HickersonMurphyKey files, lot 58 D 33, “UN Charter Review Conference”

Memorandum for the Files, by Lincoln P. Bloomfield of the United Nations Planning Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs

confidential
  • Subject:
  • Preparations for Charter Review Conference

At a meeting this morning in Mr. Hickerson’s office attended by Messrs. Hickerson, Sandifer, DePalma, Chase, Memeyer and Bloomfield, the attached memorandum dated March 4, 1953,1 entitled “Preliminary Planning for UN Charter Review Preparations”, was discussed.

[Page 173]

Mr. Hickerson’s views were as follows:

1.
The recommendations which we proposed Mr. Hickerson make to the Secretary were approved and the Planning Staff will prepare a memorandum from Mr. Hickerson to the Secretary along the proposed lines.2
2.
The proposed timetable was generally in order, i.e., to devote the remainder of 1953 to the development of the Department’s tentative conclusions on the subject of Charter Review and to defer until 1954 consultations with members of Congress and with private citizens.
3.
The Conference which we expect the General Assembly in 1955 will call would not in any event convene until some time in 1956 and preferably not until after the Presidential election in 1956, which would mean that the Conference would probably not be held until 1957.
4.
The assumptions which should underlie our preliminary studies are as follows:
a.
There will be no general war.
b.
There will be no fundamental change in the present power lineup.
c.
The USSR will still be a member of the UN.
d.
In general, the present status quo would prevail and we would not at this juncture be planning to utilize Charter review as a means of drastically or dramatically altering it.
e.
Our proposals, if any, would be made on the basis of our national interest and we would not be deterred from advancing them by the prospect of Soviet veto under Article 108.
f.
Any proposal which would constructively strengthen the United Nations will probably be rejected by the Soviet Union, but this would not deter us from making it.
g.
Our position on the veto will probably remain constant, i.e., no veto on membership and Chapter VI questions or any questions other than the use of force under Chapter VII. However, we would probably reserve our rights under Article 108 respecting amendments to the Charter in the absence of any clear-cut provisions for withdrawal.
5.
Among the major questions which should engage our attention the following should have priority:
a.
The UN Security system; under this heading we would review the failure to implement Article 43; the experience with the Uniting for Peace resolutions; as well as all other pertinent considerations.
b.
Assuming that we are unable to come up with any more optimistic outlook on the security picture and must therefore give priority to regional organizations in the security field, what adjustments in the Charter would be necessary or desirable to institutionalize this situation?
c.
Assuming that the Security Council will remain paralyzed by the use of the veto, the powers, structure, and relationships of the General Assembly should be reviewed with particular attention to the concurrent role of the General Assembly (and in fact of the United Nations as a whole) in the colonial, trusteeship, economic, and social fields.
d.
The problem of weighted voting.
6.
Mr. Hickerson suggested that the views of the office directors be solicited in order to ascertain the major problem areas for the purpose of Charter review. The Planning Staff explained that this had been done and that the Inventory or “new look” project now underway was being participated in actively by the operating officers and would, we hoped, furnish a number of useful insights into areas requiring concentration for Charter review.
7.
It was generally agreed that rather than develop an article-by-article blueprint from the outset, we would concentrate initially on those critical areas which would furnish the most important raw material in any event for any new shapes which this project might Assume.

L. P. Bloomfield
  1. Not printed.
  2. See editorial note, infra.