Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

USUN files, “Dependent Areas (DA), 1952–1957”

Memorandum Handed to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson), by the Netherlands Minister of Embassy (De Beus), June 20, 1952

June 20, 1952

Suggestions of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the policy to be followed by the Administering Powers in the Committee on information from non-self-governing territories and in the General Assembly of the U.N.

The Administering Powers which have responsibilities for non-self-governing territories, have repeatedly been subject to stringent criticism in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Susceptibilities with regard to the colonial problem are so acute in the United Nations that every year again political pressure is exercised on the Administering Powers, and the Charter of the United Nations is handled and applied in a manner, contrary to the decisions of San Francisco in 1945. Consequently, the question arises whether it would not be advisable for the Administering Powers to enter into joint consultations with respect to the policy to be adopted towards this attitude of the General Assembly.

This problem results in particular from the obligation of transmitting information under Article 73 which obligation has resulted in a supervision by the General Assembly, not provided for in the Charter. If this supervision has remained within certain bounds and the recommendations resulting therefrom have been of a constructive nature, this situation would be acceptable. However, the Sixth Session of the General Assembly has once more shown evidence of serious and unjustified criticism with respect to the policy of the Administering Powers. This criticism often was of an aggressive character and, moreover, based on political considerations, whereas the terms of Article 73e specifically exclude all discussion of political aspects. Therefore the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is of the opinion that the Administering Powers should consider the possibility of taking a firm and unanimous stand against this attitude of the anti-colonial Powers.

The Netherlands Government believe unanimous action of the Administering Powers to be of primary importance, as otherwise they, one after the other, will subsequently fall into trouble and will, again and again, find themselves confronted with unacceptable Resolutions of the General Assembly. This does not necessarily imply that this unanimity should apply to all issues; a certain divergency of opinions should be possible.

Neither should this co-ordination be expected to imply that in the future the Administering Powers would no longer be subject to unpleasant or unfavourable resolutions of the General Assembly, the composition of this body being such that the developed countries, responsible for the development of other countries, are in a small minority. However, the history of the U.N. shows that a group of States, acting unanimously and following a well-formulated programme, is often able to prevent resolutions which are contrary to the letter and to the spirit of the Charter of the U.N.

Consequently it would be most beneficial for the position of the Administering Powers if their mutual differences of policy were not too great. That differences of opinion such as presented themselves in the Fourth Committee of the Sixth Session of the General Assembly manifest themselves, should be avoided. In voting on resolutions in the Fourth Committee e.g. Denmark voted 14 times in favour, once against and once abstained, whereas Belgium cast 4 affirmative and 7 negative votes and 9 abstentions. The present situation is the more unsatisfactory as in particular the standpoints regarding certain questions of principle appeared to be different.

To avoid these differences in future the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would like to give some suggestions as to a common policy to be followed with respect to a number of problems which regularly present themselves when the reports concerning the non-self-governing territories are being discussed. It would be recommendable to consider at the same time the sanctions the Administering Powers might possibly annex to their standpoint. All possible sanctions should properly be announced before being applied, in order that the anti-colonial Powers be informed of the policy of the Administering Powers.

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is of the opinion that the Administering Powers should proceed on the assumption that the Special Committee for the non-self-governing territories will be maintained. It is indeed unthinkable that the majority of the Fourth Committee would be prepared not to re-establish the Special Committee. It must be admitted that in practice the Special Committee has done good and useful work. On the whole the discussions were matter-of-fact and observations were made which more than once proved to be of value to the Administering Powers. One of the advantages of the Special Committee being maintained is that the results of its activities exercise a favourable influence on the work of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly. Till now these results have not been unsatisfactory for the Administering Powers; this is probably due to the fact that in the Special Committee the Administering Powers and the non-Administering Powers are represented in equal numbers, whereas in the Fourth Committee the Administering Powers constitute a small minority.

2. The Administering Powers should be in perfect agreement on the nature of the interference of the General Assembly in the administration of the non-self-governing territories. The principle should be strictly adhered to that the Administering Powers exclusively are competent with regard to the administration of the territories and that they are not responsible to the United Nations in respect thereto—their obligations in that regard are limited to the transmitting of information on the subjects mentioned in Article 73(e).

3. The information submitted under Article 73(e) of the Charter is not transmitted to be “pigeon-holed”; it may be discussed of course by the General Assembly. In general, however, the General Assembly should confine itself to “observations”. In case it makes recommendations, the Administering Powers cannot be compelled to observe them; if they do observe them, they do so of their own free will. It is therefore unacceptable that the Special Committee, as was suggested by Cuba, should use a whole session (every four years) in order to examine to what extent the resolutions of the General Assembly have been observed. Therefore the Administering Powers should unanimously oppose the institution of a four-year Special Committee which would devote a fourth session to this special end. If this nevertheless should happen, the Administering Powers should not comply with a possible request for information on the way in which the recommendations of the General Assembly have been observed. They might also—by way of extreme sanction—consider the possibility of unanimously refusing to attend such fourth session (or such part of it as intended for this purpose). Finally they might react to this manifest abuse of power by suspending the transmission of the usual information.

4. With respect to the determination of the factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether a territory is or is not a territory whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government, the Administering Powers should take the view that these factors never can have any binding effect. They can only be considered as indicative, as a guide for the Administering Power itself to determine whether a territory falls outside the scope of Article 73(e) of the Charter. They may also be used as a guide in drawing up the information required by the General Assembly in compliance with Resolution 222(III).³

5. The discussions on the political development of the non-self-governing territories are a problem by themselves. During the Sixth Session of the General Assembly considerable difficulties presented themselves and it then appeared that there was no concord among the Administering Powers as to a common standpoint.

In general such discussions should be considered not to be allowed. In practice, however, it is not always possible to avoid them as the political background cannot always be neglected when economic, social and educational problems are discussed. It is therefore reasonable to agree to the practice the Fourth Committee has followed till now and not to rule a speaker out of order, so long as he does not exceed certain limits. It should be considered admissible that a speaker discusses politics by way of exception, in general terms, referring to the economic background and if, in any case, his speech does not assume the character of an attack on any Member’s political policy in any individual territory.

If this limit is exceeded all Administering Powers might, by way of extreme sanction, leave the Committee for the time during which the item that gave rise to the discussion is under debate.

If once more a resolution should be proposed such as the one proposed by Iraq at the Sixth Session of the General Assembly—in which the statement was made that it should be considered in accordance with the Charter that the Fourth Committee deals with political matters—the Administering Powers should oppose such resolution. They might then state that, if the resolution is adopted, the abovementioned sanction will be applied.

6. Another question on which a unanimous standpoint of the Administering Powers seems desirable is that of the sending of “Visiting Missions” to non-self-governing territories as was suggested by Pakistan and Lebanon at the Sixth Session of the General Assembly.

This ought certainly to be rejected, as it would directly prejudice the sovereignty of the Administering Powers. By way of extreme sanction all Administering Powers might refuse to participate in the Committee’s activities as long as the Missions’ reports are being discussed. They might also state that the Missions will not be admitted.

7. If an Administering Power has decided to cease the transmitting of information, an identical standpoint should be adopted with respect to the hearing of representatives of that territory by the General Assembly.

8. In general all endeavours to have representatives of non-self-governing territories heard by the General Assembly should be opposed. Apart from the fact that the General Assembly is unsuited for this purpose, the Charter confines this possibility to representatives of trust territories only.

If the General Assembly should nevertheless decide upon such invitation the Administering Powers might resolve to leave the Committee for the time of the hearing.

9. The Administering Powers should adopt an identical standpoint with respect to resolution 566 (VI), which invites the Special Committee to examine the possibility of associating these territories in the work of the Committee in the capacity of associate members. The Administering Powers might adopt the standpoint that representatives of non-self-governing territories can participate in the work of the Special Committee only as members of the delegations of the Administering Powers. If the non-self-governing territories should be designated as associate members of the Special Committee—be it as non-voting members—this should induce the Administering Powers not to take part in the activities of the Special Committee.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is of the opinion that it would be most important if the abovementioned suggestions could be discussed at a meeting of representatives of the Administering Powers, at such a moment that the results thereof can be submitted to the respective Governments in order that they may be able to provide their delegations to the Seventh Session of the General Assembly with identical instructions. In this connection this Ministry would appreciate it highly if it could be informed whether a discussion of this nature is considered useful and whether the points set forth above might constitute a useful starting point. Such a discussion could perhaps take place during the session of the Special Committee for the non-self-governing territories in 1952, as at that time the experts of the Administering Powers are assembled. The Ministry would be glad to learn the comments of the Administering Powers on the above.

3. In New York on June 10, the Permanent Delegation of the Netherlands had transmitted to the Mission at the United Nations (USUN) and to the Delegations of the other Administering Authorities a memorandum entitled “Non-Self-Governing Territories,” dated June 10, 1952. The memorandum was transmitted subsequently by the Permanent Netherlands Representative to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on June 27.

   This memorandum consisted of two parts, Parts A and B. The nine points of Part A were an abbreviated version of the instant June 20 memorandum. Part B, entitled “Factors”, was a more detailed discussion of this paragraph, as follows:

   “B. Factors.

   1. There is a distinction between the general principles of Chapter XI and the specific obligation laid down in Article 73(e).

   2. The “factors” merely serve to determine whether a territory has reached a stage a self-government where it falls outside the scope of Article 73(e). Such a stage has been reached as soon as the matters mentioned in Article 73(e) have been placed within the control of the Government of the territory. This is where the obligation to transmit information ends, even if the territory has not yet reached a full measure of self-government in other fields.

   Under resolution 567 (VI) it is recommended to study the factors determining whether or not a territory has attained a full measure of self-government in general. Such a study seems not to be relevant since the general provisions of Chapter XI entail no specific obligation on the part of the Administering Powers except for the obligation of Article 73(e). The question is not whether a territory falls outside the scope of Chapter XI but whether or not the transmission of information under Article 73(e) should be terminated.

   3. In the introduction to the list of factors annexed to resolution 567 (VI) three cases are distinguished:

   a. the attainment of independence;

   b. the union of a territory on a footing of equal status with … the metropolitan Power etc.;

   c. the case of territories which have become neither independent nor fully integrated with another State but which have already attained a full measure of self-government in their internal affairs.

   The list of factors is limited to the cases a and b, while c is said to merit further study. Case c should be understood as meaning the attainment of full self-government in the matters mentioned in Article 73(e).

   4. As soon as a territory has attained the status mentioned in case c the provisions of Article 73(e) cease to apply to the (former) Administering Power, because:

   a. constitutional considerations prevent the transmission of information by the metropolitan Power, the latter having lost competence in such matters;

   b. full self-government in the matters of Article 73(e) places the territory, as far as those matters are concerned, on a footing of equal status with independent States;

   c. the (former) Administering Power exercising no longer control over such internal affairs is not in a position to provide information under Article 73(e);

   d. continued transmission of information would create a new form of dependence of the territory.

   Therefore, only the competence in the matters mentioned in Article 73(e) should be taken into account in deciding whether the transmission of information should be continued.”