Department of State Committee files, lot 54 D 5, “Working Group on Colonial Problems”

Memorandum by Louis H. Pollak of the Office of the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Working Group on Colonial Problems1

confidential
  • Subject:
  • Colonial Policy Group discussions

It is our impression that the first two meetings of the Colonial Policy Group may have narrowed the agenda problem to two chief questions: first: the relative emphasis to be given to a general policy re-examination with reference particularly to the more important specific problems (e.g., the North African) as compared with a process of combined policy discussion and application to a series of particular issues expected soon to arise in various UN organs; and second: The specific topics for discussion and their priorities under each method of approach.

In developing a work program which will be the answer to these questions, we believe it would be useful to agree rather concretely on the particular jobs the group wants to complete, thereby establishing [Page 1136] a frame of reference for questions of emphasis and timing. We take it as self-evident that something more is expected of a group of officers widely representative of the Department and provided with the maximum secretariat and documentation assistance than the routine discussion and clearance of compromise language for position papers on matters of relatively minor importance, or the merely passive registering of important decisions taken elsewhere without prior referral for discussion and recommendation by the group. Alternative courses have, in substance, been put forward in the individual suggestions of several members of the group and we suggest that agreement might be reached that our jobs are roughly three:

1. Lay the groundwork for, and possibly complete, one or more papers supplementing or revising the 1950 study.

Comment.

Probably the most time-consuming part of this job would be working through the multitude of problems in the colonial policy field. To this end, it has been strongly urged that the group should address itself to current draft position papers and such an approach can perhaps best be complemented by the projected reconsideration of the 1950 paper and by discussion of special studies which may be submitted, such as the long-range planning paper to be prepared in S/P.

Perhaps more thought should also be devoted to raising and organizing some basic questions which colonial problems now pose for this Government, and to this end we attach a memorandum suggesting some factors and questions that seemed important to us. A copy of this memorandum has previously been given to S/P.

2. Assess and plan current U.S. efforts to bring the other administering powers into agreement on policies and programs which can commend themselves as consistent with U.S. objectives and as likely to maximize in the UN whatever good will is left for a course of “orderly” and non-rapid “evolution”.

Comment.

UND and EUR might prepare a statement for the group showing what problems have been singled out for bilateral discussion and what progress has been made and can be expected.

The group would consider whether additional items or countries should be added, new approaches made, or old ones renewed. We could explore alternative methods of persuasion and could reappraise the need for a fuller understanding by us of some of the problems of the other administering authorities.

In addition to the problems which can be expected to engender most heat at the 7th GA, the group might consider what longer-range programs can profitably be discussed in this context. Increased technical [Page 1137] assistance, educational exchange and a concerted counter-offensive to Soviet propaganda suggest themselves as useful subjects.

3. Serve as a focal point for the encouragement and formulation of concrete programs in the Point IV, VOA, educational exchange, and possibly other functional fields that can be carried on and recognized as U.S. substantive contributions to the economic and political advancement of colonial peoples.

Comment.

The interest of the functional offices has been evidenced by the attendance of several representatives at the first meetings, and work toward the objective stated might well be started at once by scheduling meetings devoted in whole or in part to a description of current programs and exploration of needs both as to areas and types of program, and possibilities for expansion, new emphasis, new approaches and increased public support.

The frame of reference offered, then, adds up to three objectives—reassessing and restating U.S. policy in particular and in general; seeking maximum understanding of an intelligent cooperation with our NATO friends to forward our own and their interest in the peaceful settlement of colonial problems in the framework of the United Nations; programming substantive economic and educational contributions to the eventual political stability and well-being of the peoples of the dependent areas.

These several lines of endeavor can probably best be pursued if they are taken up concurrently. Although there will be need for consecutive work in the several offices on the principal items in each line, referral to the group and reworking or supplementing can proceed with the focus of discussion shifting from meeting to meeting.

[Attachment]
secret

Re-Examination of U.S. Foreign Policy on Colonial Problems

The need for re-examining our policy on the dependent areas of other nations is pointed up by several factors in the current world situation: (1) the special relationships reflected by NATO between the United States and the principal colonial powers; (2) rising nationalism in certain dependent areas, particularly in North Africa; (3) Communist political exploitation of U.S. words as against deeds in the field of colonial policy; (4) the long-range threat of political instability in the dependent areas caused by population growth coupled with increasing disparities in per capita income.

[Page 1138]

Such a re-examination would need to frame in clear and operational terms the objectives of the United States in this field. This would necessitate consideration of such factors as:

(a)
U.S. interest in fostering strength and health (economic and political as well as military) in the colonial powers which are our partners in NATO and the defense of Western Europe;
(b)
U.S. need for raw materials and bases in the dependent areas of colonial powers;
(c)
U.S. concern with the future political orientation of the dependent areas as they evolve in the foreseeable and longer-range future;
(d)
U.S. need to minimize effectiveness of Soviet propaganda aimed at winning over dependent peoples and alienating them from the U.S.;
(e)
U.S. interest in preserving this country’s world standing as a proponent of self-determination, democratic processes, and social and economic betterment in underdeveloped areas.

When U.S. objectives have been framed, a number of questions of policy and implementation present themselves. The significance of alternative sets of answers must be assessed in order to decide on a course that can be followed, as different immediate situations arise, in pursuit of the stated objectives. It will be necessary in establishing and carrying out policies to differentiate between dependent areas: we are obviously confronted by different problems in such disparate places as (1) Western Samoa, (2) the Cameroons, and (3) Tunisia. Some dependent areas may never reach the political stage at which the North African dependencies have arrived; others may reach it in time. The following are some of the questions of policy and implementation requiring consideration:

(a)
To what extent are the strategic capabilities of the European colonial powers, in terms of European and free-world defense, enhanced, diminished, or otherwise affected by their particular colonial responsibilities?
(b)
In what cases can those powers expect to succeed in the maintenance of their dependent areas by continuing to follow the policies which the metropolitan governments now envisage?
(c)
What, if any, changes in those policies can help to keep events in dependent areas in the channels of evolution and prevent violent explosion?
(d)
What pressures are available to the U.S. and should be employed by this Government to require such changes by the colonial powers?
(e)
How much, if any, utility is there in continued reiteration by the U.S. of its well-worn generalities and clichés in the colonial field, measured in terms of whatever things we will have decided to do?
(f)
Should the U.S. expand technical assistance (direct or through the UN) to all or some dependent areas, and institute programs of capital development? How much U.S. supervision should there be? To what extent should we insist on education (including adult education) as part of the programs?
(g)
What steps can the U.S. take by way of information and propaganda to secure maximum support for U.S. policies among dependent peoples and elsewhere in the world? Some concrete suggestions: (i) attempt to avoid last-ditch and embittering fights in UN organs over colonial problems, and to use other media for pursuit and publicity of its dependent areas policies; (ii) appointment of individuals such as Luis Muñoz Marin2 to GA delegations; (iii) a UN Dependent Areas Decennial Exposition in 1955 to advertise what is being done in those areas, and to stimulate trade; (iv) special recognition of dependent area contributions to collective security (Korea?); (v) employment of dependent area personnel in UN Secretariat; (vi) review of U.S. and UN information media, particularly radio; increased advisory activity by the Trusteeship Council and Article 73 Special Committee, on political affairs in dependent areas.

  1. Circulated as Doc. CP D–1/1 Addendum; apparently written between the second and third meetings of the Working Group, that is, sometime between June 27 and July 11, 1952.
  2. Resident Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the United States.