Hickerson–Murphy–Key files, lot 58 D 33, “Ambassador Lodge”
The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Key) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)1
Dear Cabot: In a memorandum of April 28, 1954,2 you asked for comments on a paper concerning the UN membership problem which Ambassador Sawada handed to you. Ambassador Sawada suggests in this paper: (1) that we propose a list of applicants for “simultaneous admission” which would include, in addition to Japan and the other applicants we support, all or some of the five Soviet-sponsored candidates; (2) that in so doing it would not be necessary for us to consent outwardly to the “package deal” formula, since we could take the position that we have come to consider the “behaviour” of each of the Soviet-sponsored candidates to be satisfactory under a “more liberal interpretation” of article 4; (3) that it might be desirable for us not to condition our approval of the Soviet-sponsored applicants upon Soviet approval of the Republic of Korea or the three Associated States of the Indo-China; and (4) that the Soviet Union should and could concede that Japan’s admission shall not be linked with the “admission” of the Chinese Communist regime, since the Chinese representation question is legally not a membership question. Ambassador Sawada also expresses the view that it would be to our advantage if the United States rather than the Soviet Union or some “neutral” country submitted a new membership proposal for Japan’s admission.
If we decide at some future time to agree to a trade involving the admission of Soviet-sponsored applicants, I think we would want to consider a different application of the criteria of article 4 as suggested by the Ambassador. If we could base our acceptance of a trade on a lower standard, as some Members have already advocated, the admission of Soviet satellites could more easily be achieved without the act of admission constituting approval of the character of their regimes [Page 1002] and without an endorsement of the “package deal” formula. Furthermore, since the Soviet Union, even if it agreed to Japan’s admission, would hardly agree to the admission of the Republic of Korea and the three Associated States of Indo-China, we would have to consider whether we could consent to a settlement which did not provide for the immediate admission of these latter four states. However, we could certainly not consent to this now, and if we ever could, it could only be on the basis of some arrangement guaranteeing their future admission.
With respect to the Ambassador’s statement that the Chinese representation question is legally not a membership question, this is, of course, perfectly true. However, it certainly does not follow that the Soviet Union would not couple its consent to the admission of Japan with a demand that the Chinese Communists be seated.
Of course, any consideration on our part of the Ambassador’s idea of a new proposal to be submitted by us must be purely academic. As you point out in your memorandum, his proposal is contrary to our membership policy at this time. We therefore cannot give Ambassador Sawada any encouragement.
In giving him your reactions to his paper, I suggest you stress that we strongly desire a solution to the membership problem which would achieve Japan’s admission, and that we have carefully reexamined the entire question. However, we have concluded that we cannot agree to the admission of the Soviet-sponsored applicants, which in our view do not now meet the criteria of article 4, and we are not prepared to water down these criteria. I would also point out the obvious difficulties of any arrangement which did not provide for the Republic of Korea and the three Associated States of Indo-China but which did provide for Soviet-sponsored applicants. Finally, as the Ambassador well knows, it is the Soviet Union which has vetoed the admission of Japan. The United States, on the other hand, has strongly supported Japan’s admission and has sponsored its application in the United Nations. It is thus clear that the responsibility for the exclusion of Japan rests solely with the Soviet Union.3
Sincerely,
- Drafted by Paul W. Jones of UNP and cleared in draft with the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of European Affairs.↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
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The Deputy U.S. Representative at the United Nations (Wadsworth) informed Assistant Secretary Key in a memorandum as follows:
↩“On May 18 I gave Ambassador Sawada our reactions to his Membership proposal. He made little comment, but my impression was that he had not expected that his proposal would be accepted.” (310.2/5–2154)