Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 216th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, October 6, 1954
eyes only
Present at the 216th meeting of the Council were the Secretary of State presiding; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 4); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Secretary of the Army the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Admiral Duncan for the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; General Twining for the Commandant, U.S Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.
Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
[Here follows a discussion of world developments affecting United States security.]
[Page 1379]2. The Nine-Power Conference and the London Agreements Relating to Europe (NSC 5433/1;1 NSC Action No. 12272)
After Mr. Cutler had briefed the Council on the background, he called on Secretary Dulles for his oral report.
Secretary Dulles indicated his opinion that while the conference was not a conclusive success, it had at least avoided the disaster of a neutralized Germany, an isolated France, and Soviet domination of Europe. Thus the conference had succeeded in saving many of the EDC objectives.
Secretary Dulles then stated that while it would take time he thought it would be useful to report to the Council on some fairly technical aspects of the proceedings. Broadly speaking, the work of the conference fell into three phases. First negotiations between the three occupying powers and West Germany on the restoration of German sovereignty. Second, negotiation among the Brussels Treaty powers and their enlargement to include Germany and Italy. Third, arrangements affecting NATO.
On the first of these three phases, continued Secretary Dulles, agreement was reached to restore sovereignty to Germany with certain reservations affecting the City of Berlin and German unification if it should occur in the future. Adenauer had actively sought reservation of certain allied rights in Berlin. As a result of this phase of the negotiations, the three Western powers had signed a Declaration of Intent which instructed the three High Commissioners to cease exercising certain powers which were presently to be surrendered to a sovereign Germany, unless such powers were exercised by agreement with the Bonn Government. In effect this decision transferred certain powers to the Bonn Government, de facto, at once. Adenauer had said that he needed such a de facto transfer of sovereign powers to take back with him to Bonn as evidence of concrete achievement.
This phase of the negotiations obviously involved certain questions respecting the so-called “Bonn Treaty” which had been negotiated parallel with the EDC treaty. Certain provisions of the so-called Bonn Treaty had now become obsolete and unacceptable to West Germany. Accordingly, said Secretary Dulles, we had gone through the Bonn Treaty paragraph by paragraph, retaining some things, modifying others, and deleting still others. One of the most difficult problems concerned occupation costs. This whole task had been difficult, but the results were pretty specific and would probably prove satisfactory. The end of this phase of the negotiations occurred with an exchange [Page 1380] of declarations between the three allied powers and Germany. The latter had agreed not to attempt to use force to secure the reunification of Germany or to modify Germany’s present borders. The three allied powers had declared their intention to settle such matters by peaceful means and in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.
Regarding the second phase of the London conference negotiations—namely those involving the Brussels Treaty—Secretary Dulles pointed out that these arrangements would, of course, have to be ratified by the various parliaments and, accordingly, could not go into force at once. This immediately raised the question whether the United States should submit its part in the Brussels arrangements to the Senate. While the Executive might not legally be obliged to do this, it might be a good idea to do it anyway, the more so since German admission to NATO would certainly require the approval of the Senate.
The Brussels Treaty arrangements, said Secretary Dulles, were largely designed to replace the defunct EDC machinery, and the conference had agreed to admit Germany and Italy to the Brussels pact. The addition of the UK, predicted Secretary Dulles, would have both advantages and disadvantages. It was obviously an advantage to have Great Britain tied more closely to the Continent. Yet, by virtue of this closer tie you bring in a country, the UK, which is not as ready to develop the supra-national agencies. This was something of a disadvantage.
Under the new Brussels Treaty the Consultative Council will not actually make decisions by a majority vote. The Brussels Council does not have the same degree of European parliamentary backing that the EDC was to have, but at least the Brussels Council will be required to report annually to the members of the Brussels Treaty Organization, which are members of the European Consultative Assembly.
One of the principal functions of the Brussels Treaty Organization will be to keep force levels under control. The annual NATO review will continue to fix the desired force levels of the NATO powers, whereas the Brussels Council will have authority to see to it that these agreed levels become the maximum levels, not to be exceeded by any Brussels Treaty power.
There had been much discussion, said Secretary Dulles, of additional controls of European armaments, both production and stocks. Indeed, the most critical aspect of the entire conference was the French demand for an armaments pool. The French had devised very tricky definitions designed to exclude Germany almost entirely from armament production to the advantage of French industrialists. There had been an extremely stubborn struggle over this issue, and it had almost disrupted the conference The first crisis in this area was resolved by a highly statesmanlike proposal from Chancellor Adenauer in the form of a self-denying ordinance—Germany voluntarily undertaking [Page 1381] not to manufacture certain types of weapons—which Secretary Dulles outlined in some detail This crisis having been overcome, the French then went on to fight for an armaments production pooling, with the objective of locating the armaments industry entirely outside of the German borders. Throughout this phase the motives of Mendes-France were widely distrusted by the others There was also a feeling that Mendes-France was adopting rather advanced new-deal concepts regarding government control of the arms industry. However, Mendes-France had finally given in, subject to a promise of subsequent consideration of this problem by the Brussels Council.
The conference had recommended German admission to NATO. This, said Secretary Dulles, would of course require unanimous action by all present members of NATO, but no great difficulty need be anticipated in securing such agreement. The conference had also agreed to recommend greater authority for SACEUR regarding integration and deployment of forces under his command. This was the substitute for the European army contemplated in EDC. Despite its shortcomings, General Gruenther had stated his belief that this new system would in fact make it impossible for any single member nation to use its armed forces in Europe for nationalistic adventures. This effectively abolishes the danger, for example, of a revived German General Staff going off on its own. These recommendations respecting NATO would go before the NATO Council when it met on October 21.
The declarations of the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the stationing of forces in Europe certainly provided the most dramatic moment of the conference. While Secretary Dulles said that he had discussed with Eden and Churchill these commitments, he had not known until Eden’s actual announcement the precise and final decision of the UK Government. Eden and Churchill had both been anxious for a parallel U.S. commitment respecting the stationing of forces on the Continent. Secretary Dulles had replied that such a commitment by the United States was not “practical”, but that Churchill and Eden need not fear any hasty or unwarranted withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. This was the basis for the extemporaneous statement which Secretary Dulles made after Eden “shot the works” regarding the UK commitment Basically, said Secretary Dulles, his extemporaneous statement confirmed the willingness of the United States to assist the European nations if they would help themselves along the road toward unity. If the European nations made progress along this road, U.S. assistance would increase if these nations slowed up, so would U.S. assistance. Secretary Dulles had concluded by stating that he would recommend to the President that he take the same attitude respecting U.S. forces in Europe under the new Brussels arrangements as the President had taken with [Page 1382] respect to EDC. There could not be, however, a strict commitment as to the precise duration of the commitment.
Summing up, Secretary Dulles said that in the main the results of London looked hopeful. Much of the value of EDC had been preserved. The great loss was in terms of failure of the new arrangements to establish the same degree of inter-European parliamentary control as had been contemplated by EDC. On the other hand the extraordinary UK commitment compensates in large measure for this loss. With strict regard for early defensive military strength on the Continent of Europe, said Secretary Dulles, the new Brussels arrangements may even be better than EDC. However, the long-range integration of Europe will be slower. But, said Secretary Dulles, we cannot always force people to do things they don’t want to do, and Adenauer, at least, has great hopes of the French parliamentary elections in 1956.
Regarding the attitudes of the principal governments at the London conference, Secretary Dulles said that he had enjoyed better relations than ever before with the UK and Mr. Eden. The British were thoroughly frightened at what might happen as the result of the collapse of EDC, surrounded as Britain would be by hostile influences. This had induced the British to deal with us more frankly than ever before.
Apart from the historical UK commitment to the Continent, the greatest single contribution in terms of statesmanship was made by Chancellor Adenauer. Secretary Dulles characterized the Chancellor as a “true European who made real sacrifices to European principles.” The contrast between Adenauer and Mendes-France was particularly conspicuous. Mendes-France always had his eye on little things; Adenauer always on big things. Mendes-France played an inscrutable game and a lone hand, even with his own French delegation. His motives remained unclear and the other Foreign Ministers had distrusted him ever since Brussels They remained suspicious and hostile at London. Eden had actually become very angry with Mendes-France at many points in the course of the meeting, and particularly because of the lack of magnanimity in the response of Mendes-France to the UK commitment. Curiously, as a result, Mendes-France seemed to feel that he got a more sympathetic reaction from Secretary Dulles than from any other of the ministers present. Mendes-France had also put the Council on notice that a satisfactory Saar settlement might be a condition precedent to French parliamentary agreement to the new arrangements. Such a Saar settlement said Secretary Dulles, would be much more difficult to obtain in the absence of EDC—in other words, it would be more difficult now to Europeanize the Saar, and Mendes-France can use the Saar as an excuse for scrapping the London program if he wishes to.
Secretary Dulles pointed out that he himself had tried throughout “to play it cagey” from the U.S viewpoint. He had early taken the [Page 1383] position that what was to be done at London was up to the European powers. If these powers could find a means of salvaging EDC, we would go along. But Secretary Dulles had avoided so far as possible any idea that the new settlement had been “made in the USA”. We should know, added Secretary Dulles, pretty quickly whether this new program will work. The French Parliament will have an opportunity this week to give its approval in principle to what Mendes-France has done Approval or disapproval by the French Chamber of Deputies could be expected before the end of the year. Our own American action probably will not be final until some time in February, but the United States should not ratify the new arrangements until the European powers have ratified them, in order to avoid any stigma that this is a U.S. package as had been the case when Congress approved the EDC arrangements prior to the European powers. Secretary Dulles concluded by stating the hope that the results of London would really work. If not the U.S. would face a real and thorough reappraisal of its policy in the face of a neutralized, if not a Soviet-controlled, Continent of Europe.
Mr. Cutler expressed the view that the real danger to the new program would be posed by Soviet action during the interval prior to ratification. Secretary Dulles agreed and, predicted that the Soviets would do all they could to destroy the London program bringing pressure to bear both on Germany and on France. He pointed out that the Soviets may be willing to pay a very high price to prevent this settlement, and that is why we shall have to move fast on the followup to the London conference.
Secretary Humphrey inquired as to the real difference between having certain decisions made by the Brussels Treaty powers and other decisions by NATO. Secretary Dulles replied that NATO had been primarily designed to build up the armed strength of Western Europe. Accordingly, it should not be assigned the task of putting on the brakes to European armament. The Brussels arrangements can, if necessary, apply the brakes.
Governor Stassen and Dr Flemming at this point complimented the Secretary of State warmly on his achievements at London, and at the suggestion of Mr. Cutler the entire council agreed that the record of the meeting should express the thanks and esteem of the National Security Council to the Secretary of State.
At the conclusion of the discussion, Mr. Allen Dulles asked if it might not now be possible to postpone or revise the various reports which the intelligence community had been asked to prepare against the contingency of a failure of the Nine-Power Conference. Mr. Cutler, however, suggested that it would be desirable that the proposed reports be completed by the time when they were due—namely, October 28.
The National Security Council: [Page 1384]
- a.
- Discussed the subject on the basis of an oral report by the Secretary of State.
- b.
- Expressed the thanks and esteem of the National Security Council to the Secretary of State for his achievements at the Nine-Power Conference.
[Here follows discussion of United States policy in the Far East, Chinese Nationalist offshore islands, United States policy toward Formosa foreign military assistance, and the redeployment of United States forces in Trieste.]
- Dated Sept. 25, p. 1268.↩
- NSC Action No. 1227 summarized the decisions of the National Security Council meeting of Sept. 24 concerning NSC 5433, “Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe,” Sept. 16 (p. 1205); for a memorandum of that meeting including a summary of the decision reached, see p. 1263. A copy of NSC Action No. 1227 is in the S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action—1954”.↩