Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

IO files, SD/A/C.1/429

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the United States Delegation to the Eighth Regular Session of the General Assembly

confidential

[Washington,] September 5, 1953.

Admission of New Members

the problem

Nineteen membership applications are pending, including fourteen non-Soviet applications (Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, and Vietnam) and five Soviet-sponsored applications (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Outer Mongolia). In addition, the North Korean and Vietminh regimes have submitted communications purporting to be membership applications. The Federal Republic of Germany and Spain have not yet applied.

In the Security Council the Soviet Union has vetoed all the non-Soviet candidates while the required majority has never approved the admission of the Soviet candidates or the Soviet package proposal for the simultaneous admission of the five Soviet-sponsored applicants and nine of the non-Soviet applicants (all but the Republic of Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia).

The General Assembly has become increasingly concerned over the stalemate. The Seventh Session established a Special Committee to study all proposed solutions and placed the membership question on the agenda of the Eighth Session. The Committee met this spring. It analyzed various Latin American proposals for independent Assembly action to admit applicants, as well as proposals like the Soviet package deal. Its report to the Assembly makes no specific recommendations but none of the proposals it reviewed was found generally acceptable.

At the Eighth Session there may be pressure from the Latin American countries for independent Assembly action to admit applicants, but there is likely to be stronger pressure for a political settlement providing for the simultaneous admission of both Soviet and non-Soviet applicants.

united states position

1. The United States should indicate support for the fourteen non-Soviet applicants and opposition to the Soviet-sponsored applicants and also to the Soviet package proposal, and should call upon the Soviet Union to abandon its arbitrary membership policies.

2. The United States may support a resolution requesting the Security Council to keep under consideration all pending applications and reaffirming the principle that each application should be considered separately on the basis of the criteria of Article 4.

3. The United States should oppose the Soviet package proposal if it is resubmitted. If the proposal is likely to receive majority support, the United States may seek to amend it in order to obtain a resolution along the lines of recommendation 2 above.

4. The United States should not support proposals for independent Assembly action to admit applicants and should endeavor to persuade their sponsors not to bring them to a vote. However, if necessary to prevent adoption of proposals unacceptable to us, the United States may support a request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice as to whether the Assembly can admit an applicant vetoed in the Security Council not on Charter grounds but rather because of the Council’s refusal to admit others simultaneously.

5. If Italy and Japan are definitely interested in arrangements for non-member participation in the Assembly without the right to vote, the United States may consult with other members to seek their reactions, with a view to laying the groundwork for possible action along these lines at the next session for states excluded by the Soviet veto.

comment

The United States strongly supports the admission of Italy, Japan and the other non-Soviet applicants and deplores the fact that their admission has been blocked by the Soviet veto. It opposes the admission of the Soviet-sponsored applicants on the ground that they have failed to demonstrate that they meet the basic Charter qualification; and opposes the Soviet package proposal because it is contrary to the Charter principle, reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice in 1948, that each application should be considered separately on its own merits, because it includes the Soviet applicants and because it omits others we strongly favor.

The United States fully sympathizes with the motives behind various Latin American proposals calling upon the Assembly to admit applicants even though the Security Council has not made a favorable recommendation. However these proposals present legal difficulties. Article 4 of the Charter, as interpreted by a Court opinion of 1950, requires a favorable Security Council recommendation before the Assembly can admit an applicant. Furthermore, it has been generally understood from the beginning that recommendations on membership applications are subject to the veto.

Under existing procedures perhaps the only solution lies in a political settlement involving the admission of both Soviet and non-Soviet applicants. However, even in the unlikely event that the Soviet Union could be induced to agree to a settlement which provided for all the states we favor, it is believed that we should not seek such a settlement. There should be concrete deeds on the part of the Soviet Union and its satellites showing a sincere desire to settle other long-standing issues before the satellites are admitted. In addition, United States agreement to admit Soviet satellites in spite of the fact that they have failed to demonstrate that they are able and willing to carry out the Charter obligations could jeopardize support for our position on Chinese representation.

In order to do everything possible for Italy and Japan, the United States has considered arrangements which would give non-Members excluded from membership by the Soviet veto the right to participate in the Assembly on a regular basis without vote. Italy thus far has not been interested and Japan, while more interested than Italy, has shown no great enthusiasm. However, if these countries definitely want such arrangements it would be desirable to consult with other Members to obtain their reactions. We believe that such arrangements could be worked out in accordance with the Charter and might provide the best solution for some time to come. Even though it would not be practicable to take action on non-Member participation arrangements at the Eighth Session, it would be desirable, if Italy and Japan become interested, to lay the groundwork for future action by consulting with other Members, some of which have had legal reservations.