A/MS files, lot 54 D 291 (V), “UNA/P master file”
Paper Prepared by the United Nations Planning Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs
IV–1
Collective Security
character of the issue
In view of Soviet non-cooperation in the Security Council, attempts have been made to develop UN collective security functions under General Assembly auspices, attempts which have met with determined opposition on the part of the Soviet Union. Because of this Soviet opposition, the problem of collective security has come to be regarded as a Cold War issue. Certain Members have hesitated actively to support US efforts to organize a UN collective security system, fearing that such a system would provoke the Soviet Union, without necessarily increasing world security. Differences on this matter reflect divergent views on the role of the UN in the East-West conflict, and also certain contrasts between the Strategic interests of the US and European or Asian powers.
background
The UN security system originally was supposed to center in the Security Council’s capacity for instant decisions backed by the full weight of the united great powers. Their disposition to exercise this joint responsibility for world peace was supposed to express itself in an agreement to set aside military forces for the use of the UN under Article 43 of the Charter. It soon became clear that the absence of cooperation between the USSR and the other great powers reduced this system to impotence. The Charter, however, conferred on the GA certain [Page 114] functions with respect to international peace that were susceptible of development in case of SC impotence.
Long before Korea the US had publicly taken the position that failure of the great powers to cooperate in the SC and to agree on Article 43 military forces did not relieve UN Members of their responsibility to seek effective means of collective security by alternative avenues. Following the experience in Korea,* this idea was translated into the Uniting for Peace Resolution. The Resolution asserts the right and intention of the GA to recommend that members take collective measures to maintain peace whenever the SC, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to do so. Practically this meant, of course, that the UN might be called upon to recommend collective action in a case of aggression even if the aggressor is one of the great powers, a case which originally used to be considered virtually outside of the UN system on the generally held premise that UN collective security action required a SC decision and thus agreement among the great powers.
The strong opposition of the Soviet Union against the Uniting for Peace Resolution undoubtedly lent pointed political meaning to this responsibility.
The Resolution established a Peace Observation Commission designed to observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists a danger to international peace. It also set up a Collective Measures Committee to study measures which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security. Furthermore, it recommended that Members maintain armed forces so trained, organized, and equipped that they could be promptly made available for service as UN units. The purposes and use of these institutions of collective security have provided some of the concrete topics on which the various groups and forces in the UN have joined issue.
The Peace Observation Commission need not be discussed here since it has not figured prominently in the stresses and strains surrounding collective security arrangements.
The Collective Measures Committee has by now been continued into its third year, each time by resolutions supported by over fifty Members. All the same, its role has been the object of pronounced differences of opinion. More than other GA institutions, the CMC has been symbolic of the intent to develop collective security capabilities of the UN despite the paralysis of the SC. It is therefore significant that certain members of the Committee, notably the British and French, feared that certain aspects of preparatory planning by the CMC might [Page 115] give the UN the appearance of an anti-Soviet alliance. In view of these fears, the Committee agreed from the beginning to confine itself to studies of a generalized and abstract character, refraining from mentioning specific measures by specific countries and altogether avoiding certain topics (e.g. bases) even in generalized form. While the Committee’s studies are meant to reduce improvisation in case of future collective action, they do not envisage such action in terms of any concrete strategic assumptions. CMC planning has been directed toward “aggression” in the abstract.
The CMC also requested Members that they inform the UN of steps taken to maintain armed forces in such a manner that they could promptly be made available to the UN. The replies, while generally in favor of the principle of collective security, were sufficiently evasive to suggest that most Member States are at this time unwilling to translate the general idea into concrete preparations. Only six countries (all small powers)† offered specific contingents. An overwhelming majority, however, indicated support in principle, and several pointed to their forces in Korea as a contribution to the UN collective security system. NATO members also cited their contributions under the North Atlantic Pact. The response from others was less positive, several states pleading prior requirements of self-defense or lack of resources.‡ India frankly expressed its disagreement with the concept of collective military measures. Fourteen states have not formally replied.§
Collective security was furthermore put to the test in UN reactions to Communist China. The resolution condemning Communist Chinese aggression in Korea (February 1, 1951) clearly invoked the obligation to join in further collective action for international peace and security. It was strongly opposed by an Arab-Asian bloc under Indian leadership (it received 44 affirmative votes). The Additional Measures Committee, set up under this resolution to consider sanctions against the Chinese aggressors, under similar pressure confined itself to the recommendation of an embargo of arms, ammunition, and strategic materials, as determined by each state. (Collective security also played an indirect role in the problem of Chinese representation, since the refusal to contemplate the seating of the Chinese Communist Government has been, since June 1950, based on the argument that the UN could not consider the Chinese Communist Government’s claim as long as the latter actively resisted UN collective action.)
[Page 116]In general, the development of collective security in the UN since 1950 shows strong and scarcely diminished voting support of the principle of solidarity against aggression, together with persistent fears, on the part of many states, to take any practical steps that might provoke the Soviet Union or draw unwilling Members into unpredictable military commitments.
united states policies
The objectives of our policy up to now can be broken down into long and short term categories. In the long run, we have desired to build in the UN the broad framework of a system of collective security that would gradually promote conditions of enduring peace. In the event of general hostilities, we would prefer to have the war fought between the UN and the aggressor rather than between the US (plus allies) and its enemy. In the short run we have been interested in finding ways and means by which collective resistance to aggression could be planned and prepared under UN auspices as much as is possible in advance of unpredictable situations which must determine the eventual decisions of states, and we have sought to promote a growing awareness on the part of states of their responsibilities to an effective system of collective security. With respect to regional arrangements like NATO, we have desired to obtain recognition of a mutually supporting relationship between them and the UN. These objectives have been pursued with the realization that even if they were not fully attainable at all or within a given period, their discussion in the UN would help to keep Members alert to the meaning of the organization and the common stake of the free world in it.
US interests with respect to Soviet aggression are involved in UN collective security in these two respects:
On the one hand the US wishes to obtain a maximum of political and military support in event of a future war provoked by Soviet aggression. On the other hand, political support in the UN for US sponsored measures to strengthen collective security in time of peace involves US prestige in the sense that the number of votes in favor of the US position in such matters is often considered to be indicative of the willingness of nations to side with the US in an ultimate showdown.
major difficulties facing the united states
Obstacles to rapid progress in this field have arisen chiefly from the attitudes of our main allies. In general, many of our friends look upon collective security in the present situation as an issue of the Cold War rather than as a normal and continuous function of the UN. They tend to fear that insistence on collective security would reduce the usefulness of the UN as an impartial agency for conciliation and negotiation. [Page 117] Those who participate with us in regional arrangements also incline to rely for their security on the concrete commitments under those pacts rather than on the UN. The British privately insist that in the event of Soviet aggression, the core of resistance would be the US supported by the UK and the Commonwealth, that in view of the precarious balance of forces UN collective action might not cause the aggressor to desist, but rather would be likely to bring closer World War III, and that the attempt to organize collective action against aggression through the UN would, because of the East-West conflict, be likewise interpreted as preparations for World War III instead of preparations to prevent this occurrence. The British also discount the view that “roping in” marginal states in UN collective action could make any substantial difference in World War III. Regarding NATO, the British fear that the more attempts were made in times of peace to foster the relationships between such organizations as NATO and the UN, the stronger would be the impression that the UN and NATO were indistinguishable.—The French similarly believe that emphasis on a short-run program of planning and preparation for collective security would tend to convert the UN into an anti-Soviet alliance which would tend both to alienate the neutrals and further to exacerbate relations with the Soviets. Certain countries precariously exposed to the Soviet threat, like Yugoslavia and Turkey, have taken a different attitude and displayed a lively interest in the advantages they expect from UN preparations for collective resistance to aggression.
In the particular application of collective security to the problem of North Korean and Chinese Communist aggression, certain phases of our policies have encountered the resistance of those of our European allies who had recognized the Chinese Communist Government, and those Asian and Arab states who are inclined to view the Korean war, as it has developed, in terms of Chinese self-defense rather than aggression, and to dissociate themselves from UN sponsorship of the Korean action. In other words, different attitudes toward this particular case of collective security are heavily colored by differences in the national policies of various countries with respect to Communist China. Different interpretations of the role of the UN in the Korean conflict follow from, rather than motivate, these divergent national policies.
trends
Discussion about the CMC has by now led to a considerable amount of agreement between the US and its main allies, so that this particular question would hardly be expected to cause further difficulties. Nevertheless, the underlying issue, of which the question of the CMC is but one symbolic aspect, continues as a latent difference of views about the role of the UN under present historical circumstances. The issue still [Page 118] is, whether, given the conflict between the Soviets and the “free world”, the emphasis in the UN should be on security and enforcement functions or on negotiating and conciliatory functions of the Organization. As long as the US is vitally interested in the UN as well as in vigorous counter-action against the Soviet threat, under prevailing policy we would hold that de-emphasizing UN security and enforcement functions would mean to “put the UN on ice”. Other leading nations of the free world will probably continue to desire a UN devoted mainly to conciliating and mediating functions, lest a firm UN front of resistance to the Soviet threat might “aggravate the tension”. The extent to which this issue will cause further stresses and strains between the US and its friends in the UN depends mainly on the future development of the Soviet “peace” offensive and its effects on the leading non-communist powers.
- In Korea, UN action, based on a SC recommendation, was taken against an aggressor backed by the Soviet Union, the action having been supported morally by 53 Members of whom 16 have contributed military forces, another 26 rendered some material assistance, and one has borne the brunt of the fighting. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Burma, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, Israel, Liberia, Pakistan, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Colombia, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Philippines, and Uruguay. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
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Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iceland, Iran, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Syria, Thailand, and Yemen. [Footnote in the source text.]
Note: The foregoing listings are as of August 2, 1952. [As in the source text.]
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