310.2/8–2453: Despatch
The Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State
No. 96
- Subject:
- China’s Representation in the United Nations.
Forward:
This despatch is forwarded with considerable diffidence in view of the specialized nature of United Nations’ activities, regarding which various persons in the Department and in New York have expert knowledge far beyond that possessed by officers of this Embassy. Technical treatment of the subject has been avoided, and only the broad lines dealt with as they appear from Taipei.
After describing the peaceful Purposes and Principles of the United Nations in Chapter I, the Charter of that Organization states in Chapter II (Membership), Article 4:
“Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.”
Experience since the Charter was signed in 1945 has established conclusively that no communist state associated with Moscow qualifies for membership in the United Nations under the clearly stated provision of the Charter. In fact, several of this group of states have, by their actions, made themselves liable to suspension or expulsion under the terms of the Charter.
The question arises whether it would be in the spirit of the Charter and would contribute to the purposes of the United Nations, either to admit additional communist states to membership, or to expel such states as are now members and have qualified for expulsion. Whatever may be said for or against expelling communist members, it may be stated without fear of contradiction in non-communist circles that, based on past experience, the admission of additional communist states would be more likely to hamper than to help the avowed purposes of the United Nations. The arguments in favor of such admission would, if stated honestly, relate to hopes of appeasement and of economic benefit to the supporters of these arguments, rather than to furthering the clearly stated principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter. All such considerations partake of the substance of the matter. There are also procedural considerations within the United Nations Organization; to date the admission of other communist states has been prevented largely in this way, without going openly into [Page 687] substantive matters, although non-communist states which are eminently qualified for membership have also been excluded in the process.
It has seemed natural and proper to the United States that communist governments should be excluded from the United Nations by procedural methods as long as these were effective. When there is indication that they may fail, however, it would appear to be a clear obligation of the United States to oppose such admission on substantive grounds. This obligation becomes of particular importance in the case of China, the first major country to undertake a deliberate attack upon the United Nations with its armed forces and to be formally branded as an aggressor in consequence. It would require the most convincing evidence of a very tangible character, and over a long period of time, genuinely to persuade the members of the United Nations that the Peking regime has experienced the fundamental transformation which alone could qualify it for membership in the Organization.
There is also to be considered the effect on the remaining non-communist states of Asia in the event of Red China’s admission to the United Nations Organization. Certain of these countries appear to favor such action; others oppose. But all would accept it as representing acquiescence by the Free World in Mainland China’s definitive loss to communist conquest. Depending upon their individual circumstances, all would either seek a larger degree of accommodation with Peking, or prepare to be overwhelmed by force when the communists got around to them.
If, despite all efforts of the United States, Red China were finally admitted to membership, it would generally be accepted in the Far East that the United Nations as such could no longer be expected to function as an agency of collective security. These responsibilities might then be expected to pass definitively to the field of mutual defense pacts and to the Regional Arrangements foreseen in Chapter VIII of the Charter.
To offset in part the tremendous impact of Red China’s success in shooting its way into the United Nations, it would be necessary for the United States to negotiate additional mutual assistance pacts with non-communist states in the Far East, including Free China. This would best be done quickly, if possible before the formal entry of Red China into the United Nations, since the purpose of these pacts would be largely psychological. More important for the longer term would be the necessity of a speedy and substantial expansion of American military aid programs in the Far East. Nothing short of such measures would have any appreciable effect in keeping hope alive among our friends and in maintaining respect for the United States among both friends or foes. It would also be highly desirable to make [Page 688] clear at the earliest possible moment whether American policy toward communist states is to be one of containment or of liberation.
In pursuing a policy of non-recognition of Red China and of opposition to its acceptance into the United Nations Organization, the United States Government must expect to find itself recurrently in the position of explaining the circumstances under which it might modify this policy. Obviously, a great danger lies here. The exploitation by communist propaganda of the most measured statement on this subject, and the alarm among various non-communist countries of Asia at any suggestion of accommodation between the United States and Communist China, make it of transcendent importance that American policy be stated in the simplest terms.
Technically, of course, there is no necessary connection between the question of American recognition and the membership of Red China in the United Nations, but in the public mind these two are closely related if not to all intents and purposes identical. In explaining the American position, it may be fortunate that this is true. A case can be made out for extending American recognition to the Peking regime on the same grounds adopted by the United Kingdom and several other countries. American traditions are somewhat different in this respect, but from both substantive and legal standpoints, the case against Red China’s acceptance into the United Nations Organization appears stronger than that against recognition. The United States is in a position to say that it opposes and will continue to oppose the entry into the United Nations of any and all regimes which fail to qualify under the express terms of the Charter. The various counts under which Red China must be excluded could then be detailed in such fashion that all could understand.
In might appear implicit in the foregoing policy that the United States would acquiesce in Peking’s entry into the United Nations Organization, and presumably extend recognition, at such time as that regime could establish itself as qualified. There would be grave danger in positive statements to this effect by high American officials. But there could be a tacit acceptance of this implication. To qualify fully for United Nations membership under the clear terms of the Charter would require such far-reaching changes in Red China’s relationships with Moscow, with the Free World, and with the Chinese people, that the China problem would be well on its way to the kind of solution which the United States desires. The Curtain, whether of iron or bamboo, would have been rolled up, and a friendly, stable China would be at hand. The United States should accept no less.
From the propaganda standpoint, there would seem to be considerable merit in representing what now appears to many as a negative position—objection to Red China’s acceptance in the United Nations—in the positive light of firm support for the Charter. To place one’s [Page 689] opponents in the position of seeming to attack the Charter has the same advantages as making them appear to oppose “peace”.