During our meeting with you on January 22, you indicated that you attach very
great importance to planning some means of breaking the membership deadlock
in the United Nations at an early date. It was agreed that we would take a
fresh look at the question promptly.
You will recall that there was special discussion of the possibility of
advancing the device of associate membership. After reviewing the extent of
our prior exploration of this question showing the lack of any interest on
the part of Italy and2
Japan in associate member status, it was concluded that it would probably be
better to concentrate attention on some means of dealing with the problem on
the basis of regular membership status.
The attached preliminary memorandum has been prepared pursuant to this
discussion. I would very much appreciate your views concerning the possible
course of action suggested. If you think it is worthwhile to explore the
possibility of an omnibus arrangement in preparation for the meeting of the
Special Committee on Membership, we will press the matter actively here with
other interested Bureaus.
[Attachment]
Admission of New Members to the United
Nations
The essential background on the present membership stalemate and a
possible course of action for consideration are set forth below.
[Page 919]
possible course of action
- 1.
- The Department for the past few years has seriously considered the
advantages and disadvantages of an omnibus arrangement but has
always finally decided against it. However, in view of the urgency
of finding some solution to the membership problem which would
achieve the admission of Italy, Japan and others we favor, we should
again consider the possibility of an omnibus arrangement. If we
handled the matter carefully we could probably overcome some of the
difficulties of an omnibus settlement noted below.
- 2.
- We should not seek any action in the United Nations on the
membership question before the Assembly’s Special Committee meets in
May to review the whole problem and prepare conclusions for the
consideration of the Assembly. The Committee will have before it
many proposals, some designed to circumvent the Soviet veto and
others to achieve a solution within existing procedures. We will
have to take a position on all these proposals. If we should decide
to move ahead on the basis of an omnibus arrangement, we could pave
the way in the Committee for subsequent Security Council
action.
background
The qualifications for new members and the procedures for their admission
are governed by Article 4, which reads as follows:
- 1.
- Membership in the United Nations is open to all other
peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in
the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization,
are able and willing to carry out these obligations.
- 2.
- The admission of any such state to membership in the United
Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly
upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
The International Court of Justice has given two advisory opinions on
Article 4. In the first, it said that a Member, while recognizing that a
state fulfills the conditions of Article 4, cannot subject its favorable
vote on the admission of that state to the additional condition that
other states be admitted simultaneously. In the second, the Court
advised that the General Assembly cannot admit a state in the absence of
a favorable Security Council recommendation.
Only nine states have been admitted as new members since the founding of
the Organization. These nine are: Afghanistan, Burma, Iceland,
Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Sweden, Thailand, and Yemen. The last time
that a state was admitted was in 1950, when Indonesia was accepted.
Nineteen other candidates have applied. The USSR has used its veto 28 times to block the admission of
fourteen of these candidates (Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Laos, Libya, Nepal,
Portugal, and Vietnam), all
[Page 920]
of
which the Assembly has determined to be qualified. The remaining five,
which are Soviet-sponsored (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and
Outer Mongolia), have never received the seven votes required for a
Security Council recommendation or been found qualified by the Assembly.
In addition to these nineteen, the North Korean and Vietminh regimes
have submitted communications purporting to be membership
applications.
The Soviet Union has proposed the simultaneous admission of nine of the
non-Soviet applicants (including Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland,
Italy, Jordan, Libya, Nepal and Portugal but not Cambodia, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Laos and Vietnam) and of the five Soviet-sponsored
candidates, always making clear, however, that it would continue to use
its veto to block the admission of the non-Soviet applicants unless its
own candidates were also admitted. The majority on the Security Council,
including the United States, have not accepted this package deal because
it is contrary to the Charter principle that each applicant should be
considered separately, and because it includes applicants not considered
qualified and while excluding others which meet the conditions for
membership. The membership question has therefore remained deadlocked,
the Soviet Union vetoing the non-Soviet applicants and the majority
rejecting the Soviet-sponsored candidates or a package deal.
Some of the Latin American countries have proposed, and will again
propose in the Special Committee established by the Seventh General
Assembly, that the General Assembly should itself proceed to admit Italy
and other applicants considered qualified even though the Security
Council has made no recommendations on them. Those advocating this
course have tried to justify it on the grounds that a Council
recommendation to admit a new member is not subject to the veto, or that
the separate Soviet vetoes of Italy and others included in its package
deal have been illegal because the Soviet Union has voted for their
admission as one of a group. However, it has been widely understood from
the beginning that a recommendation on a membership application is a
substantive question to which the veto applies, and the Security Council
and the General Assembly have always proceeded on this basis.
Furthermore, there could be serious consequences in connection with the
veto power over other matters of vital concern to us if a precedent were
established whereby the Assembly could itself decide whether a matter
before the Council is substantive or procedural or whether the vote of a
permanent member is null and void because it is illegal. Some members
have suggested that recourse might be made to the International Court of
Justice on the question of the veto, but it is unlikely that this would
lead to any useful result. Similarly, an amendment to Article 4 to
remove the veto from votes on membership applications would only be
vetoed by the Soviet Union.
[Page 921]
special committee of seventh general
assembly
The large majority of Members have become increasingly concerned over
this stalemate. The Seventh Session of the Assembly established a
Special Committee to review the whole problem and report its conclusions
to the Eighth Session. The Committee, which is now scheduled to meet on
May 15, is composed of representatives of the following nineteen states:
Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Columbia, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador,
France, Greece, Lebanon, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru,
Philippines, South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States. (The
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and India were also designated as members
of the Committee but declined to participate.) The United States favored
the establishment of the Committee in order to stave off support for
proposals unacceptable to us and in order to give the new administration
an opportunity to reexamine the problem.
omnibus arrangement
It appears that the only possibility of breaking the membership stalemate
under existing membership procedures would lie in an omnibus arrangement
approved by the Security Council providing for the admission of a large
number of applicants, both Soviet and non-Soviet. Such an arrangement
would in all probability have to include the five Soviet-sponsored
candidates (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Outer Mongolia) in
order to avoid a Soviet veto. For our part, the arrangement should
preferably include all of the non-Soviet applicants (Austria, Cambodia,
Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Laos,
Libya, Nepal, Portugal and Vietnam) and also Spain and the Federal
Republic of Germany, which have not yet applied. However, it appears
certain that the Soviet Union would not accept a list which included the
Republic of Korea and the three Indo-China states, all of which it has
omitted from its own package deal, or the Federal Republic of Germany.
In addition, it might well maintain its opposition to Japan’s admission
and be unwilling to consider Spain. In my opinion we could under no
circumstances agree to an omnibus arrangement which did not include
Japan and Spain. The issue to be resolved, it seems to me, is whether we
could consider an arrangement which in the beginning would include all
the states we favor but which was negotiated downward so that the
Republic of Korea, the three Indo-China states and the Federal Republic
of Germany would be left out, and which in its final form also included
the five Soviet-sponsored candidates.
A. Arguments for Omnibus
Arrangement
- 1.
- Admission of many non-Soviet applicants, particularly Italy and
Japan, is politically important to them and to the United States. We
have been under heavy pressure from Italy and Japan to help obtain
their admission.
- 2.
- The Members of the United Nations have become increasingly
concerned over the stalemate and are pressing for a solution.
- 3.
- Perhaps a greater moral influence could be exercised over the
Soviet satellites if they were inside rather than outside the United
Nations.
- 4.
- The Soviet-sponsored applicants are no worse than some present
United Nations Members, i.e., the Soviet five.
- 5.
- United Nations membership, by furnishing an additional method of
contact with the free world, tends to offset exclusive Cominform
control over the satellite countries and might conceivably
strengthen the position of elements therein opposed to Moscow
domination.
- 6.
- The United Nations was meant to be a universal organization, the
membership of which would reflect the world as it actually
is.
- 7.
- An increase in the number of United Nations Members would give a
lift to the Organization.
B. Arguments Against Omnibus
Arrangement
- 1.
- Since 1946, the United States has maintained that the
Soviet-sponsored candidates do not meet the Charter qualifications.
At the same time, the conduct of the Soviet-sponsored applicants has
become progressively worse.
- 2.
- The admission of Soviet-sponsored applicants might dignify the
puppet regimes, could be interpreted as tacit acquiescence in their
present status, and might have an unfortunate effect upon the
peoples within these states still looking with hope to the
West.
- 3.
- The admission of Outer Mongolia would give some sanction to the
Soviet effort to organize Asia into pseudo-independent
states.
- 4.
- If we accepted an omnibus settlement excluding the Republic of
Korea, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Indo-China states,
the Soviet Union would be even less likely to agree to their
admission later. It would be particularly difficult to omit the
Republic of Korea, at a time when the United Nations is taking
action to defend it against Communist aggression.
- 5.
- Even though the questions of membership and representation are
technically unrelated, willingness to admit the Soviet satellites
might make it more difficult to obtain support for our position on
Chinese-representation.
- 6.
- Admission of the five Soviet-sponsored applicants would increase
Soviet obstructive capabilities, while on many issues we could not
count on the votes of all the eleven non-Soviet applicants included
in the arrangement.
- 7.
- Additional Soviet satellites in the Organization would
correspondingly increase the scope of our internal security problem
in New York.
