396.1 LO/10–654

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Barbour)

top secret

Subject:

  • London Nine-Power Conference: Possible Association of Norway with Brussels Treaty

Participants:

  • The Secretary of State
  • The Norwegian Ambassador1
  • Mr. Barbour, EUR

The Ambassador congratulated the Secretary on the Nine-Power London Conference and his part in it, expressing the view that some [Page 1376] of the firm statements made by the United States on that occasion appeared to have been most effective in achieving success. The Secretary thanked the Ambassador and noted that he felt he had perhaps been able to dispel doubts in some people’s minds as to the seriousness of US intentions to reappraise its policy towards Europe in the event it should be impossible to pick up the pieces left by the failure of EDC.

The Ambassador said he has received a telegram from his Foreign Minister stating that the Foreign Minister will discuss the Nine-Power meeting in the Storting tomorrow and with his Scandinavian colleagues in Copenhagen on Monday, with particular reference to the desirability of Norway joining the Brussels Treaty. The Ambassador asked whether the Secretary would think it a good idea for Norway to join the Brussels Pact.

The Secretary said that frankly he did not believe it would be a good idea. He pointed out that in the concept formulated at London the role of the Brussels Treaty would be principally one of control on European armament, particularly as to the limits of the size of the various military establishments. In the circumstances, he could not see advantage for Norway in joining a pact of this nature. Norway, as a member of NATO, already participated in the most advantageous instrument for defense cooperation. The Ambassador noted that it might be helpful from the standpoint of Norwegian public opinion for Norway also to participate in the control machinery to be provided by the Brussels Pact in relation to Germany. The Secretary while making clear that he was not in a position to assess Norwegian internal opinion noted that, under the NATO structure, the powers of SACEUR would also be increased, particularly in regard to the disposition of military forces and logistics which, in the opinion of General Gruenther, would themselves constitute the most effective controls against the establishment of a German national army and that, in fact, the Brussels Treaty controls would be of peripheral importance.

The Ambassador referred to the fact that the Secretary has cancelled his proposed radio address on the Nine-Power conference. The Secretary confirmed that cancellation and said that he had done so in the thought that Mendes-France is scheduled to speak in the French Assembly tomorrow and he did not wish to run the risk of saying anything which might disturb Mendes’ presentation. The Secretary added that there were considerable difficulties which still might complicate the situation, notably, the status of the Saar problem He said he had discussed the Saar with Mendes-France and with Adenauer and that it is not clear whether Mendes-France will insist on a solution for the Saar before ratification of the London agreements. He noted that Adenauer and Mendes-Frances seemed to be scheduled to discuss the Saar on October 20 but in view of the contemplated four-power, nine-power, [Page 1377] and NAC meetings from the 21st to the 24th, they would not have much time.

In conclusion, the Secretary emphasized again that he could not presume to comment on or make suggestions as to courses of action for Norway and that the views he had expressed to the Ambassador were extremely informal, not official expressions of the US Government nor anything other than his personal reactions in response to the Ambassador’s questions.

  1. Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne.