Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

320/8–1954: Despatch

The Chargé in the Republic of China (Cochran) to the Department of State

confidential
No. 90

Taipei, August 19, 1954.

• Ref: Taipei’s 125 to Department; Unnumbered to USUN

• Subject:
• China Representation in the United Nations

There follows the verbatim text of the unofficial English translation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ memorandum of August 18, 1954, on the subject of Chinese representation in the United Nations:

Memorandum

i.

The Government of the Republic of China has noted with gratification the firm stand recently reiterated by the Government and supported by the people of the United States of America against the admission of the puppet Peiping Communist regime into the United Nations. It has particularly taken note of the statements on this subject made by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles on July 7 and 8, 1954 respectfully and of the resolutions unanimously adopted by the United States House of Representatives on July 15, 1954 and by the United States Senate on July 29, 1954. At a time when an appeasement policy towards the Communists is being pursued by certain Powers at the expense of the principles of the United Nations, this strong and just position taken by the United States will help restore confidence in that organization and strengthen the moral basis on which it is founded.

It is expected that, in the impending ninth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Communists will redouble their efforts in bringing the puppet Peiping regime into the United Nations. Their sinister design would be facilitated by the compromising attitude of some of the non-Communist member states. In the face of this situation, the Chinese Government wishes to seek closer cooperation and more frequent consultations with the United States Government with a view to thwarting the Communist design and ensuring the representation of China by the only legitimate Chinese Government in existence.

ii

The question of China’s representation in the United Nations is not a question of whether one government or another should represent China in that organization. It is not a question which concerns the Chinese people alone. A far large issue is at stake, and, in the words of President Eisenhower, a moral question is involved. It affects the future course of the United Nations and, indeed, the very existence of the United Nations itself.

When the question was first raised early in 1950, its significance was perhaps not immediately realised by the free nations. Even the Representative of the United States in the Security Council thought that the question was one of procedure. In connection with a Soviet proposal to exclude the duly accredited representative of China from the Security Council, Mr. Ernest Gross of the United States made a statement at the 460th meeting of the Council held on January 12, 1950 in which he said:

“I should like to make it clear that the United States Government considers that the Soviet Union draft resolution presents to the Council a procedural question involving the credentials of a representative of a member. Accordingly, a vote against the motion by my Government could not be considered as a veto, even assuming that seven members of the Council voted in favor of the resolution. I wish to make it clear that my Government will accept the decision of the Security Council on this matter when made by an affirmative vote of seven members.”

The stand taken by Mr. Gross indicates that the United States was not at the time fully appreciative of the gravity of the question and that she was not prepared at the time to assume the role of leadership on this issue in the United Nations. The United States Government has since come to modify its views as shown in the statement made by Secretary Dulles at his press conference on July 8, 1954:

“I believe that as far as the General Assembly is concerned this certainly is an important matter which would require a two-thirds vote. Anybody that says this is not an important matter is certainly not facing up to the realities of the situation. I believe that in the Security Council it is a matter which is properly subject to veto.”

While it is not expected that there will be need to invoke the veto in this matter, its recognition by the United States Government as an important matter has served to place the question in its proper perspective and to underline the fact that it is a question deserving the most serious attention of the members of the United Nations.

iii

The Chinese Government is now canvassing the various friendly governments, through its missions abroad, with a view to securing the support of the largest possible number of United Nations members on the so-called question of Chinese representation when that question is again raised by Communist or pro-Communist delegations at the ninth session of the General Assembly. The Chinese Government will keep the United States Government fully informed from time to time of the outcome of such contacts. It is requested that the United States take what action it may think fit to line up the widest possible support on the same question.

In the meantime, a careful study of such past records of the attitudes of the United Nations members as are available to the Chinese Government shows that eighteen United Nations members apart from China and the United States are certain to give support to the legitimate representation of the Chinese Government; the support from twelve others is almost certain; that of nine others is hopeful although their stand has not been consistent; there would be eight abstentions; and eleven members, including Soviet Russia and its satellites, would certainly oppose the representation of the Chinese Government. A list grouping the United Nations members into the above categories is attached herewith for the reference of the United States Government.

The Chinese Government further wishes to request that, when the United States Government decides to approach the other member Governments on this issue, it pay particular attention to and bring its influence to bear upon those free nations whose stand is wavering or unfavorable. Most of them have severed, or have no diplomatic relations with the Chinese Government. A few others are political fence-sitters or are inclined to appease the Communists. These members are: Afghanistan, Burma, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Liberia, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, United Kingdom, and Yemen.

The Chinese Government will be grateful if the United States Government will keep the Chinese Government informed of what action it may deem fit to take or may have already taken in this respect and the result of such action.

iv

The United States Government will recall that the question under discussion has been raised every year in the General Assembly since its fifth session. However, no decision has yet been made on its substance. Each time it was raised, it was disposed of procedurally by a resolution of the General Assembly to postpone its consideration for the duration of the session. At the eighth session of the General Assembly, the consideration of the question was postponed for the duration of the session “in the current year” only. While the advantage of this formula in securing more favorable votes can not be ignored, it nevertheless gives the impression that the United Nations is merely awaiting a more opportune moment to admit the puppet Peiping Communist regime. Such a resolution is at best a compromise resolution lacking in moral force. It is one on which it is difficult for the Chinese Government to vote.

The Chinese Government, which has recently given much thought to this problem, is anxious to see a stronger and more positive resolution in support of its representation in the United Nations. Such a resolution will not only greatly improve the position of the Chinese Government, but will also strengthen the morale of the free world. However, at a time when the atmosphere seems to be heavily laden with desires to appease the Communist aggressors, the Chinese Government is not under-estimating the difficulties involved in attempting to obtain the desired majority to adopt such a resolution.

The actual strategy in dealing with the question may perhaps have to be worked out at the delegation level shortly before or during the ninth session of the General Assembly in the light of prevailing circumstances. It is hoped, however, that the United States Government will bear the above view in mind in making a decision on this matter. If it should appear obvious that such a resolution would greatly reduce the number of favorable votes, the Chinese Government would prefer to have the Communist resolution rejected by the General Assembly rather than have any counter resolution at all. If some counter resolution should be found necessary to express the sense of the General Assembly, it is hoped that it may be so worded as to simply provide that the General Assembly decides not to discuss any question of the representation of China, leaving out any mention of the postponement of its consideration and any such qualifier of time as “in the current year” or even “for the duration of the present session”. Since under Rule 82 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly a reconsideration of the Communist resolution at the same session after having been rejected is virtually impossible, it is believed that the insertion of such qualifiers of time in a counter resolution is not only unnecessary but would have an adverse psychological effect.

Taipei, August 18, 1954.

I. Support Certain (20)

1. Brazil

2. China

3. Colombia

4. Costa Rica

5. Cuba

6. Dominican Republic

7. ElSalvador

8. Greece

9. Guatemala

10. Haiti

11. Honduras

12. Nicaragua

13. Panama

14. Paraguay

15. Peru

16. Philippines

17. Thailand

18. Turkey

19. United States

20. Venezuela

II. Support Almost Certain (12)

1. Australia

2. Belgium

3. Ecuador

4. Egypt

5. Ethiopia

6. Iraq

7. Liberia

8. Mexico

9. New Zealand

10. Lexemburg (sic)

11. Union of South Africa

12. Uruguay

III. Support Hopeful but Inconsistent (9)

1. Argentina

2. Bolivia

3. Canada

4. Chile

5. Iran

6. Lebanon

7. Saudi Arabia

8. Syria

9. Yemen

IV. Hopeful Abstentions (8)

1. Afghanistan

2. Denmark

3. Israel

4. Netherlands

5. Pakistan

6. Iceland

7. France

8. United Kingdom

V. Unfavorable Votes (11)

1. Burma

2. Czechoslovakia

3. Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic

4. India

5. Indonesia

6. Norway

7. Poland

8. Sweden

9. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

10. Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

11. Yugoslavia

A copy of this despatch has been pouched to Hong Kong.

Action Requested: Department please send copies of despatch to USUN, London and Paris.

For the Chargé d’Affaires:

Robert W. Rinden

First Secretary of Embassy