Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

UNP files, lot 59 D 237, “Membership”

Department of State Instruction to the United States Representative on the Special Committee on Membership

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[Washington,] May 11, 1953.¹

Position Paper on Admission of New Members

the problem

The Special Committee on Membership established by the Seventh General Assembly was instructed “to make a detailed study of the question of the admission of States to membership in the United Nations, examining the proposals and suggestions which have been made in the General Assembly and its Committees or which may be submitted to the Special Committee by any Members of the United Nations…”. It was requested to submit a report on its work and conclusions to the Eighth Session.

Generally speaking, the proposals which the Committee will consider fall into three categories. In one category are proposals regarding admission procedures, such as the various Latin American proposals calling for independent action by the Assembly to admit applicants vetoed by the Soviet Union. In a second category are proposals regarding the application of the criteria of Article 4, such as the Peruvian resolution adopted by the Sixth Assembly, proposals for a universal membership, and the Soviet proposal for simultaneous admission of applicants. Under a third category is the proposal submitted by El Salvador in 1950 for non-voting participation in the Assembly for applicants excluded by the Soviet veto.

What should be the position of the United States on the work of the Special Committee and on the various proposals which it will consider?

recommendations

The United States position on the work of the Committee and proposals it will consider should be as follows:

1. General Objective and Procedure of the Committee

The Committee’s objectives should be limited to an exploration of the various possible approaches to the membership question and, without itself taking decisions, to a formulation of these alternatives in such a way as to facilitate action by the Assembly and the Security Council. It should avoid consideration of the qualifications of individual applicants and confine its study to the larger aspects of the entire problem, examining all proposals offered as solutions, and without casting votes or making specific recommendations, reporting to the Assembly the arguments for and against all proposed solutions.

2. Proposals on Admission Procedures

(a) With respect to various proposals relating to the veto, the Committee’s report should contain adequate recognition that the most important reason for the frustration of the membership question is the Soviet abuse of the veto right.

(b) The United States should indicate its strong sympathy with the purposes of the proposals of El Salvador, Argentina and Peru, since they represent an unending effort at a solution and since they represent attempts to counteract the arbitrary policies of the Soviet Union. However, we must note the legal difficulties of these proposals as outlined in the Comment section below. If these proposals are pressed to a vote, we would have to vote against them.

(c) If the Latin American countries wish to discuss the possibility of an advisor opinion from the International Court of Justice on the veto, a request for such an opinion should preferably be so framed as to link the question of the effect of a negative vote of a permanent member to the Court’s opinion of 1948. However, the United States should not take the initiative in proposing this alternative or express optimism as to the results of recourse to the Court.

3. Proposals Concerning the Application of the Criteria of Article 4

(a) The Committee’s report should stress the necessity of complying with the Court’s opinion of 1948 and of basing votes on membership applications exclusively on the conditions contained in the Charter.

(b) If any members take the position that Article 4 should be applied so as to permit the attainment of absolute universality and the admission of an applicant without the act of admission constituting approval of the conduct of its government, we should not endorse this position and should point out the difficulties involved in view of the language of Article 4. However, we should not object if the arguments in favor of an application of Article 4 based on universality are included in the report together with a statement of the application which we have supported.

4. Non-Member Participation in the General Assembly

Unless prior consultations show that Italy and Japan object, the Committee’s report should include, as one of the approaches studied, the grant of non-Member participation in the Assembly as a possible temporary measure if no solution to the membership problem is forthcoming. If practicable, some other member, such as El Salvador, should be induced to present a paper or proposal on this matter.

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Background

The qualifications for new members and the procedures for their admission are governed by Article 4, which reads as follows:

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

The International Court of Justice has given two advisory opinions on Article 4. In a 1948 opinion, it said that a Member, while recognizing that a state fulfills the conditions of Article 4, cannot subject its favorable vote on the admission of that state to the additional condition that other states be admitted simultaneously. In a 1950 opinion, the Court advised that the General Assembly cannot admit a state in the absence of a favorable Security Council recommendation.

Only nine states have been admitted as new members since the founding of the Organization. These nine are: Afghanistan, Burma, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Sweden, Thailand, and Yemen. The last time that a state was admitted was in 1950, when Indonesia was accepted.

Nineteen other candidates have applied. The USSR has used its veto 28 times to block the admission of fourteen of these candidates (Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, and Vietnam), all of which the Assembly has determined to be qualified. The remaining five, which are Soviet-sponsored (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Outer Mongolia), have never received the seven votes required for a Security Council recommendation or been found qualified by the Assembly. In addition to these nineteen, the North Korean and Vietminh regimes have submitted communications purporting to be membership applications.

The Soviet Union has proposed the simultaneous admission of nine of the non-Soviet applicants (including Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Libya, Nepal and Portugal but not Cambodia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Laos and Vietnam) and of the five Soviet-sponsored candidates, always making clear, however, that it would continue to use its veto to block the admission of the non-Soviet applicants unless its own candidates were also admitted. The majority on the Security Council, including the the United States, have not accepted this package deal. The membership question has therefore remained deadlocked, the Soviet Union vetoing the non-Soviet applicants and the majority rejecting the Soviet-sponsored candidates or a package deal.

The large majority of members have become increasingly concerned over this stalemate. Some of the Latin American countries have proposed that the Assembly should itself proceed to admit applicants vetoed by the Soviet Union. Other countries have urged a solution within existing membership procedures based on universality.

The Seventh Session of the Assembly established a Special Committee to review the whole problem and report its conclusions to the Eighth Session. The Committee is composed of representatives of the following nineteen states: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Greece, Lebanon, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States. (The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and India were also designated as members of the Committee but declined to participate.)

Work of Special Committee

1. Objectives and Work Program

The main purpose of the Committee should be to develop the various alternative approaches to the membership question in concrete enough form so that the Assembly could, if desirable, make use of them in the fall. The Committee should, insofar as practicable, avoid consideration of the qualifications of individual applicants and confine its study to the larger aspects of the entire problem. It should preferably not make specific recommendations for a particular course of action or vote on individual proposals, but should examine all proposals offered as solutions and report to the Assembly the arguments for and against each of them. In other words, its objective should be a thorough analysis of all proposed solutions which would assist the Assembly to reach a decision.

It is especially important that the Committee’s debates and report not serve to promote the idea that a solution can be achieved only through big power negotiations—a development which would tend to weaken our hand if we later decide to negotiate a settlement and which would make our position more difficult should we decide not to negotiate a settlement. The Committee should therefore discuss and report upon all the approaches, including a provisional arrangement for permitting non-members to participate in the Assembly pending their admission. To the same end, it would be preferable if the United States, United Kingdom, and France would not declare themselves definitely on the substance of the problem, and if the countries which strongly desire a big power settlement would refrain from enthusiastic declarations or resolutions to this effect in the Committee. The small powers on the Committee should, accordingly, be induced to take the formal leadership in the Committee in order to emphasize, at this stage, the role of the Assembly as a whole in this problem rather than that of the great powers. In this way the Committee, representing the broad membership of the Assembly, can convey to the USSR an impression of its sense of urgency concerning this problem and of a willingness to consider courses other than big power agreement.

If agreement can be reached on the over-all objective of the Committee, it could then proceed to reach decisions on its work program which would achieve this objective. The best procedure might be for the Committee to ask the Chairman and Rapporteur to prepare an agenda listing the various proposals which the Committee would analyze. These would include the major proposals discussed in the Secretariat paper on the historical background of the membership question as well as any new proposals which might be introduced. The proposals might be organized on the basis of the categories mentioned in the “Problem” above. In order to limit the debate and minimize pressure by individuals for Committee approval of specific proposals, the members might be requested to give their views on all proposals within one category by a single statement. At the end of the Committee’s discussion, the Rapporteur would prepare a report containing a clear statement of the proposals considered and a summary of the views expressed on each.

2. Proposals on Admission Procedures

The continued use of the veto over membership applications by the Soviet Union has led to repeated efforts to find ways to eliminate the veto from votes on recommendations for admission. The United States in 1947 announced that it would not exercise its veto to exclude any of the then applicants which the Assembly deemed qualified, and said that it would go further and accept complete elimination of the veto in the Security Council in reference to the admission of applicants in the future. In 1948, the Interim Committee embarked upon a study of voting procedures in the Security Council. The results of its study were embodied in a resolution adopted by the Assembly in the spring of 1949. This resolution, inter alia, recommended that the permanent members of the Security Council should seek agreement among themselves upon what possible issues they might forbear to use the veto and suggested that admission to membership was such an issue. In the fall of 1949, the General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending that the permanent members refrain from using the veto over membership applications. The United States supported these resolutions and has reiterated from time to time its position that it will not prevent the admission of any state whose application receives seven affirmative votes in the Security Council. It would be desirable for the Committee’s report to stress the past efforts of the Assembly on this question and to recognize that the most important reason for the frustration of the membership problem is the Soviet abuse of the veto right.

As a result of the continued use of the veto by the Soviet Union, a number of Latin Americans have pressed for direct Assembly action to admit applicants. The Special Committee will have before it three proposals, submitted by Argentina, four Central American states, and Peru, respectively, calling for such action. These proposals overlap in some respects but the essentials of each are as follows: Argentina submits that the Assembly can admit a member upon a “negative recommendation” of the Security Council; El Salvador contends that the Assembly can admit applicants which have received seven or more favorable votes in the Security Council on the ground that a recommendation to admit a new member is not subject to the veto. Peru also maintains that membership applications are not subject to the veto, and that even if the veto does apply, it is inadmissable in cases involving a violation of the Charter; thus, according to Peru, the Assembly can admit at least the nine non-Soviet applicants included in the Soviet package deal since the Soviet Union is willing to admit these nine as part of a group and its separate vetoes of these states are illegal.

The United States fully sympathizes with the motives behind the Latin American proposals but each of them presents legal difficulties which make it difficult if not impossible for us to support them. In the first place, as the International Court of Justice advised in 1950, the General Assembly cannot admit an applicant in the absence of a favorable Security Council recommendation. In the second place, it has been generally understood from the beginning that a recommendation to admit a new member is subject to the veto and the Assembly and Council have always proceeded on this basis. Even if there were some doubt on this point, it would be for the Security Council and not the Assembly to decide whether the question was vetoable. There could be serious consequences in connection with the veto power over other matters of vital concern to us if a precedent were established whereby the Assembly could itself determine whether a matter before the Council is substantive or procedural. In the third place, even though the Soviet vetoes of Italy and the eight others included in its package deal have been cast on non-Charter grounds, it does not follow that they are null and void or that the Assembly can take action assuming this. It is believed that the majority on the Committee will be unable to support the Latin American proposals for these same reasons.

At the same time, the promotion of these proposals by the Latin American countries would point up the responsibility of the Soviet veto for the frustration of the membership question and might even have a useful effect upon the Soviet Union. It would therefore be useful for the Committee’s report to include statements on them even though the majority could not support them. It would also be desirable for the Committee to refrain from rejecting them through a vote.

At the Sixth Session of the General Assembly the Central American States submitted a draft resolution which would request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice as to whether membership applications are subject to the veto. While this proposal was subsequently withdrawn and has never been seriously considered by the Assembly, the Latin American countries may urge its consideration by the Special Committee. However, we have grave doubts that the Court would consider itself competent to consider the question and even if it did consider itself competent it would almost certainly decide that a recommendation to admit a new member is substantive.

If a question were to be submitted to the Court, it should at least be calculated to increase the likelihood that the Court would consider the question and give a desirable decision. A question which linked the veto problem to the Court’s 1948 opinion would seem to be the most logical alternative. For instance, the Court might be asked whether the Assembly can admit a state when a permanent member of the Security Council has proposed and voted for a proposal that the Council recommend the admission of the State as one of a group of states to be admitted simultaneously and yet voted against a proposal in the Security Council for a separate recommendation on the admission of the State, which proposal received seven or more affirmative votes and no negative vote from any other permanent member. As the Seventh Session of the Assembly the United States Delegation discussed this alternative informally with several Latin American delegations. However, the latter decided not to press for any request for an advisory opinion.

If the Latin American members of the Committee commence discussion of a request for an advisory opinion from the Court on the veto it would be desirable again to discuss with them informally the alternative mentioned in the paragraph above. However, it would be necessary to point out that we are not at all optimistic about the results of recourse to the Court.

3. Proposals Regarding the Criteria of Article 4

The Soviet Union has conditioned its consent to the admission of nine applicants on the simultaneous admission of the five Soviet-sponsored candidates. The General Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions requesting the Soviet Union to abandon this policy. It has, since 1947, adopted resolutions determining that specific candidates are qualified and should be admitted and requesting Security Council reconsideration of their applications. In 1947 it requested an advisory opinion from the Court as to whether a Member can condition its consent to the admission of one State upon the simultaneous admission of another. When the Court replied in the negative, the Assembly in 1948 adopted a resolution recommending that states act in accordance with the Court’s opinion. At the Sixth Session the Assembly again requested that the Security Council reconsider all applications and base its action exclusively on the conditions contained in Article 4 and on the facts establishing the existence of these conditions. The Soviet Union has disregarded all of these resolutions and has maintained that its package deal is the only solution.

The United States has warmly supported the Assembly’s resolutions directed against the Soviet membership policies. It has strongly opposed the Soviet package deal on the grounds that each application should be considered separately on its own merits, that the deal includes five applicants which in our judgement should not be admitted and omits others which should. Thus far the majority in the Assembly have supported the United States position. It would be desirable for the Committee to note the past resolutions of the Assembly and to determine that the Soviet policies are contrary to the Charter.

At the same time it will be realized that a number of Members, particularly the Scandinavian countries and certain Arab-Asian states, favor universality as an immediate goal. Many of them have supported the Soviet package proposal even though they do not endorse the theory of en bloc admission. Sweden has submitted resolutions to past Assemblies recommending reconsideration of applications in the light of the principle of universality, and in 1949 Iraq proposed that members apply with greater flexibility and generosity Article 4 to States which have not received seven votes in the Security Council. The Committee will undoubtedly consider proposals for absolute universality and for an application of Article 4 under which the Organization, in deciding whether to admit an applicant, would not have to pass judgment on the conduct of its government.

The United States has always expressed the opinion that universality is a desirable ultimate goal and that all states should be admitted as soon as they become qualified. However, we have maintained that the criteria of Article 4 cannot be ignored and that the Organization has to examine the conduct of an applicant in deciding whether it is a “peace-loving” state which is “able and willing” to carry out its obligations. We have pointed out that the Soviet satellites have rendered at least moral support to Communist aggression in Korea; that the European satellites defied efforts of the Assembly to end the guerilla war in Greece; have waged a war of nerves against Yugoslavia; and have molested foreign diplomats; and that Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary have violated the human rights provisions of their Peace Treaties. On these grounds we have argued that the Soviet candidates do not meet the basic criteria required by Article 4.

It would be desirable for the Committee to include in its report a statement of the application of Article 4 which we and the majority have thus far favored. At the same time, it will be realized that under existing procedures a political settlement based on universality providing for the admission of both Soviet and non-Soviet applicants appears to be the only solution to the membership problem. If the United States should ever decide to seek such a settlement, it would be desirable to base agreement on a principle and not a deal, and we might therefore have to accept a new application of Article 4. For this reason, and since the Committee’s report should contain statements on all proposed solutions, it is believed that the United States should not object if Members of the Committee favoring universality request that a statement of their views be included in the report.

4. Non-voting Participation in the Assembly for non-Member States

Only one formal proposal for non-member participation has been presented to the General Assembly. Under this proposal, submitted by El Salvador in 1950, the General Assembly would have requested the Secretary General to invite non-Members whose applications have been vetoed by the USSR to send observers to sessions of the General Assembly and its Committees, including the Interim Committee, “in order to enable them to express their views and furnish information whenever consulted by the Delegation or any Member State.” The proposal would also have provided for the distribution to Members of documents and letters sent by the non-Members to the Secretary General. The General Assembly, however, did not adopt this proposal. Many Members, including the United States, while fully sympathizing with the motives behind El Salvador’s suggestion, wanted more time to consider its implications or had doubts that the non-Members would themselves be interested.

The Department has for the past few years considered the possibility of granting non-Members the right to participate in the Assembly pending their admission, and has concluded that there is nothing in the Charter to prevent this. However, thus far Italy has opposed this idea, Japan has shown no great enthusiasm, and some Members have expressed reservations. We have, therefore, never pressed for this course.

While we have made no decision to suggest non-member participation as an interim solution, it would nonetheless be desirable for the Committee to consider this alternative along with other proposals, provided Italy and Japan have no objections. This would be in line with our view that the Committee’s objective should be an analysis of all proposed solutions. Furthermore, it is possible that Italy, Japan and others might become interested if it becomes clear that full membership will not be forthcoming in the near future, if an attractive plan is submitted to them and if the plan is presented not merely as a favor to them but also as a means to increase the effectiveness of the Assembly. In addition, discussion of non-member participation in the Committee would strengthen our position against the Soviet Union on the membership question.

There are various possible alternative arrangements under which non-Members qualified for admission might be permitted to participate in the Assembly. The Assembly might adopt a resolution providing that, upon the specific request of a non-Member, the Assembly might invite the state to participate without vote in Committees on which all Members are represented and in the plenary meetings. Participation might include speaking under the same rules as members, and of making proposals. The Assembly might also request non-Members which participate in the Assembly’s proceedings to make a voluntary financial contribution to cover the cost of their participation. While we would wish to avoid discussion in the Committee on the specific states which might be granted the right to participate, we would hope that the Assembly, if it decided to move ahead on this basis, would limit the privilege to those states already found qualified for membership.

If possible the United States should avoid taking the lead in discussions of non-Member participation in the Committee. El Salvador might be approached informally to ascertain whether it wished to initiate discussion on this matter.

1. Transmitted on May 13 to the Deputy U.S. Representative at the United Nations (Wadsworth).