certain major political and security objectives.

The first of the protocols will bring about several important changes in the Brussels Treaty. First, it provides for the accession of Germany and Italy to the Brussels Treaty so that the membership will correspond to that of the proposed European Defense Community, plus the United Kingdom. Second, the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty will be transformed into a new “Council of Western European Union” for the purposes of strengthening peace and security and promoting unity and encouraging the progressive integration of Western Europe and closer cooperation between them and with other European organizations. Special provision is made for votes by two-thirds majority or simple majority on specific questions. Provision is made for close cooperation between the Brussels Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. There is a clause stating the undesirability of duplicating the work of the military staffs of NATO and stipulating that the Council and its Agency for the Control of Armaments will rely on the military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

The second protocol is concerned with the size of the forces of Western European Union. It provides that the total strength and number of formations of the land and air forces of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands placed under SACEUR shall not exceed those laid down in the special agreement annexed to the European Defense Community Treaty. The forces of the United Kingdom under SACEUR shall not exceed those presently under SACEUR command, and Luxembourg’s forces shall be set at one regimental combat team. Naval forces are to be set by the NATO annual review process. Any increase in the agreed maximum forces will be subject to the unanimous approval of all parties to the Brussels Treaty.

An important feature of this protocol is the commitment by the United Kingdom to maintain on the mainland of Europe the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces now assigned to SACEUR, i. e., four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force or such other forces as SACEUR regards as having equivalent fighting capacity. The United Kingdom undertakes not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of a majority of the Brussels Treaty Powers. The protocol provides that this undertaking does not bind the United Kingdom in case of an acute overseas emergency. It further provides that if maintenance of forces on the Continent at any time places too great a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, the Government of the United Kingdom will invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions under which the United Kingdom forces are maintained.

This commitment is in addition to the commitment implicit in the United Kingdom’s membership in the new Council of Western European Union.

The third protocol relates to the control of armaments. It is concerned both with armaments which are not to be manufactured in the Federal Republic and those which are to be controlled within the Brussels Treaty countries on the mainland. The prohibited arms, which the Federal Republic of Germany has renounced the right to produce, are atomic, biological, and chemical weapons and guided missiles, larger naval vessels, and strategic bombing aircraft. Unanimous vote of the Council of Western European Union is required to give Germany the right to produce atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. A two-thirds majority of the Council can give Germany the right to produce guided missiles, larger naval vessels, and strategic aircraft, provided that SACEUR recommends that Germany be given this right.

The armaments subject to control throughout the territory of the six Continental countries include both the weapons which are prohibited and a number of other major weapons. These include mines, tanks, large artillery and ammunition therefor, aircraft bombs and most types of military aircraft.

A fourth protocol creates an Agency for the Control of Armaments. With respect to controlled items, the Agency is to exercise its control over stocks of armaments rather than over production. It will also ensure that prohibited items are not produced in Germany.

The United States will give the Council of Western European Union information with respect to military aid to be furnished to the forces of the Brussels Treaty countries on the mainland of Europe. This information will be transmitted to the Agency for Armaments Control by the Council. The United States retains full authority to determine the allocation of United States military assistance.

The Agency does not have responsibilities with respect to the production and procurement of armaments or with the allocation of military equipment. However, the Brussels Treaty countries did agree in a resolution approved at Paris October 21, 1954, that they would convene a Working Group in Paris January 17, 1955, to consider proposals for development of rationalized production programs.

XI

The arrangements which I have discussed impose no treaty engagements and obligations upon the United States other than those incident to restoring to the Federal Republic of Germany sovereign powers which the Allies had assumed after the defeat of the Nazi Government; and the acceptance of the Federal Republic as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty. Nevertheless, the prospective attitude of the United States toward the whole arrangement is a matter of profound, even decisive, significance.

In this connection, I made a statement at the London Conference at its meeting of September 29, 1954, the full text of which is reproduced in an annex to the final act of the London Conference, transmitted herewith.¹¹ By that statement I sought to make clear the desire of our Nation to encourage and support measures which unify and strengthen Western Europe, whereas we would be disposed to draw away from a Europe which persisted in divisions and weakness. In this connection 1 said that if new arrangements were made by the Western European countries, which, in replacement of the European Defense Community, provided unity and strength, so that the hopes which we had placed in EDC could reasonably be transferred to these new arrangements, then I would recommend to you, Mr. President, that you should make a declaration of policy comparable to that which you offered, after consultation with congressional leaders, in connection with the prospective European Defense Community Treaty, including an expression of intention by the United States—

to maintain in Europe such elements of its armed forces as may be necessary or appropriate to contribute our fair share of what is needed for the common defense of this North Atlantic area while the threat to that area exists.

I was careful to point out that such a declaration would constitute no more than a policy declaration and that it would not be a legally binding commitment. I pointed out:

under our constitutional system, the President of the United States is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States and, as such, has the right to determine their disposition. One President of the United States is not constitutionally able to bind his successor in this matter. Each President of the United States comes into office enjoying the right to dispose of the Armed Forces of the United States as he thinks best serves the interests of the United States in accordance with the advice he gets from his military advisers.

I nevertheless pointed out that basic and fundamental policies were, as a practical matter, not likely to be altered and that our policy to cooperate with a Western Europe which was itself acting effectively to make itself united and strong was, I felt, basic and fundamental United States policy, as both the Executive and the Congress had clearly made manifest.

In pursuance of the statement which I made in London, I expect, Mr. President, to make a recommendation to you as thus indicated, if the arrangements which were entered into at Paris have been, or appear likely to be, realized. I understand that you would be disposed to act favorably on such a recommendation.

XII

It is evident that the foregoing agreements, if they come into force and are implemented, will have far reaching and benign consequences.

They will fulfill the aspirations of the people of the Federal Republic of Germany for a position of equality in the family of free nations.

They will increase substantially the defensive potential of the Atlantic alliance.

At the same time, they will afford protection against excessive militarism as a tool of aggressive nationalism. This protection will go not only to the members of the Atlantic alliance, but to all.

They will offer strong assurances against a renewal of fratricidal strife among the free nations of Europe and will afford a framework of practical cooperation which should encourage further advances toward political and economic unity among the Western European states.

Because of the importance to this Nation of achieving these results, I recommend, Mr. President, that you request early consideration by the Senate of this matter, and, in particular, the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the two documents of treaty status which the United States has signed, namely, the protocol which will restore sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany and the protocol which will admit the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Respectfully submitted,

John Foster Dulles

Schedule¹²

(1) The Final Act of the Nine Power Conference held at London, September 28–October 3, 1954, with annexes; (2) three resolutions adopted by the North Atlantic Council on October 22, 1954; (3) four protocols to the Brussels Treaty of March 17, 1948, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, together with the text of treaty itself; (4) a declaration dated October 23, 1954, of the states signatory to the Brussels Treaty inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to accede to the treaty; (5) a resolution on the production and standardization of armaments adopted by the Nine Power Conference at Paris on October 21, 1954; (6) the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954; (7) the Tripartite Agreement on the Exercise of Retained Bights in Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954; (8) certain letters relating to the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, dated October 23, 1954, together with the texts of letters exchanged in 1952 referred to therein; and (9) a statement on Berlin made by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United States, and the United Kingdom in Paris on October 23, 1954.

An agreement on the Saar was also signed at Paris by the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on October 23, 1954.¹³ When an authentic English translation of this agreement is obtained, it will be made available to the Senate for its information.

1. Source: Reprinted from the Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 6, 1954, pp. 849–856.
2. For the text of President Eisenhower’s message of transmittal addressed to the U.S. Senate on Nov. 15, see ibid., pp. 847–849.
3. The two protocols under reference are part of the Paris Agreements; for texts, see pp. 1435 and 1456.
4. For the text of the Bonn Convention on Relations, see volume vii.
5. For the text of the Paris Treaty, see AFP , vol. i, pp. 1107–1150; for documentation concerning the attitude of the United States toward the establishment of a European Defense Community, see pp. 571 ff.
6. Brackets in the source text.
7. For the text of the Tripartite Statement, see p. 1428.
8. For the text of the Resolution To Implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference Concerning the Powers of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, see p. 1431.
9. For the text of the Resolution of Association with the Tripartite Declaration of Oct. 3, 1954, see p. 1435.
10. For the texts of the four Protocols, see p. 1441.
11. The text of Dulles’ statement was made Annex II A of the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, p. 1357.
12. All the documents listed in this schedule are printed in this compilation except for the letters enumerated as (8). For the text of (1), the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, see p. 1345; for the texts of (2) through (7), which were collectively known as the Paris Agreements, see pp. 1435 ff.; and for the text of (9), the Tripartite Statement on Berlin, see p. 1428.
13. For information concerning the Saar Agreement, see the editorial note, p. 1463.