330/8–2752
Memorandum of Conversation, by William B. Sale of the Bureau of European Affairs
- Subject:
- Italian Membership in the UN
Signor Luciolli referred to the fact that the Soviet resolution on membership in the UN is scheduled for discussion by the SC on September 2nd, and asked what our position would be at that meeting. I informed the Charge d’Affaires confidentially that the private meeting which the permanent members of the SC had recently held on the membership problem had confirmed our belief that the Soviets would persist in their determination to block the admission of any of the [Page 853] Western-sponsored applicants unless the UN would accept the Russian package proposal. I told Signor Luciolli that none of the other permanent members of the SC seemed prepared to accept the Russian package and that it was therefore apparent that the membership problem would remain stalemated.
In reply to Signor Luciolli’s inquiry concerning the tactics which would be followed at the September 2nd SC meeting, I informed him that we preferred that each of the applicants listed in the Soviet resolution, as well as Japan, the ROK, and if the French so desired, the Indo-Chinese applicants, should be voted on separately in order that our support for applicants which we considered qualified would be a matter of record. It was our understanding, however, that the French and British were not inclined to favor a separate vote on each of the applicants and that they seemed to prefer that the September 2nd SC meeting dispose of the Soviet resolution in the simplest way possible, and that we would not therefore press for a separate vote. I informed Luciolli of our understanding that while the British and French would probably abstain on the resolution as a whole, we would probably vote against it as we had at Paris.
Signor Luciolli said that he of course appreciated our difficulty in accepting the Russian package proposal, particularly at the present time, but that he was very much concerned with respect to the tactics which we propose to follow at the SC meeting. He referred to the fact that another failure to resolve the membership problem would be a keen disappointment to Italian public opinion, particularly in view of the fact that there was evidently no alternative solution which would achieve Italian admission. He expressed the view that the continued stalemate will not only be considered a political defeat for the Italian Government but that it will, both in and out of the Government, result in a decreasing interest in the UN as an effective instrument of international action. Luciolli said that as a minimum he hoped that, while defeating the Soviet resolution, the SC might through a separate vote on each of the applicants listed in the resolution reaffirm the support of all but the Soviet member for Italy’s admission. He said he hoped we would be able to persuade the other friendly members of the SC to agree to a separate vote on at least the Italian application and said that he would request Guidotti, the Italian Observer at UN Headquarters, to urge the other members of the Council to support such a vote.
With respect to our negative vote on the Soviet resolution, Luciolli recalled the adverse effect which our position at Paris had had on Italian public opinion; that because we had voted negatively and the British and French had abstained, the Italian nationalist press had placed the blame for the defeat of the Soviet resolution (and the continued [Page 854] exclusion of Italy from membership) primarily on the US.1 He pointed out with respect to Italian public opinion it would be greatly preferable if we could abstain, with the British and French, rather than vote negatively on this resolution in the SC. He remarked it was our vote which made the headlines in the Italian press—not the explanation of our vote.
Luciolli spoke at some length concerning the importance of the UN membership question in connection with the forthcoming Italian elections, explaining that while membership in the UN was a problem beyond the control of the Italian Government, still failure to obtain admission was looked upon by the Italian public as a foreign policy failure on the part of the DeGasperi Administration; Italian public opinion is not concerned with the complicated political and technical reasons for Italy’s exclusion, they are interested only in the fact that it is excluded. He said that the UN question had a bearing on public opinion support of DeGasperi’s policy of closest possible cooperation with us and that the question would undoubtedly become an important foreign policy issue in the election campaign. He urged that we continue to do everything possible to demonstrate not only our continued support for Italian membership, but also our determination to make every effort to find an effective solution of the problem despite the Soviet’s obstructionism.
I assured Signor Luciolli that I would bring his views to the attention of the interested officers of the Department.
- For documentation on the Italian membership application in 1951. see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. ii, pp. 286 ff.↩