Department of State Committee files, lot 54 D 5, “Working Group on Colonial Problems”
Memorandum by Erie Stein of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs to the Working Group on Colonial Problems1
Conflict of United States Policy Objectives in Relation to Tunisia and Morocco2
Tunisia and Morocco are French Protectorates, established in 1871 and 1912, respectively. While the treaties setting up the protectorates recognize the sovereignty of the native ruler, they transferred important powers to the protecting power, including control of foreign affairs, armed forces, finance, and a dominant position in the control of land ownership and economic development. Both Protectorates have been financial liabilities to France. On the other hand, such economic development as has occurred has resulted in numerous benefits to the ever increasing number of French settlers (there are some 150,000 Frenchmen in Tunisia and 350,000 in Morocco) and a relatively small group of investors and absentee owners in France. The Tunisian and Moroccan people have derived relatively limited economic and social benefit from this development.
Nationalism has grown in strength since the end of World War II so that it now commands broad popular support in Tunisia particularly in the well disciplined Tunisian labor organizations; in Morocco the support while substantial is somewhat more circumscribed. The rise of new states in Asia (India, Indonesia, etc.) as well as the independence of the less advanced Libya fired the nationalist aspirations. In the minds of a steadily increasing number of Tunisians and Moroccans the nationalist parties offer the only means of regaining for the local inhabitants political, economic and social control of the country. Any improvement brought about by the protecting power in the lot of the local population inevitably swells the ranks of the nationalists. If no real concessions are made to the nationalists they may turn away from their present leaders to more radical elements.
[Page 1143]For France, it is impossible either to grant its protectorates independence or ruthlessly suppress the nationalists because of the political and philosophical cleavage among the French themselves. To maintain their position as a great power and to protect the interests of the large French colony they believe that they must cling to the status quo, or a reasonable facsimile of it, as represented by the French Union. This explains why their programs for the protectorates offer a shadow of reform but retain the substance of French control. The French policy appears to be to foster political progress and stability by balancing as much as possible each concession to the North Africans by formal increase of the political status of the French colonies.
The French are convinced that any concessions to the nationalists brings them a step closer to a complete loss not only of the two protectorates but of the rest of French Africa. They believe that such a development would be a first step toward the complete destruction of the present colonial system on which so much of Europe’s power and civilizing influence is based. The problem has vast domestic political implications for the French Government.
The United States has conflicting interests in the area. Our long-term traditional interest leads us to sympathize with the aspirations of dependent peoples toward independence. Our shorter range policy makes it imperative for us to support France in order to create the essential area of strength in Western Europe, the keystone of the containment arch. Strategically, North Africa would be particularly important in the event of an Allied withdrawal from Europe and bases are considered necessary in that area. We have the necessary bases in Morocco. An outbreak of violent nationalist resistance would force the French to increase their military contingent in the area at the expense of Europe, Indochina, etc. In considering French reactions to our policies on Tunisia and Morocco it should always be remembered that their stakes in the defense against Soviet Russia is at least as great, if not greater, than ours.
For the United States, the problem resolves itself into the need for a moderate middle-of-the-road policy which will neither permanently alienate the good will of the North Africans by too firm alignment with French colonial policy, nor drive the French to emotional acts of desperation by the encouragement of too rapid evolution towards independence for the protectorates.
In dealing with the North Africans it should be remembered that, while the surge of nationalism has world-wide repercussions, the power of the West, if wisely used, will induce the Moslem world to accept gradual progress towards independence, provided such progress is continuous and real.
- Circulated to the Working Group under cover of Doc. CP D–11, Aug. 26, 1952, entitled “Dilemmas of United States Foreign Policy Objectives with Respect to Colonial Areas”. The instant memorandum was the first of five attachments; a sixth memorandum prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research was subsequently added to the group at an undetermined date.↩
- For documentation on French North Africa, see volume xi .↩