Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

L/UNA files, “Headquarters Agreement—Section 6”

Memorandum by the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs (Meeker) to the Legal Adviser (Phleger)

Washington, May 27, 1953.

• Subject:
• Ambassador Lodge’s proposals for dealing with visa cases under Headquarters Agreement

The paper forwarded by Ambassador Lodge to Mr. Lourie in anticipation of Friday’s meeting with the Attorney General states some constructive practical suggestions for dealing with cases where the United States, for reasons of national security, doubts that certain aliens covered by the Headquarters Agreement can be admitted to this country.

Particularly on the procedural side, Ambassador Lodge’s paper recommends steps which would go far to eliminate delays and friction in visa cases.

On substance, the paper proposes that an alien covered by the Headquarters Agreement be excluded only if (a) it is clearly shown that he is coming to this country for a purpose not connected with United Nations business and (b) the United States Government determines that this non-United Nations purpose requires his exclusion. Under the first issue, (a), Ambassador Lodge would have the United States show the evidence to the Secretary-General in order to persuade him. Under the second issue, (b), the opinion of this Government would be conclusive. It seems likely that in many, if not most, cases the evidence bearing on (a) and the evidence bearing on (b) would be the same or closely intertwined. However, if the security officers of this Department and the Department of Justice believe that evidence bearing on (a)—perhaps paraphrased and shown on a confidential basis—can be made available to the Secretary-General without compromising sources or otherwise injuring security interests, Ambassador Lodge’s proposal offers a practical solution under which decisions on what action is required to protect this country’s security would be kept within the United States Government; persuasion of the Secretary-General would be limited to the factual issue of the purpose of the alien’s travel.

The paper forwarded by Ambassador Lodge, in stating the criteria referred to in the preceding paragraph, employs varying formulae. At some points the element of “undesirability” is mentioned as an alternative to “security” requirements in connection with the United States Government’s appraisal of the purpose of an alien’s travel. The additional element of desirability versus undesirability seems off the mark in considering implementation of the Headquarters Agreement and protection of this country’s security. Further, it would seem advisable to use consistent and uniform language in stating the criteria wherever they appear.

At one point the paper refers to an opportunity for Mr. Hammarskjold “to participate in the determination that the persons in question are coming for a purpose not directly connected with United Nations business”. I doubt whether this statement is advisable from the United States point of view and also whether the Secretary-General would be willing to assume openly a share in the responsibility for determining that a particular alien shall or shall not be admitted to this country. It would seem more accurate to describe this part of the process contemplated by Ambassador Lodge as the showing of evidence to the Secretary-General to persuade him of our version of the facts in a particular case.

In the section on the Immigration and Nationality Act (page 4 of Ambassador Lodge’s paper) there is an abbreviated reference to “subversive activities” under subsections 212(a) (27) and (29) of the Act. The Department of Justice may feel this needs spelling out.

For convenience, there is attached a redraft of certain paragraphs from Ambassador Lodge’s paper, to take care of the three matters just referred to.

Leonard C. Meeker

[Attachment]

A. Principles which should govern.

In a limited number of cases the United States will wish to prevent the entry of an individual to the United States because of clear evidence that he is coming to this country for a purpose which is not legitimately connected with United Nations business and which, in the opinion of the United States, poses a threat to this country’s security.

As is rightly indicated in the position paper, admission should be denied to persons covered by Section 11 of the Headquarters Agreement only in cases where there is clear and convincing evidence that such persons are coming to this country for a purpose which is not legitimately connected with United Nations business and which, in the opinion of the United States, poses a threat to this country’s security. Mr. Hammarskjold, I am certain, will agree to this position provided arrangement is made for the United States to show him the evidence that the persons in question are coming for a purpose not legitimately connected with United Nations business. I believe he will agree, on the other hand, that a determination that the purpose in question poses a threat to United States security is wholly for the United States itself to make, provided I can be supplied enough information to satisfy myself and thus assure the Secretary-General that this is so—information which I have been extremely unsuccessful in getting so far.

B. Application of principles.

The application of these principles will vary somewhat with the class of persons involved.

(1) Secretariat and Specialized Agency Employees, Accredited Correspondents and Representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations.

In the case of persons falling within these classes, I suggest that the United States ought to be prepared to show to the Secretary-General, for his confidential information, the evidence in its possession indicating that the persons in question are coming to this country for a purpose not legitimately connected with United Nations business. If the evidence is clear and convincing, as it obviously would be, I feel certain that Mr. Hammarskjold will raise no question as to the denial of admission in any case where the United States considers that the purpose so shown poses a threat to this country’s security.

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C. These principles are consistent with Immigration and Nationality Act.

I do not believe the foregoing principles are in conflict with subsections 212(a) (27) and (29) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. I believe that those subsections, properly applied, would exclude persons covered by Section 11 of the Headquarters Agreement if there is clear and convincing evidence on the matters referred to in those subsections—namely, intention to enter the United States to engage in activities covered by subsection 212(a) (27), or probability of engaging in activities covered by subsection 212 (a) (29).

1. Asterisks are in the source text.