The attached report (Tab A) which I thought you would be interested
in looking over sums up the highlights of the Committee Six debate
on Charter Review at the present General Assembly session.1
Some of the preliminary votes were quite interesting. The lineup
within various groups of states as reflected in speeches and in the
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preliminary voting is
diagrammed in Annex B to the attached report. Annex A is the text of
the resolution which, as you may know, was finally approved in
plenary session on November 27th by a vote of 54–5.
[Attachment]
Memorandum by Lincoln P.
Bloomfield Planning Adviser, Bureau of United
Nations Affairs2
confidential
[Washington,] November 30,
1953.
- Subject:
- Analysis of Committee Action in 8th GA on Charter Review.
The recent debate on Charter Review in the Legal Committee had
some rather interesting aspects which I summarize below. Even at
this preliminary stage their significance should, I think, be
kept in mind as part of the general backdrop against which we
will be maturing our own preparations. For brevity I have
eliminated all background material in favor of the salient
features of committee debate itself.
1. The overt role of the US delegation throughout the three-week
debate in committee was deliberately minor, although our
generally positive attitude toward Charter Review, as enunciated
by the Secretary, was of course well understood. Our tactics
were to work backstage, mainly through the Netherlands and New
Zealand delegations which steered the six-power resolution. In
retrospect, this role was effective because (a) it made liars out of the Soviets as they persisted
in characterizing the various resolutions before the committee
as reflecting a conspiracy led by the US, (b) on the same count the Soviet charges served to
insult such sponsors of the various resolutions as Egypt and
Pakistan, as well as the others (Netherlands, New Zealand, Cuba,
Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica), and (c)
it helped preserve our tactical freedom of action in
committee.
2. US objectives in this matter were generally achieved, even
down to some small details: (a) the final
resolution (Annex A) contained a clear and unequivocal reference
to Article 109, Charter Review, the 10th GA, etc.; (b) the Egyptian
proposal for a preparatory committee was abandoned; (c) the final resolution was procedural
and unprejudicial in character; (d)
adequate documentation will be made available and the
legislative history, about which we were not enthusiastic on
grounds both of substance and economy, was rejected in favor of
a comprehensive index; and (e) the
Netherlands-sponsored invitation
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to governments to submit preliminary views
which we had accepted only conditionally was [eliminated?].
3. The debates showed a marked diversity of views and approaches
and, as we suspected would happen, often went considerably
beyond procedure to the point of reflecting basic national
attitudes, aspirations and fears. There were forty-six speeches in the general debate in committee.
In the face of the splits which appeared within the free world
and within blocs which usually stand together, it was rather
extraordinary that in the final vote of 48–5, with no
abstentions, the Soviet bloc alone was isolated in opposition to
a heavy majority. The Dutch had been fearful that their proposal
would drive a wedge into the free world, and it was a pleasant
surprise to them and an illustration of the fundamental
solidarity of the non-Communist world that at the end all but
the Soviets rallied in support of the resolution.
4. The configuration of forces in the debate took the form of a
spectrum, at one end of which were those countries enthusiastic
for revision of the Charter and at the other end those strongly
hostile to any mention of it. Within each of the several
groupings the same shadings tended to appear. Perhaps the most
egregious example was within the Western European group and the
“old” Commonwealth. The Netherlands was bitterly opposed by
Belgium and France; New Zealand and Canada appeared to be poles
apart from the UK, Australia, and
South Africa.
The motivation behind the opposition to Charter Review was
varied. The Soviet bloc (which it will be recalled had opposed
paragraph 3 of Article 109 at San Francisco on the grounds that
any review conference in the future would be a club in the hands
of opponents of unanimity) apparently felt their predictions
were coming true, and were implacably hostile. They were joined
all the way in spirit, if not in the final vote, by France,
Belgium, Syria, Guatemala, and Liberia. The Syrian
representative, Dr. Tarasi, made little
attempt to disguise his obvious sympathy with the Communist
line. Presumably Guatemala was similarly animated. However, the
intensity of the French and Belgium challenges to the legality
and constitutionality of preparations for Charter Review
reflected deepseated apprehension that further inroads would be
made in their colonial relationships. I cannot estimate the
Liberian motives. These various “bitter-enders” were joined
along a good part of the road by a number of others. Annex B is
my rough classification of the shadings within each grouping as
reflected in speeches and to some extent in the votes. I have
shown at the end of Annex B the present profile of the NATO membership based on this
evidence.
5. I believe some of the votes which preceded the final showdown were significant
reflections of the real feeling of many delegations.
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The sharp basic
division within the committee was epitomised by the first test
veto, when the Dutch invitation to governments to submit views
was eliminated by 24–25 with 5 abstentions. This was a low
watermark for the co-sponsors and, I might add, we worked hard
to discourage their tendency to panic. However, after this
controversial provision was eliminated their fortunes rose
swiftly, and perhaps the most meaningful vote was on the
four-power amendment to eliminate from the basic resolution any
reference to Charter Review. This lost 15–28 with 9 abstentions.
The 15 to eliminate were the 5 Soviets, the 4 co-sponsors of the
amendment (France, Belgium, Mexico, Colombia) plus Guatemala,
Iran, Liberia, Syria, Afghanistan, and Burma. The 9 abstainers
were the UK, Australia, South
Africa, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and
Thailand. Thus, 24 out of 52 had doubts as to any mention of
Charter Review, essentially the same 24 who killed the
invitation to governments to submit views.
6. As reported earlier, once the invitation was out of the way
and the legislative history thrown out (on the motion of UK and Australia) and after the
critical test of strength described above, only the Soviet bloc
voted in the negative. In the final voting, the preamble citing
Charter Review carried 36–5 with Syria, Mexico and Israel
abstaining (seven others apparently did not want to be caught
voting on this since there were 14 abstentees, compared with
only 7 abstentees in the vote a few minutes later on the
resolution as a whole). The preambular reference to the
preparations required on the part of both governments and the
SYG carried 41–5 with 2
abstentions; the preambular reference to the need for
documentation 40–5 with 5 abstentions; and the remaining
operative clause regarding documentation carried 44–5. The
absentees on the final vote were Ethiopia (which had favored the
resolution but had apparently retired in embarrassment after
casting her vote the wrong way the evening before), Haiti,
Lebanon, Luxembourg, Paraguay, Yemen, and Bolivia. Thus, if
Ethiopia had been present, the vote would have been 49–5, and if
the others had put in an appearance it might conceivably have
been as high as 55–5.
7. In the plenary session on November 27th the resolution was
approved 54–5–0.
8. There is good reason, in my opinion, to anticipate renewed
discussion of this subject at the 9th GA, with likelihood that the proposal to establish
a preparatory body will be revived.
Annex A
Resolution on Charter Review as Approved by
the General Assembly, November 27, 19533
The General Assembly,
Having regard to the provisions of
Article 109 of the Charter under which a proposal to hold a
General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the
purpose of reviewing the Charter is to be placed on the agenda
of the tenth annual session of the General Assembly if such a
conference has not been held before that session,
Considering that the examination of such
a proposal will require considerable preparation on the part of
both the Secretary-General and Member States,
Considering that study of the legislative
history of the Charter and of the practice followed by the
various organs of the United Nations is one of the best methods
of acquiring knowledge of the Charter and will greatly
facilitate the General Assembly’s consideration, at its tenth
annual session, of the question of calling a General
Conference,
Having regard to the memorandum by the
Secretary-General (A/C.6/343),
Requests the Secretary-General to
prepare, publish and circulate among the Member States during
1954, or shortly thereafter:
- (a)
- A systematic compilation of the documents of the
United Nations Conference on International Organization
not yet published;
- (b)
- A complete index of the documents of that Conference
on the lines envisaged in part II and part III C of the
memorandum by the Secretary-General;
- (c)
- A repertory of the practice of United Nations organs
appropriately indexed.
