FE files, lot 55 D 388, “United Nations”
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Murphy)
- Subject:
- Chinese Representation and the ECOSOC Slate
The following comments are with further reference to our conversation this afternoon on the question whether the United States should support Indonesia or Afghanistan for ECOSOC, with special reference to the Chinese representation question.
As you know I am by strong personal conviction committed to doing everything possible to prevent the unseating of the Chinese National Representatives or the seating of the Chinese Communists in the UN. This position is also the firm policy of the United States Government We are accordingly in complete agreement on this objective. When, however, it is urged that we support Afghanistan in preference to Indonesia in the belief that, if at some future time the moratorium is terminated and the United Kingdom and other states withdraw their support from postponement proposals on Chinese representation, Afghanistan will remain staunch in an abstention and that abstention may save the day for Chinese representation on ECOSOC, I am unable to follow the reasoning.
A basic factor in the situation is that both Indonesia and Afghanistan have recognized the Chinese Communists. We shall be indulging in dangerous self-delusion if we regard any recognizing state as “safe” after the moratorium terminates.
At the present time while the moratorium continues, we have an adequate majority on the Chinese representation question in ECOSOC. Whether we support Indonesia or Afghanistan there will be 8 states which recognize the Chinese Communists out of a total council membership of 18. Some of these 8 states, however, will vote with us while the moratorium holds. If we were to support Indonesia, accordingly, the vote on our usual postponement motion might be about 12–6–0 in our favor; if we support Afghanistan the vote might be 12–5–1. In either case, there would be no problem at the present time.
The problem will arise if the moratorium terminates. In that case we have to consider both Indonesia and Afghanistan as probably opposition votes. At the opening of the 7th General Assembly both states abstained on the Chinese representation question. At the opening of this General Assembly Afghanistan abstained and Indonesia voted against the postponement proposal. A few days later in the Credentials Committee, when the USSR was ruled out of order by the Chairman for attempting to reopen the issue, Indonesia abstained. [Page 708] While in my view the Soviet proposal was clearly out of order the Indonesian position nevertheless indicates a willingness to avoid an extreme position. There is no assurance that Afghanistan, like Indonesia, may not move from an abstention to a negative vote. Similarly, it is conceivable that if we support Indonesia for something it strongly desires—instead of continually rejecting all its requests for United States support for UN council seats—it might move back from a negative vote to an abstention. As both are recognizing states neither can be considered as “safe” if the moratorium terminates and we do not need the vote of either state while the moratorium remains “in effect. In the meantime, if we are to go to Indonesia, which has formally asked our support, and tell it that once again we will not support it for ECOSOC but intend instead to support Afghanistan, we shall be losing the opportunity which our support might afford for promoting our objectives in Indonesia, tightening its ties to the UN and developing its sense of responsibility through acceptance of a seat on a major council.
I may point out that our present slate contemplates our supporting Norway which has recognized the Chinese Communists and no longer can be regarded as supporting the moratorium. The Department also recently decided to support Pakistan, which has recognized the Chinese Communists and will follow the United Kingdom lead if the moratorium should be terminated, in preference to the Philippines which was at the time a candidate and which is completely firm on the Chinese representation question. Is it proposed that we should reconsider our position with respect to Norway and keep our support for Pakistan open in the event that the Philippines re-enters the race?
For the above considerations I believe that the case for our supporting Afghanistan in preference to Indonesia at this time is not convincing. I believe that there is no evidence that we can count upon any substantial difference between the position of Afghanistan and Indonesia on the Chinese representation question if the moratorium terminates.