Office of the Historian

310.2/8–1952

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)1

secret
[Washington,] August 19, 1952.
  • Subject:
  • Japan’s Entry into the United Nations
  • Participants:
  • Ambassador Eikichi Araki, Japanese Embassy
  • Mr. John M. Allison, Assistant Secretary
  • Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Director, NA

After discussing another subject today with me, Ambassador Araki raised the above matter. After referring to Minister Kamimura’s meeting with Mr. Hickerson on August 15, the Ambassador said that he wished to take up this important problem himself. He emphasized the desirability for the United States not to be put into the position in the Security Council of appearing to be the reason for Japan’s failure to gain entry into the United Nations. The Ambassador told me that US-Japanese relations would be gravely injured if such an impression arose among the Japanese. He therefore urged that the United States would take some feasible and concrete step to make fully clear its desire and effort to bring Japan into the United Nations. The Ambassador hoped that our opposition to a “Soviet package deal” would not obscure our support for Japan’s entry should the Soviet Government decide to add Japan to its list of admissions. He said that his government was particularly concerned over Soviet tactics in this matter because it might lead to great embarrassment for the United States in Japan.

I assured the Ambassador that we were fully aware of the problems involved and will endeavor to do everything we can to bring Japan into the United Nations. I explained that we were planning our tactics in such a way that United States support and Japan’s entry would be clear to the world. I said that our present plan was to bring up Japan’s application for entry as a separate matter before voting on any other [Page 847] proposals. In that way United States support for Japan would be clear and so would the Soviet position. The Ambassador said that he had discussed this question with certain other Embassies in Washington and would continue discreetly to inform them of Japan’s position.

  1. Drafted by Young.↩