Hickerson–Murphy–Key files, lot 58 D 33, “Membership”
Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Popper) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Wainhouse)1
confidential
[Washington,] March 25, 1954.
- Subject:
- Reexamination of UN Membership Question
We have sent copies of your March 23 memorandum on UN membership to Messrs. Robertson (FE), Merchant (EUR), Byroade (NEA), Woodward (ARA), Phleger (L), and Bowie (S/P). When Mr. Murphy responds to your memorandum you might suggest to his office that all of them be invited to the meeting.
The following are UNP’s views on the main questions for reexamination which were enumerated in your memorandum:
- 1.
- We believe that if the U.S. agreed to admit Soviet candidates despite their conduct, it would be harder to keep out the Chinese Communists. We think that is the major consideration against a deal on membership at this time, but we would like to get some indication of what the Department’s view would be on a membership settlement if in the future we found that a deal would not jeopardize support for our position on Chinese representation.
- 2.
- We are inclined to believe there would not be too serious domestic opposition to the admission of Soviet candidates as part of a deal provided we could get a trade along the lines suggested in your memorandum and could hold the line on Chinese representation. However, advance Congressional consultations would be advisable.
- 3.
- We believe we could meet the Charter difficulties a deal would involve. We could, for instance, make it clear that we are willing to accept at its face value the commitment to accept the obligations of membership made by all the applicants, as a means of testing their intentions. We are most anxious for the admission of states like Italy and Japan. Therefore, we are willing to accept a political settlement if this is what the overwhelming majority really wants, and on the clear understanding our views on the Soviet applicants remain unchanged.
- 4.
- We think that the admission of Soviet satellites would have the advantage of making them more accountable for their conduct. However, others will be better judges of the effect of the admission of satellites on opposition elements in these countries and on the governments in control.
- 5.
- A settlement along the lines suggested in your memorandum to Mr. Murphy would increase Soviet obstructive capacities, though not materially. (The Soviet bloc now represents one-twelfth of the total. If the deal went through, it would represent one-ninth of the total.) We could still maintain sufficient free-world majorities on “cold-war” issues but these majorities would not be proportionately as great as they have been, since on some questions many of the new non-Soviet Members would abstain. There would be serious difficulties for us on colonial and human rights questions.
- 6.
- If we proposed a deal which the Soviets refused, we believe we would still not have to resort to the veto in the Security Council to prevent the adoption of the Soviet proposal or some other “compromise” proposal, assuming we could keep the UK and France in line. However, we would have a difficult time in the Assembly, particularly if the USSR should add Japan to its package.
- 7.
- If we agreed to include Albania (in addition to Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania) we might conceivably be able to get Spain included. However, we would have no future bargaining power since all the Soviet applicants except Outer Mongolia (which we believe we should not include in a deal now or later) would be admitted. Furthermore, the more inclusive the deal, the greater might be the chances that some country would try to obtain the seating of Chinese Communists as part of a membership deal.
- 8.
- We believe we should propose as part of a deal that the permanent members agree not to use the veto in future cases, if we can do this without jeopardizing our right to use the veto on Chinese representation. We should also try to get a guarantee that Germany, Korea and the three states of Indochina will eventually be admitted.
- 9.
- In our view, we should not discuss this question at Geneva,2 particularly because we doubt the advisability of making a decision to accept a package deal at this time. If we later decided to move ahead, we would probably do better to negotiate directly with the Soviets.
- Drafted by Paul Jones (UNP).↩
- For documentation on the Geneva Conference, see volume xvi.↩