ODA files, lot 62 D 225, “General Assembly”
Memorandum by the United Nations Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs (Allen)1
General Observations and Comments on the First Part of the Eight Session of the United Nations General Assembly–1953
[Here follow numbered paragraphs 1 (generalities), and 2 (propaganda and the cold war) of Part A, captioned “Results of Eighth Session”.]
3. In the complex of colonial and racial issues, the gulf between the colonial minority and the anti-colonial majority widened alarmingly at this session. The natural reaction to extreme positions on one side is to increase the extremist attitudes on the other. At least some UK officials, for example, seem now convinced that their temporary, US inspired campaign at the two previous sessions of a more forthcoming and conciliatory approach has not paid dividends in evoking a similar cooperative approach from the majority. Moreover, France’s adamant, uncooperative stand on the North African items proved more effective, to judge by the voting results, than South Africa’s more restrained and persistent efforts through continued participation to convince the members of the correctness of her case in the South African questions. It can be anticipated that this will be taken as a lesson, both by South Africa and by others who are under future attack for their colonial or racial policies.
The anti-colonial majority, on the other hand, while reasonably adroit in the wording of resolutions, was at times bolder and stronger in its attacks than previously. Even the US, for almost the first time, was the direct object of criticism and opposition in the Puerto Rico case.2 It is true that we succeeded in obtaining approval of a resolution which indorses our conclusion that Puerto Rico has become sufficiently self-governing for us to cease transmitting information on it as a “non-self-governing territory”. However, this was obtained only through the most strenuous efforts with other members, both at New York and in various capitals; the resolution was far from satisfactory in wording, and there was in the debate a disturbingly widespread undercurrent of anti-US sentiment. More importantly, decisions taken which extend the Assembly’s role in NSGT problems beyond its originally intended [Page 1340] scope and which at the same time permit decisions on these matters by a simple majority (rather than two-thirds) are disturbing developments which foreshadow intensification of these problems at future sessions.
[Here follow numbered paragraphs 4 and 5 of Part A, dealing with President Eisenhower’s speech and proposal for an atomic energy pool for peaceful purposes and general observations on the lack of salient political issues for the Eighth Regular Session of the General Assembly; and numbered paragraphs 1–4 of Part B, entitled “Comments Regarding the Political Role of the GA”.]
5. There is some question as to whether the General Assembly is performing as constructive a role as it should in its third major task of easing tensions and strains in the complex of changing colonial relationships.3 It seems sometimes unfortunately true that the GA increases tensions by providing inviting opportunities which would not otherwise exist for the divergent anti-colonial countries to make common cause against the colonial powers regarding territories remote from areas of their direct interests or knowledge or concern. The GA does offer the non-colonial powers a mechanism to ventilate their feelings and grievances and has served as a sometimes effective prod to the administering authorities to hasten the institution of improvements in territories they administer.
On the other hand, as indicated above, the gulf between the colonial minority and the anti-colonial majority is steadily widening and compromise and accommodation seem to be more and more difficult. In general, at the Eighth Session, the US continued to maintain a balance in its position between the two groups but did not adhere consistently to a middle-of-the-road position. That is to say, the “balance” was achieved in a number of instances by taking alternately positions more favorable to one side and then to the other on succeeding questions. The inevitable consequence was that both sides felt we were not consistent and neither side was satisfied with the results. The most outstanding examples in the political field were, of course, the North African items where we sternly resisted even the mildest of resolutions and the subsequently discussed South African items where further [Page 1341] interpretative inroads were made, with US acquiescence or support, into the classic principle of non-interference in domestic matters.
We may anticipate in the future continuing and increasingly successful efforts on the part of a confident anti-colonial majority to extend the role of the UN in colonial problems. In particular, efforts will concentrate upon extending the more limited surveillance of the UN in NSGTs to approximate the extent of UN supervision over the trust territories. This development the other colonial powers will fight bitterly, and the US too must necessarily resist as illegal from the point of view of the Charter and undesirable for the development of the UN at its present stage. The serious dilemma posed to the US by this struggle of forces is to take more forthright steps to guide and channel, and where necessary resist these efforts by the anti-colonial majority without alienating that majority, destroying their confidence in us and their support on other matters and without abandoning our adherence to the traditional principles of self-government and self-determination.
[Here follow further and extensive general remarks about the political role of the General Assembly, “as a forum for both sides in the cold war….”]
- Source text was an attachment to a covering memorandum of Feb. 19, 1954, by Allen, addressed to the Director of the Office of UN Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse), the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs (Robbins), the Planning Adviser, Bureau of United Nations Affairs (Bloomfield), and the Assistant Legal Adviser for UN Affairs (Meeker), not printed (ODA files, lot 62 D 225, “General Assembly”).↩
- For documentation on this matter, see pp. 1427 ff.↩
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In the omitted portion of Part B, four major potential political roles for the General Assembly were listed, as follows:
- “(a) To substitute for the moribund Security Council as the UN action body in the event of breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, such as another Korea;
- “(b) To work out the peaceful settlement of political disputes, both East-West issues (Germany, Austria, Trieste, etc.) and other political questions (Palestine, KMT troops in Burma, etc.);
- “(c) To ease the tensions and strains in the complex of changing colonial relationships, and
- “(d) To serve as a forum and sounding board for both sides in the cold war.”