Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

310/6–1352: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Mission at the United Nations ¹

secret

Washington, July 7, 1952—6:03 p.m.

16. Re: US–UK talks on UN Problems. Urtel 933, June 13. We hope you will be able hold informal, gen discussions with Jebb before his departure.

We suggest that in your conversations you focus on Jebb’s public speeches and points raised in Hickerson’s letter to Jebb (on his Syracuse speech) dated June 13, copy of which has been pouched USUN. Purpose of conversations wld be develop info and ideas for Sept talks re UN and GA (Hickerson–Burrows–Salt Memo Conversation June 24² pouched USUN) with greater realism.

Dept leaves to your discretion way in which you shld approach conversations. We wld suggest that you might begin by referring to great interest in Jebb’s speeches in Dept and pointing out feeling that implications these speeches go deeper than might appear on surface. We wld like ascertain exactly how far Brit thinking has gone in direction Jebb’s apparent emphasis on UN as instrument of conciliation rather than as collective security organiz useful in coping with aggression.

You may wish cover some or all fol points with Jebb:

1. In our view UN is capable serving both as instrument of conciliation and as organ for collective action against aggression. Under Charter we think it must perform both functions. We are committed to use of UN for both purposes, and we do not feel that they are in any way mutually exclusive. UN, in its various organs, offers sufficiently diverse and flexible procedures for both procedures.

2. We wld be interested in having Jebb’s views on UN experience re Kor. If aggression in Kor were to be repeated, how wld Jebb propose UN shld react? What is his view re future of CMC? For our part, while we recognize CMC operation can not proceed in future at speed attained during its first year, we hope it will be possible continue gradual improvement of planning techniques in prep for potential future aggression.

3. We have some difficulty in knowing what can be done to improve UN machinery for conciliation. Presumably Jebb wld agree that if there is will for conciliation, UN machinery is fully adequate. Has he any suggestions as to way in which UN might be made more effective for this purpose?

4. We wld be interested in anything Jebb wishes say re relationship between UN and NATO. We are impressed with importance of using “UN umbrella” in event aggression in NATO area, in order mobilize that part of free world not included in NATO on our side in what may be a desperate struggle for survival. We are equally impressed with need for use UN aegis if def against future aggression is needed outside NATO area.

5. While we wld not expect you to go into detail on NAfrican problems in your discussions with Jebb, you might inquire whether he has any particular views on long-range preps for handling problems such as Morocco and Tunisia in UN organs. We shld imagine, for example, that Nehru’s strictures against NATO powers and UN for their attitudes on NAfrican problems wld confront Brit with difficult dilemma, as it does US. Has Jebb any particular ideas as to way in which we can reconcile apparently irreconciliable tendencies on colonial issues in UN?

6. We wld be interested in Jebb’s reaction to question whether we shld carry out strong anti-Sov campaign against USSR in 7th GA. We appreciate possibility carrying anti-Sov campaign too far, but feel we cannot fail utilize GA for this valuable propaganda purpose. We may wish raise Katyn massacre; we may wish bring up treatment of aliens such as “Hungarian fliers” in Sov areas.

7. In course your discussion with Jebb, you may have occasion refer to Charter revision conf. We wld be interested in knowing whether Brit have given any thought to this subject.

As stated urtel 933, you may become involved discussion GA issues. If this shld happen we suggest you make any comments contingent upon studies now beginning in Dept with view to fixing positions on specific issues prior Sept talks.

Bruce

1. Drafted jointly by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) and the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Popper). Cleared with the Bureau of European Affairs (William B. Sale and Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs Barbour). The signing officer was the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse).
2. Not printed (320/6–2452).