Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

711.00/12–3052

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Jernegan ) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State ( Matthews )¹

secret

Washington , December 30, 1952.

• Subject:
• Attitude of the Arab States toward the Incoming Republican Administration in the United States.

Problem:

The Arab States greeted the election of General Eisenhower with enthusiasm, as marking a probable turning point in U.S. policy toward the Near East. They expect from the new Administration a greater appreciation of the strategic importance of the area and a recognition of the greater importance of the Arab countries relative to Israel in the strategy of Near East defense against the USSR. The question is how to deal with this Arab attitude, which presents both an opportunity and a problem to basic U.S. interests in the Near East.

Background:

The conviction of the Arab world that the outgoing Administration is heavily biased toward Israel was reaffirmed recently by U.S. support of the Eight-Power Resolution at the United Nations General Assembly, operative paragraph 4 of which urged the Israelis on the one side and the Arab States on the other to seek a peace settlement by entering “at an early date, without prejudice to their respective rights and claims, into direct negotiations for the establishment of such a settlement, bearing in mind the resolutions as well as the principal objectives of the United Nations on the Palestine question, including the religious interests of third parties”. This paragraph is regarded by the Arab States as relegating previous United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine into a position where they could be ignored, and as requiring negotiation to be on the basis of the de facto boundary and refugee situation in Palestine. Arab bitterness on this subject during the General Assembly debate was recently reflected in a violent press campaign against the West in the Arab States. In addition, the Arab League is holding a threat of economic boycott over the Federal Republic of Germany, effective at such time as the German Parliament ratifies the Restitution Agreement which it signed in 1952 with Israel, and has charged the U.S. with responsibility for this ‘un-neutral’ document, which they say, ignores the compensation rights of the Arab Palestine refugees.

Discussion:

The Arab attitude towards the election of General Eisenhower has been more clearly indicated by press reactions in the Near East than in official statements. The press was particularly vocal in Beirut and Baghdad, less so in Syria and Egypt where military regimes exercise a more strict control over what is printed.

The Arabs appear to hope vaguely for a new orientation of U.S. policy towards the Near East which will include: (1) greater emphasis on economic and military assistance to the Arab States as compared with Israel; (2) an affirmation of U.S. determination to prevent aggression by Israel against the Arab States; and (3) pressure on Israel to implement the obligation (which she has accepted in principle) to compensate Arab refugees; to repatriate to Israel a substantial proportion of the Arab refugees; and to rectify her boundaries with the Arab States at least in rough equivalents to the allocations of territory outlined in United Nations resolutions which have gone unobserved by both Israel and the Arab States.

However vague and imprecise may be the feelings of the Arab States, there is no doubt that their hopes are very high. This fact presents both an opportunity and a risk at a time when the U.S. Government is moving to effect a settlement of differences between the U.K. and Egypt and to establish a Middle East Defense Organization. The alternatives are three:

(1) that the present mood in the Arab States may be turned to U.S. advantage by certain friendly gestures and actions by the incoming Administration; or that

(2) this wave of Arab enthusiasm, if given no encouragement, may spend itself rapidly in such disillusionment that currently dwindling faith in U.S. friendship for the Arab world might be completely lost and the leadership of moderate Arab opinion, which favors closer ties with the U.S. and the West, would be supplanted by extremist opinion of an anti-Western and a neutralistic nature; or

(3) that Arab enthusiasm may be over-encouraged, beyond capacity to later satisfy.

Recommendations:

It is recommended:

(1) that you call the attention of Mr. Dulles to the problem of Arab-Israel relationships and to the declining prestige of the U.S. throughout Arab lands which has resulted from Arab conviction that present U.S. policy favors Israel against the vital interests of the Arab States;

(2) that a special opportunity exists for the incoming Administration to capitalize on Arab hopes and expectations, without raising the latter too high;

(3) that in the best interests of the U.S. these hopes and expectations should not be allowed to collapse;

(4) that, accordingly, it is suggested that the incoming Administration consider the desirability of several initial moves designed to convince the Arab States of (a) its deep interest and impartiality toward all states in the Near East; (b) its determination to discourage aggression within as well as upon the Near East area; (c) its desire to work steadily for peace between Israel and the Arab States by whatever means seem best calculated to produce that result; and (d) its determination to weld the states of the Near East into a workable structure for defense against Soviet aggression;

(5) It is also suggested by NEA that the following might be considered as suitable initial moves by the new Administration designed to create the desired effect:

(a) a brief general statement in the President’s Inaugural Address embodying a recognition of the importance of the Near and Middle East area to the U.S. and to the defense of the free world, and the friendly and impartial interest which the U.S. entertains towards all states of the area. An example of the type of general statement which this Bureau believes useful is attached.²

(b) an early reaffirmation by the new Administration, in conjunction with the governments of the United Kingdom and France, of the principles of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 regarding non-aggression within the Near Eastern area.³ It is hoped that this reaffirmation might strengthen the earlier language, so as to re-emphasize that (assuming the new Administration pursues current plans to develop a Middle East Defense Organization) any arms aid extended to states of the Near East are to be used only for area defense against an outside threat and not for intra-area aggression.

(c) an early visit by Secretary Dulles himself to the Near East to discuss with heads of states top policy problems regarding U.S. relations with the Near East. It is suggested that if Mr. Dulles finds this idea congenial, announcement of the intention to make such a trip might be made as soon as feasible after the Inauguration.⁴ The purpose of the trip would be primarily to underline U.S. interest in the area by “breaking precedent. No Secretary of State has visited the Near East in recent years, although many visits have been made to Europe and Latin America. The dramatic aspect of such a visit would recall to Near Easterners General Eisenhower’s pre-inaugural visit to Korea and would serve to emphasize an awakened U.S. understanding of the rising importance of Asian peoples in the panorama of U.S. foreign relations. From a practical standpoint it would embolden moderate, pro-Western leadership in the Near East at a moment when the Soviet Union is redoubling its efforts to discredit the U.S. and its Western Allies throughout the area by alliance with extremist, anti-Western groups.⁵

1. Drafted by Parker T. Hart, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs.
2. Not printed.
3. Dated May 25, 1950. For documentation regarding the Tripartite Declaration, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, pp. 122 ff.
4. Initialled marginal notation by Matthews: “I have reservations as to timing.”
5. Dulles made a visit to the Near and Middle East in May 1953; see volume ix .