Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

ODA files, lot 60 D 512, “Col/Pol, US Policy Dependent Areas”

Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Dependent Area Affairs

confidential

[Washington, undated.¹]

Fourth Committee

a. the issue of colonialism

The general issue of colonialism has become an issue as dominant in the United Nations as the East-West conflict. A large majority of the members—in fact, all the members outside Western Europe, the old Commonwealths [sic] and the U.S.—have a strong tendency to vote against “colonialism” and for “self-determination” or “independence” whenever these issues are posed. A small but vociferous group of countries—at the Sixth Session Egypt was by far the most active—which have strong emotional feelings against “colonialism”, activate the large latent anti-colonial majority; Pakistan, India and Egypt are now pushing forward their rival efforts to organize it as a continuing tactical group under their leadership.

It must be anticipated that colonial questions will continue to be a major issue in the General Assembly for the foreseeable future and certainly an increasingly contentious subject for the immediate future. The colonial question in the General Assembly, initially largely confined to Committee Four and in special cases to the First Committee and the Ad Hoc Political Committee, has by now spilled over into other main Committees; for example, the Third Committee in the question of self-determination and the “colonial application” clauses, and the Second Committee in the question of an Economic Commission for Africa. However, it is in Committee Four, concerned with Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories, that colonial issues are constantly considered and the political tensions surrounding the “colonial problem” are continually evident.

b. fundamental split in the fourth committee

Since the first session of the GA, the Fourth Committee has tended to divide on practically all questions into two groups—a small minority of powers administering trust territories or non-self-governing territories (7 states not including the U.S.) and the overwhelming majority of non-administering powers. The latter group is motivated by strong anti-colonial sentiment which has come to increasingly strong expression, and has held almost the entire initiative in determining the program and proceedings of the Committee, These two groups are attracted to opposite poles on five essential points:

1. The non-administering powers generally believe that colonialism in any form should be eliminated. The administering powers, however, start from the premise that one or another of the dependence relationships may, according to circumstances, still be useful or necessary.

2. Many of the non-administering powers maintain that the United Nations has the sovereignty or at least shares the sovereignty over trust territories. This is denied by the administering powers, who, however, do not claim sovereignty for themselves.

3. The non-administering group generally contend that there can be no final change in the status of non-self-governing territories under Chapter XI without General Assembly review and perhaps even revision. The administering powers, in general, reject this view.

4. While the majority of non-administering powers maintain that independence is the only acceptable goal for colonial territories, the administering powers see other alternatives; e.g., unity within the French Union, voluntary membership in the British Commonwealth, or statehood in the case of the United States.

5. Many of the non-administering powers contend that independence should be promised within a fixed term of years, if not immediately; the administering powers maintain that the desirable date of independence cannot generally be determined in advance.

In this situation the United States has, in practice, evolved a middle position between the extremes and has sought to develop a sizeable group of states which would also take a moderate position with respect to the various colonial issues. In this effort, the United States is assisted materially by the fact that the views of the members of the United Nations on colonial issues are diverse. The members of the administering and non-administering groups by no means share a common viewpoint, nor do they vote identically on specific issues arising in the Fourth Committee. Among the administering powers, general positions range all the way from “ultra-conservative” to “moderate” or “liberal”. In the non-administering group, there is a similar graduation ranging from “moderate” to “extreme”. Thus, a moderate force exists potentially in the Fourth Committee. It is comparable in many respects to the “independent vote” in politics. It may on occasions support even the conservative administering powers, or, it may sometimes support the more extreme members of the non-administering group, but it constitutes a hard core about which a moderate position, between the two extremes, may be formulated and adopted in the Fourth Committee at the expense of more extreme proposals. While the composition of the moderate group may vary from time to time and on particular issues, it is clear that the following states are among those which normally take middle ground positions on colonial questions: Among the administering group—the United States, Denmark, and New Zealand; among the non-administering group—the Scandinavian states, Luxembourg, Iceland, Greece, Turkey, Canada, Thailand, the Dominican Republic, Peru, and certain other Latin American states.

c. u.s. recrod in votes

If all Committee Four resolutions approved during the Sixth Session of the General Assembly are taken into account, it is apparent that on almost every question the U.S. was able to support or to abstain on the action taken by the General Assembly. It should be noted that the U.S. participated in the sponsoring of only two of these resolutions. The U.S. Delegation, both by statements in the Committee and by informal talks with the sponsors of numerous other resolutions, was able to persuade the sponsors to accept changes which improved their resolutions. As a result, in its votes on Committee Four resolutions the Delegation opposed only two proposals which were approved by the Assembly. These were as follows:

(1) The paragraph in the resolution on administrative unions affecting trust territories providing for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to give preliminary examination to the special report of the Trusteeship Council on administrative unions; and

(2) The paragraph in the resolution on organization and methods of functioning of the visiting missions recommending that, whenever necessary to appoint to visiting missions members other than representatives sitting on the Trusteeship Council, the Council consider inviting UN Members who are not members of the Council to nominate suitably qualified persons.

After the failure to eliminate the foregoing objectionable portions of the resolutions in question, the U.S. voted against the administrative unions resolution and abstained on the visiting missions resolution. The only other resolutions on which the U.S. Delegation abstained were the following:

(1) The Fourth Committee resolutions granting hearings to representatives of the indigenous peoples of South-West Africa and their spokesmen.

(2) The resolution on attainment by the trust territories of the objective of self-government or independence (which invited the administering authorities of the trust territories to report on the period of time in which it was expected that the trust territories would attain self-government or independence.)

(3) Part (b) of the resolution on the question of South-West Africa reaffirming that the normal way of modifying the international status of South-West Africa would be to place it under the International Trusteeship System in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter.

d. significant trends in committee four

It is possible that the foregoing evaluations, based wholly upon U.S. votes on General Assembly resolutions which were actually put to the vote, may give an overly optimistic picture of the degree to which the discussion and actions of the Fourth Committee accorded with the interests and desires of the U.S. In the first place, the U.S. voted affirmatively on a number of resolutions which we would have preferred not be brought to a vote because of embarrassment to our Allies or because we do not consider helpful additions to the UN machinery and procedures. Moreover, there is no doubt that a deepening of the cleavage between the administering and non-administering members of the Committee occurred during the session. We were less successful than before in moderating the conservative approach of some administering countries, particularly the French, Belgian, British and Australian delegations, as well as the extreme approach of some of the administering group. The extremism of the anti-colonial majority increased measurably. The more radical members expressed their objective more clearly and sharply as being the grant of independence to non-self-governing areas rather than the improvement of conditions and the increase of autonomy. South Africa’s refusal to carry out the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on South-West Africa added to the truculence of this group. When the Western powers, including the U.S., opposed the consideration of the Arab complaint concerning Morocco, the same issue broke out in aggravated form in the Committee Four debate at various points.

Experience even before the Sixth Session had shown clearly the settled technique of the anti-colonial majority of using the debates in the Fourth Committee to maintain a steady pressure against the administering powers toward an undefined or vaguely defined objective of “freedom” or “independence” for these territories. One major field of application of this increasing pressure on the administering powers is the gradual development of machinery, in addition to the Trusteeship Council, for passing judgment on the actions of the administering powers not only in the trusteeship field but in the field of reports from non-self-governing territories under Chapter XI. Year by year the machinery in this field has been increasing. This year the Assembly added two new bodies, a Committee on Administrative Unions and a Committee on the Factors to be Taken into Account in Determining Whether a Territory is or is not Non-Self-Governing. These bodies, like the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and the South West Africa Committee, are inter-sessional bodies.

During the sixth session the majority in the Committee also pressed ahead with other forms of pressure. They extended the practice of hearing directly from inhabitants of territories under consideration in the Fourth Committee itself. In the case of South West Africa the attitude of South Africa gave great provocation for this. However, the Committee not only declared its intention to hear chiefs of the Herero tribes—and even before any other action had been taken—but they have heard the Rev. Michael Scott on two occasions and the challenge to this practice by South Africa may in fact encourage the extension of it in the future. The Committee also passed resolutions looking toward the adoption of continuing arrangements for confronting the representatives of administering powers in the Trusteeship Council and in the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories with representatives of the indigenous inhabitants. Although the temper of the anti-colonial group in the Fourth Committee was greatly aggravated by the particular conditions that existed at the time, it must be assumed that the majority will in following sessions continue its pressure and move ahead from the positions achieved at this session, in the same direction.

The reaction of the principal administering powers to these developments was to increase the rigidity of their attitudes and, in general, to state or imply that the end of their patience and of their collaboration had about been reached. All of them, with the exception of Denmark, adopted a more uncompromising attitude than the United States. This is revealed in the voting record alone. The voting record of the administering powers on seventeen Committee Four resolutions approved by the Sixth Assembly is as follows:

	Yes	No	Abstentions
United States	12	2	3
Denmark	13	1	2
Netherlands	8	4	5
France	6	6	5
United Kingdom	6	4	7
Australia	6	3	8
New Zealand	6	3	8
Belgium	3	7	6

Many of the administering powers, not including, however, the U.S., were ready to walk out of the Fourth Committee if a resolution affirming the right of the Fourth Committee to discuss political conditions within the Chapter XI territories was adopted. Only superb conciliation moves behind the scene averted the adoption of this resolution and a consequent walk-out. Even so, members of the French Delegation in the Fourth Committee absented themselves during the discussion of the issue, which had its origin in speeches by various representatives on conditions in French Morocco.

e. u.s. role

The GA is the forum in which the issue of colonialism is most dramatically presented to the world. Although the U.S. is not subject to the same criticisms as are the other administering powers it is, after all, an “administering authority” with not insignificant territorial responsibilities. For this reason alone the U.S. cannot completely associate itself with the anti-colonial majority in Committee Four. As indicated above, we have sought to maintain a middle position between the extreme members of both groups.

In consequence, the U.S. has attempted, through advance consultations and tactics in the GA, both to moderate the anti-colonial majority and to loosen up the rigid opposition of the administering powers. In 1951, our consultations with other governments were far more extensive than ever before, including all regions except the Soviet bloc. However, experience in the recent GA creates doubt as to whether many votes were altered by these consultations. This is probably due, at least in part, to the circumstances which aggravated the consideration of Fourth Committee questions at the very beginning of the session. Our experiences with non-administering powers shows clearly that, even though their delegates in the Fourth Committee do a great deal of “free wheeling” and spontaneous production both of speeches and resolutions, their governments generally support the anti-colonial trend in the Fourth Committee itself and will back-up even extreme positions taken by their representatives.

In the Fourth Committee, we attempt to play a conciliating role in the formulation of resolutions. We attempt to secure such modifications of majority resolutions as will enable ourselves, in the light of our substantive and political interests, and as many administering powers as possible to vote for them. We try to moderate the stand of the administering powers. On a given issue we seek to bring together a group of moderate states sufficient in size to ensure the adoption of reasonable resolutions or, as has been done on occasion, to prevent by the two-thirds rule the adoption of unreasonable or extreme resolutions. These tactics have been thus far relatively successful, having regard to the composition of the Committee. They have thus far prevented a breakup of the Committee, and, up to the present, have largely avoided for us the stigmas attached to “colonialism” by most UN Members.

However, the sixth session showed that a crisis may be near concerning the whole work of the Fourth Committee. The majority is clearly bent on pressing forward further and faster. The administering powers are at the point of refusing cooperation. It is evident that we face formidable difficulties in the Fourth Committee in maintaining, at even the standards of past performance, a program which will be on the whole moderate in its results and an atmosphere which will permit the continued cooperation of the administering powers in the work of the Committee.

f. certain conclusions regarding u.s. participation in committee four

It is clear that the colonial problem as a whole is fast developing into a major international issue in which U.S. interests and relations with the rest of the world are vitally affected. While the ability of the U.S. to control this issue will vary from case to case, the position of the U.S. and the manner in which it exerts its influence will affect United States interests with respect to the colonial powers, the non-colonial world, our own territories and the UN as an organization. By mustering considerable effort, we managed to defeat the Arab request for considering the Moroccan item at the last session; the same thing was done concerning the Tunisian item in the Security Council. But a strong majority is determined to secure a hearing for the anti-colonial case in these and other areas. Even at the sixth session, the Moroccan problem and the other anti-colonial problems detracted considerably from the emphasis which we wished to give to East-West issues. It is quite possible that, at subsequent sessions, such anti-colonial issues may displace East-West issues at the center of the stage. Many countries—such as Iran—which have political independence have retained a degree of economic subservience to the UK, France or the U.S. and in future cases of friction such countries will find it expedient to appeal to the “colonial” issue.

On the basis of the factors which have been set out in this paper, the United States seems destined to continue to play a middle role, between extreme positions on colonial issues, both in the UN as a whole and in the Fourth Committee. The following conclusions regarding U.S. participation in Committee Four assume the continuance of this middle position:

1. The positions taken by the United States Delegation in the Fourth Committee on specific questions should be based on a comprehensive view of U.S. requirements and interests rather than on an effort merely to conciliate opposing viewpoints. Normally, however, this will place the U.S. in a middle position and will, as a result, prevent the U.S. from being completely identified with either the extreme administering or non-administering group.

2. The efforts which U.S. delegations have made in previous Assemblies to develop a sizeable, moderate group of states on the various issues which have been presented should be continued and intensified. At best, such a moderate group can determine the action which the Committee will take. Failing that, it may be able to prevent extreme or unreasonable action.

3. Every effort should be made to ensure that the U.S. position on colonial issues is made clear both publicly and in consultations with other Members. To this end strong emphasis should be placed on statements of our position on the substance of issues, and situations in which U.S. positions can only be inferred from U.S. votes should be avoided. While it is difficult to imbue middle-of-the-road positions with “glamour” or drama, some initiative and leadership can be secured by taking a strong, plainly and fully explained position which will serve as an alternative attraction to extreme negativism on the one hand or irresponsible radicalism and innovation on the other.

4. Despite the fact that the results of pre-Assembly talks with administering and non-administering members have not been as satisfactory as we have wished, we should continue and even extend these talks in the future. We should ensure that a proper balance is maintained in these consultations so that neither group will feel that it is neglected or regarded as secondary importance, so that the U.S. will not be completely identified with either group. Careful consideration should be given to the more suitable method of carrying out consultations both prior to the Assembly and during Assembly sessions. In discussions with both groups we should continue to emphasize our hope that expressions of view and proposals for action on these issues, which understandably arouse sentiment and emotion, will be moderate and responsible and look toward the preservation of an atmosphere in which constructive action can be taken.

5. Our present policy of stressing the importance of the continuing activities of the Trusteeship Council and the Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories is well advised and should be firmly adhered to. We might develop even further the line that the effective operation of the Charter system requires that the General Assembly not interfere with the work and decisions of the Trusteeship Council except on the really major issues.

6. As one tactical device, we should try to establish definitely the principle that questions relating to Chapter XI are “important questions” and subject to the two-thirds majority requirement pursuant to Article 18, paragraph 2 of the Charter. Although most of the precedents are in this direction, practice has not been entirely uniform.

7. In some cases, consideration might be given to referring appropriate contentious issues to the International Court of Justice for advisory opinions. A case in point might be the question of the compatibility of administrative unions involving trust territories and adjacent colonies with the provisions of the Charter and the trusteeship agreements.

8. Continued study should be given to methods of restricting the influence of the Secretariat among non-administering delegations. The use by the Secretariat of these delegations to put forward speeches and resolutions as a means of promoting contentious Secretariat policies in the colonial field should be appropriately discouraged. As on all other issues, the services of the Secretariat on matters relating to the critical colonial field should be impartially rendered.

9. In determining U.S. positions on issues arising in the Fourth Committee we should, in every instance, give consideration to the desirability of the United States taking the initiative by introducing, “planting” resolutions or ideas.

10. Where advisable, major questions in the colonial field should be assigned to Committee Four as a means of forcing a concentration on significant issues rather than on the details of the operation of the Trusteeship Council and the Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories.

11. In view of the fact that colonial questions are discussed in a number of committees of the Assembly, careful coordination is required by the Assembly Delegation in order to ensure that there is identity of policy in the various forums of the Assembly and that the tactics in the various committees are mutually adjusted to accord with U.S. objectives. An important discussion or vote in Committee Three on self-determination can readily affect a decision taken shortly thereafter by Committee Four.

1. This memorandum, a review of matters relating to non-self-governing and trusteeship territories at the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly, Nov. 6, 1951–Feb. 5, 1952, is undated. It is obviously a draft of a document which was eventually completed for the Working Group on Colonial Problems (Doc. CP D–5, July 25, 1952). A commentary on the completed document by the UN Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Bacon), is not printed (Department of State Committee files, lot 54 D 5, Doc. CP D–5/1, July 23, 1952).