Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

795.00/6–1253: Circular telegram/airgram

¹

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions²

confidential

Washington, June 12, 1953—5:34 p.m.

1195. For Ambassador from Secretary.

1. Pursuant to instructions from President re representations to be made concerning question Chinese representation in UN bodies following Korean armistice, arrange appointment your earliest convenience with Foreign Minister to convey US views and seek views his government.

2. If there is Korean armistice, efforts will undoubtedly be made by Soviet bloc to seat representatives of Chinese Communist regime in UN bodies in place of representatives of Government of Republic of China, and argument will be made that armistice justifies such change. It is this government’s earnest hope that matter will not be raised by countries outside Soviet bloc and that vast majority of free world, particularly those who with troops in Korea have borne major burden of repelling aggression, can remain united against any such move. US believes it imperative that representatives of Government of Republic of China should continue be seated in UN bodies. Following are main considerations which may be used in support our position (see para 4).

a) In this government’s view, agreement by Chinese communists to military armistice does not constitute adequate evidence Chinese Commie regime has abandoned use armed force to seek its objectives and those USSR. There is nothing indicate change represents more than tactical shift designed create atmosphere in which resistance to Communist imperialism will be weakened. As result UN resistance Communists have found it unprofitable continue war in Korea but danger renewed aggression by them, particularly in SE Asia, remains.

b) In absence real evidence Peiping regime has changed its conduct and decided abide by Purposes and Principles Charter, seating of its representatives in UN would appear as reward for halting criminal aggression and would, in our considered judgment, not deter in any way Chinese Commies from further aggressive ventures. In fact, this international acceptance would be taken as an indication of free world weakness which Commies would seek to exploit to utmost.

c) US welcomes armistice as successful achievement and important milestone UN efforts maintain international peace. Full benefit may however be lost if essential unity not maintained post-armistice period. In interest solidarity on which common security depends, most important in coming period for countries of free world stand together on major issues and avoid public divergence.

d) I cannot emphasize too strongly most unfortunate effect which renewed attempt seat Chinese Commies in UN bodies would have upon American people who, in response request UN, have so recently suffered, as of May 22, 136,129 casualties and who have contributed so substantially of material wealth. Foreign Minister will be aware recent proposal in Senate, withdrawn only through intervention President, to effect that US contribution to UN budget should cease if Commie China were seated in SC, and concurrent resolution approved unanimously by both Senate and House expressing opposition to seating Chinese Commies.

3. US realizes that some friendly governments may honestly differ with its views as outlined above. In interest of avoiding open difference in UN, with minimum sacrifice by any government of its substantive position on question as to what regime is entitled represent China in UN, US would be willing continue present practice of avoiding vote on substance through some procedural action by which any proposal change Chinese representation would be postponed indefinitely. If any new procedural arrangements should prove necessary on this point, they can be discussed by UNDels in NY.

4. Above material is to be used in your discretion in light circumstances of Government to which you are accredited, so as maintain maximum support our position. In few posts it may be judged counterproductive go beyond effort discourage them from raising issue in UN and minimize generally their opposition our position.

5. Report results your conversation together with any recommendation whether additional approaches USUN and Washington would be helpful.

Approach GOI at discretion Ambassador.

If any post believes approach would be counter-productive it should inform Department before taking action.

Dulles

1. Sent to 51 posts for action, 13 by telegram, 38 by airgram; sent by air to 6 posts for information (including Moscow, Praha, Warsaw).
2. Drafted by Paul B. Taylor, Officer in Charge, General Assembly Affairs, Office of UN Political and Security Affairs, and Gough, with concurrence of Hickerson and Wainhouse; cleared with the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of European Affairs, the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews), and the Executive Secretariat; approved for transmission and signed by the Secretary of State.