310.2/5–2153: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State
715. Re admission of new members: As Department aware, there appears to be strong feeling among UN members, particularly the small countries, that settlement of membership question is imperative. French, who have hitherto opposed any package deal on membership, have now indicated to us that they would favor such approach provided agreement could be reached with UK and US.
Proceedings thus far in special committee on membership indicate sentiment in favor of breaking deadlock. As indicated in Deptel 438, May 14, Egyptian suggestion that omnibus settlement is only practical solution would probably raise difficulties for US. British feel it may be difficult to keep committee from at least tacitly recognizing that a political accommodation among the big five is only way out of impasse. Looking forward to 8th GA, when Soviet package proposal doubtless will be reintroduced (with better prospects of adoption unless some other settlement is in sight), it might be helpful to us to take initiative with some sort of omnibus proposal of our own, although I have reached no firm conclusion as to what the precise nature of such a proposal should be.
I am generally in favor of trying, under the right circumstances, to find omnibus solution of this problem.
Our action in UN on this question should be consistent with broad lines of policy laid down by President in his April 16 speech which, while it did not refer to admissions question, did refer to a series of other specific matters, in order of priority, as tests of Soviet sincerity. In other words, while he is willing to meet Soviets half way, he wants evidence of their sincerity in regard to such matters Korea, Indochina, Austria and Germany before we start making substantial concessions to them. Admission of Soviet satellites to UN would be substantial concession for which there should be some very real quid pro quos.
In addition to foregoing general considerations there are number of specific risks against which we must carefully protect ourselves:
- 1.
- There is likely to be, following armistice in Korea, a much stronger emotional and political drive for seating Communist China in UN than for admitting new members. While American public opinion might in due time become reconciled to admission of Soviet satellites to UN, particularly if such action followed clear evidence of Soviet sincerity in regard to matters mentioned in President’s speech, I do not anticipate that American public opinion within predictable future would countenance seating Communist China. Any action which we may support with regard to new members is bound to have effect on our position in UN with regard to Chinese representation [Page 959] and could conceivably seriously weaken our position in latter regard. This should be governing consideration.
- 2.
- As indicated, any political solution of membership question would have to be based on clear evidence that Soviet Union has demonstrated by deeds its will for peace. Moreover such solution would have to be based on evidence that satellite countries had demonstrated by their action (e.g., Cardinal Mindzenty, et cetera) that they would at least plausibly qualify under Article 4 of charter.
- 3.
- We should also insist on something better than two-to-one ratio in our favor in order to preserve at least our voting ratio on important questions in GA. Moreover, we should not lose sight of fact that nuisance value of each Soviet satellite in UN may offset positive advantage we derive from having our friends in UN.
- 4.
- Finally, we must face fact that unless we succeed in securing admission of all nations whose candidacies we support, there is every likelihood that the Soviets, having secured the admission of all their satellites, would veto such nations friendly to US as had not been initially admitted. In this connection Department will recall indications we have had from British that they have had in mind package deal which would leave out Japan, admission of Japan presumably to be used as quid pro quo for seating Communist China. This, I feel, would be quite inadmissible for us.
I feel that procedure outlined by Department for work of present admissions committee, which would prevent it from reaching firm conclusions, is entirely sound and I think we should insist, particularly with British but also with French and others, that this committee refrain from vitiating our bargaining power by attempting to make any specific recommendations at all, including a recommendation that a political settlement should be sought.