740.5/9–254: Telegram

The Chargé in the united Kingdom ( Butterworth ) to the Department of State 1


1120. At his request I called on Permanent Under Secretary this morning who wished to have a general discussion and to bring to the fore for comment by us following two matters.

[Page 1131]
If as Scott has reported we do not favor an 8-power meeting is it because we regard a NATO ministerial meeting to be held in a month’s time as the alternative? HMG’s view is that NATO meeting would have grave disadvantage (unless it was a mere pro forma performance to isolate France) of 14 participants many of whom have no direct connection with problem at issue, and above all would not include Germany, I gather that HMG has open mind about its 8-power proposal and the fact that Adenauer reaction to protocols and British discussion of NATO plan is decisive factor. If by any chance 4-power discussions should go well then a jump from 4 to 14 would take on a different complexion. Since Canada is anxious to participate Kirkpatrick has been turning over in his mind as a possible formula the powers having military forces in Western Germany plus EDC powers. At any rate further elucidation of what we have in mind is desired.
Secondly, if the time schedule of study group is to be adhered to Kirkpatrick pointed out that action in matter of Germany’s military contribution is to be completed within 90 days after signature of second protocol. Scott having reported Department’s reference this general matter to Pentagon Foreign Office wishes to know how soon our considered views will be forthcoming. (Department has already received for comment Study Group document 62 containing British views.)

Incidentally, Kirkpatrick thought it fortuitous that Senator Wiley will accompany Ambassador Conant to Adenauer interview since he anticipates that the former’s presence will have a restraining effect.3 In his experience after suffering serious setbacks Chancellor goes into 3 stages: (1) “Quiet bereavement as for loss of a wife”; (2) bitter and formidable anger; (3) make the best of it and continue pursuing constructive role. He judges Adenauer to be in the midst of (2) and he attaches significance to point 4 of the German Cabinet statement,4 namely, “judicial regulation of the stationing of troops of other countries in the Federal Republic by the conclusion of treaties”. He has some bitter things to say about the example at Brussels5 which [Page 1132] Mendes-France had set for the Germans if they chose to treat the contractuals as Mendes-France had tried to treat EDC by requesting omission of all disadvantageous provisions.

  1. Repeated to Paris and Bonn.
  2. This is a reference to Document 6, which is an enclosure to the Report of the London Study Group, July 12, p. 1013; Document 6 is a British paper entitled “Restrictions on German Rearmament Which Might Be Feasible in the Event of German Admission to NATO.”
  3. In a letter to Senator Alexander Wiley, dated July 27, Dulles asked him to take a trip to Europe in order to study firsthand the European defense situation with particular emphasis on “the use of American assistance, the possibility of coming into force of the European Defense Community, and the question of alternatives in the event of the failure of full ratification of the European Defense Treaty,” as well as examining matters relating to the Foreign Service. (033.1100 WI/7–2754) When Wiley agreed to make the European trip, arrangements were made for him to visit Paris, London, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, Bonn, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, London, and Paris. Wiley, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was accompanied by Carl Marcy, a staff member of the Senate Committee, and their two wives. (CA–843, Aug. 4, 1954; 033.1100 WI/8–454) For a summary of the conversation among Conant, Wiley, and Adenauer, see telegram 663 from Bonn, Sept. 2, p. 1138.
  4. See foonote 3, p. 1129.
  5. For documentation concerning the Brussels Conference, Aug. 19–22, 1954, see pp. 1052 ff.