USUN files, “Arab-Asian States”
Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State
- Subject:
- Preliminary Analysis of Considerations Affecting Decisions on the Arab-Asian Problems in the United Nations General Assembly
General Conclusion
Careful study of all the papers prepared by the various offices of the Department leads to the conclusion that no one is able to suggest action which the United States or the United Nations can take at this time which will solve or put an end to any one of the current issues which involve the problem of our relations with the Arab-Asian group. There is no such action for instance which will terminate the nationalist agitation in North Africa, end “Malanism” or the opposition to it, or put an end to Arab-Israeli antagonism. It may be stating the obvious, but it is well to bear in mind that policy decisions on these cases must therefore be made with a view to alleviating difficulties, reducing frictions and contributing to ultimate progress toward solutions, while avoiding so far as possible actions which would have the opposite results. More broadly, the United States should endeavor to follow a course of action which will maintain in the world the moral position of the United States as a counter to the communist appeal. The actions which the United States can usefully take in pursuing its general objectives in regard to these issues are not confined to actions in the United Nations but the elaboration of these other courses of action is not included in this paper.
I. The Issues Arising in the United Nations.
A number of cases which will come up for consideration in the United Nations General Assembly involve issues about which the Arab-Asian group feel very strongly and on which their positions are sharply opposed to those of the so-called metropolitan powers, especially France. These cases include Tunisia, Morocco, and the new item on the racial policies of the Union of South Africa. So far as South Africa is concerned, they include also the old cases of the Indians in South Africa and the case of Southwest Africa. The Palestine case, from the point of view of the United States, also presents problems in terms of our relations with the Arab-Asian group but does not strictly involve the so-called “colonial” issue and the related problem of “nationalism”. A number of other cases which will arise in the Second, [Page 54] Third and Fourth Committees of the General Assembly dealing with human rights, the development of underdeveloped areas, and the administration of dependent areas and trust territories will also involve some of the same antagonisms and conflicts. This situation is one in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
II. Use of Terms.
It should be explained also that to avoid at each step an examination of the differences which exist between the attitudes and positions of the countries of the Near East, Middle East and Far East, the term “Arab-Asian group” is employed as indicative of a general attitude which creates a problem for the United States. Similarly, for convenience the case of France is, in the first instance, treated as illustrative as an attitude and position of the metropolitan or “colonial” powers. The necessary distinctions and differentiations will be analyzed subsequently.
Similarly, for convenience of analysis, the word “nationalism” is used to indicate the powerful force which inspires or excites a very large part of the human race today. It is recognized that the motivating force is not confined to “nationalism” in the strictest sense. It includes the reactions of those who consider that they are unfairly kept in underprivileged conditions and who have been awakened to the belief that historic inequalities whether social, economic or political can now be removed. Racism is another element contributing to the same turmoil.
III. The Problem.
It is recognized that the appearance of these cases in the General Assembly does not mark either the origin or the extent of the general problem confronting the United States in terms of the conflict between “Arab-Asian nationalism” and “French colonialism.” The cases in the General Assembly require specific decisions but those decisions cannot be made wisely without a consideration of the much broader and continuing problem. No one supposes that the “ideal” decision on these cases will finally dispose of the agitation over the particular cases or the long-range difficulties confronting the United States in terms of meeting the general issues. Primary reliance in our approach to these difficulties must probably be placed on actions falling outside the scope of the United Nations and other traditional diplomatic processes, such as are discussed under VII, at the conclusion of this paper. Our United Nations action will, however, have a considerable effect in helping to create the atmosphere and background which will influence our prospects of success in carrying out these other types of action.
For convenience of preliminary analysis, attention is focused here on the problems raised in the case of Tunisia and Morocco. Reserving [Page 55] for later a detailed analysis of the distinctions between the Tunisian and Moroccan cases, the two are considered here in terms of the problem of French North Africa.
This memorandum also attempts to concentrate at this stage upon factors to be considered in making general policy decisions, as distingushed from arguments which could be advanced and tactics which could be followed to sustain such decisions when made.
IV. Major United States Interests and Objectives.
In regard to the particular case of North Africa in the General Assembly, certain specific major United States interests and objectives can be identified.
In regard to France, it is to our interest:
- a.
- to maximize France’s internal strength and external contribution to the Western position in either a prolonged cold war or a general war;
- b.
- to enhance the possibility that North Africa will contribute to French strength rather than cause a weakening drain upon French resources;
- c.
- to preserve North Africa as a stable area for basing Western operations in the event of general war.
In regard to the Arab-Asian countries, it is to our interest:
- a.
- to prevent a further deterioration in the internal stability of the North African area such as might involve a drain on Western strength or an accretion to Soviet strength;
- b.
- to promote a sympathetic attitude which will in turn affect favorably the actions of these countries on such issues as participation in MEDO, granting of base rights, availability of raw materials particularly oil, and cooperation in the United Nations especially on such problems as the joint effort in Korea or a possible similar joint effort in case of any new communist aggression.
The United States also has an interest in strengthening the United Nations. Although it is not demonstrable that any country would withdraw from the United Nations if it felt a sense of outrage as a result of United Nations action in these cases, if such an eventuality appeared likely the United States would wish to prevent such a development. Whether or not the short-range interests of the United States are served by the discussion of such cases as those here under consideration in the General Assembly, the United States is at present committed to the generally popular concept of the United Nations as the “Town Meeting of the World” and that concept could not be eradicated overnight.
V. Alternative Courses of Action Open to the United States.
The United States’ freedom of action in choosing a course of action on these cases is limited. An extreme course of action in favor of either one of the antagonistic interests would be likely to place in real jeopardy [Page 56] the attainment of two lines of objectives of American policy neither one of which can be disregarded.
For example, if the French were suddenly to withdraw from North Africa, the result would probably be local chaos in the area since there is no other country to fill the vacuum. France would lose an important source of military manpower, the loss of which would seriously affect not only the French military position in Europe but also its capacity to continue the effort in Indochina. Moreover, the French have the determination to stay and the present power to do so despite any resistance of the local populations even with such support as their Arab-Asian friends could give them. If, however, the French maintain their position solely by force without progressive improvement in the local situation, the drain on French resources could have an equally crippling effect. It is possible to look forward to developments wisely guided by the French which would enable them to salvage at least many of their interests without excessive cost.
The various positions which the United States might take on these cases are subject to numerous variations. Factors to be considered in choosing among these variations would include the actual merits of the cases, the effect on the general French position in the promotion of our European policies, the effect on the effort to increase the cooperative attitude of the Arab-Asian states, the effect on the attainment of other objectives of the United States in the United Nations especially in connection with Korea, the effect on the future of the United Nations itself, and the maintenance of the moral position of the United States throughout the world as a counter to the communist appeal.
It is therefore concluded that the United States can best serve its [ramified?] interests, both with respect to the states concerned and with respect to our stake in the future of the United Nations, by resisting the role of partisan for either camp and by adopting—with such variations as are required by our national attitudes toward each dispute—a mediatory role.
VI. Execution of Recommended Course of Action.
A. Introduction.
In proceeding with an amplification of this intermediate course of action, it becomes more difficult to segregate the particular cases under discussion from other cases in the General Assembly involving relatively the same or comparable line-ups of antagonists. The United States’ attitude in a discussion of the Palestine issue, for example, might exacerbate the passions of the more extreme representatives of the Arab-Asian nationalists. On the other hand, if the United States should decide to take an attitude generally in support of the Arab-Asian position on the issue of “Malanism” in South Africa, the atmosphere would be less highly charged in regard to a possible United States intermediate position on the North African cases.
[Page 57]B. The North African Cases.
It seems to be true that the French anticipate, although they may not be fully reconciled to, United States’ support for the inclusion of the North African items on the agenda. (This may be more clearly true in regard to the Tunisian item than in regard to the Moroccan item.) It is not anticipated therefore that United States’ support for the inclusion of the items on the agenda would subject our relations with France to a very severe strain. Possibly there would be a somewhat stronger French feeling if they raised the issue of competence and the United States votes against them on this issue. Depending upon the general nature of the debate in the United Nations and the final decision of the French Cabinet, it would appear from the most recent indications that this further step would also be supportable without serious damage to Franco-American relations. Since the Arab-Asian group, supported in this respect in general by the Latin Americans and some other small states, attach great importance to these preliminary questions, it would seem that action of the United States along these lines would be distinctly helpful in terms of our Arab-Asian relationships.
It must be further recognized that the situation in regard to our relations either with the French or with the Arab-Asian group might be changed by the position taken by the United States concerning the adoption of any resolution by the General Assembly concerning these cases. It is probably true, however, that the Arab-Asian group would not expect the United States to join in the kind of strong resolution of condemnation which they would probably favor. The failure of the United States to support such a resolution would probably therefore have only the negative effect of not advancing our cause with the Arab-Asian group. On the other hand, if the United States supported a strong resolution of condemnation, it would undoubtedly surprise and shock the French and might well represent the limit of extreme action which would seriously prejudice French cooperation in support of our policies in Europe. It must be admitted that it is difficult to discuss this point in abstract terms since there are many variations in what might be considered to constitute a “strong resolution of condemnation.”
It does not appear that United States’ refusal to go along on a General Assembly resolution obnoxious to the French would in and of itself seriously affect (a) the Arab decision to participate in MEDO, (b) the present status of base rights in those countries, or (c) general support of the United States’ position in the General Assembly on such questions as Korea. Neither does it appear at the present time that such an intermediate United States’ position would have a determining effect (a) on the fate of the Pinay Government, (b) on French ratification [Page 58] of EDC, or (c) the actual solution of the basic problem in Tunis and Morocco.
The basic situation in Tunis and Morocco cannot be improved without the cooperation of the French. It is doubtful whether the cooperation of the French can be induced by action in the General Assembly. It is at least possible that favorable French action can be induced at least over a period of time by steady, quiet pressure from the United States. On the other hand, there are strong arguments to the effect that any strong action in the form of a resolution by the General Assembly would encourage the recalcitrant elements among Tunisian and Moroccan nationalists to resist profitable negotiations with the French even if the French took a more forward-looking position.
It may further be noted that it seems to be the judgment of officers of the Department that, while the Moroccan and Tunisian situations are inherently ripe for communist agitation, there is not in the present situation or in the immediate future any prospect of communist control of the nationalist movements in North Africa.
C. Certain Other Issues.
Earlier sections of this memorandum have formulated the general role in terms of the issues posed by the Moroccan and Tunisian items, which exemplify most clearly the problem to which this memorandum is addressed. The general line of action to be followed with respect to these two items has been suggested. But application of the general line to other concrete situations—disputes which differ from the North African questions in one or more significant respects—is not an automatic process.
1. Palestine
The Palestine case, for example, differs from the North African items in that, inter alia, (a) the complainants include only a portion of the Arab-Asian group; (b) their adversary is not a “metropolitan” power; (c) the Arab complaint is not directed against a colonial overlord but a rival neighbor-state. Notwithstanding these differences, the free-world need for a strong Israel (and ultimate peace between Israel and the Arab states) requires that here, as in the North African cases, the United States must remain in a middle position, doing all in its power within and without the United Nations to assist the parties to a permanent settlement. (Indeed, since the most fruitful approach to solution of the Palestine question seems to lie in direct negotiations between Israel and the new Naguib government, the immediate objective of United States’ action in the United Nations should be to see to it that United Nations debate does not so exacerbate existing tensions as to make direct negotiation outside the United Nations impossible.)
2. South Africa
The Palestine case, despite its significant differences from the North African items, does not call for rejection of the indicated mediatory role. However, the new South African item, which likewise differs [Page 59] from the North African prototype, does not offer ready ground for the assumption of a neutral position on the merits.
In terms of impact on American interests, the South African case differs significantly from the North African cases. Our cordial relations with South Africa, although important to us, are relatively minor as compared with the importance of maintaining French cooperation. Furthermore, the merits of the South African case are significantly different, in terms of United States national attitudes, from the merits of the North African questions. In the latter situations, the American presumption in favor of self-government is balanced by the American realization that the establishment of self-government is a delicate’ process calling for statesmanlike efforts jointly agreed upon and carried forward by the metropolitan power and the dependent peoples. In the South African case, fundamental principles of American democracy, embodied in the United Nations Charter, dictate refusal by this Government to countenance any policy of governmentally-imposed racial oppression.
Whether debate in the General Assembly will reach the merits of “Malanism” is problematical, since the competence of the General Assembly may well be called into question. This issue of competence involves both legal problems and policy decisions concerning the effects of the precedent established. If the debate does reach the merits of the controversy, the United States can exercise a moderating influence by privately urging the futility of a sharply condemnatory resolution, but the United States should not put itself publicly in the morally untenable position of supporting or condoning the racial practices of the South African Government.
It is recognized that strong condemnation of the South African Government may provoke South African withdrawal from the United Nations. On the other hand, refusal by the United Nations to discuss “Malanism”, or acceptance by the United Nations of a double standard of Charter observance, might provoke the response of Indian negativism toward (or even withdrawal from) the United Nations. On balance, it would seem that the possibility of South African withdrawal must be accepted as a calculated risk. In any event, it should be the special concern of the United States, through private approaches to the South African Government and the South African Delegation, to prevent any precipitate South African response.
VII. Other Types of United States’ Action.
Previous parts of this paper indicated that the United States could not, if it was to avoid jeopardizing its vital interests, follow a course of action that would be wholly consistent with Arab-Asian aspirations. There will be both a continuing frustration of these aspirations and a continuing tendency to blame the Western powers, including—at least to some extent—the United States, for that frustration. This will be one of the factors stengthening extremist anti-foreign groups and weakening the position of more moderate and responsible leaderships in the Arab-Asian area, and particularly in the Middle Eastern countries. This emphasizes the need for considering [Page 60] carefully whether parallel United States’ actions of other types might not be taken which would, to some extent, offset the consequences of the continuing and unavoidable non-fulfillment of Middle Eastern aspirations that impinge on vital Western interests.
Such a consideration calls for at least a cursory examination of the forces underlying the presently accelerated trend toward anti-Westernism and political instability in the Middle East. That trend results, in large part, from recent economic and social changes within this area, which have expanded the numbers and heightened the aspirations of certain groups—notably the urban middle sector—far beyond the point at which they can be satisfied or absorbed under this area’s existing social, political, or economic organization. These emerging groups are consequently moved to seek to overthrow that organization, and particularly to challenge the established position of the traditional ruling elite, which is largely composed of members of the landed and tribal hierarchy. While this traditional elite has previously perceived in some degree of Western influence a guarantee of its domestic position, the emerging urban middle sector has found in anti-foreignism a potent issue with which to accelerate its accession to power. So long as the leaders of this urban sector consider that their position as aspirants for, or holders of, power is insecure, they will continue to emphasize this issue in relation to the foreign scene as well as to press for more extremist policies at home. They will, in all probability, continue to be strikingly successful in creating and mobilizing articulate “popular” support for their anti-foreign goals, particularly among the urban proletariat and possibly among the military, since the activism of both of these groups is becoming a factor of increasing political significance in this area.
In the long run, therefore, any approach to the difficulties that we face in our relations with this area (difficulties which the debates in the General Assembly necessarily will not reduce and may compound) must deal with their basic causes rather than symptomatic manifestations. It is doubtful that any practicable United States or indeed Western policy in the United Nations could fulfill Middle Eastern demands and lead to a cooperative partnership with these countries, so long as the exigencies of domestic politics compel their governments to find a zenophobic outlet for the feelings that contemporary social and economic changes are engendering. Most of these governments are leading or confronting internal revolutions, which are nonetheless real for not following the pattern that was established by the events of 1789 in France or of 1917 in Russia. Underlying these revolutions is the aspiration of a new emerging group to alter the area’s existing internal structure and external posture in such a way as both to enhance [Page 61] its own position and to give effect to certain of its “reformist” and “nationalist” concepts. In proportion as these emerging groups succeed in attaining their goals, their revolutions may “come of age”, as in Mexico and Turkey, and thus create a new pattern for political stability. It is by assisting this process that the United States can perhaps best maximize the long-term prospects for fulfilling its objectives vis-à-vis this area. For only stable and reasonably secure Middle Eastern governments will, in the foreseeable future, be able to react to a friendly Western attitude on outstanding issues affecting Arab-Asian interests by limited collaboration rather than by “raising the ante” in their demands on the West. Perhaps the most that can be expected of United States’ action in the General Assembly is that it should not so violently disarrange our relations with these countries as to render impossible United States’ actions of other types that might help to bring such governments into being.
The processes by which the United States might seek to accomplish this purpose are set forth in the Staff Study appended to NSC 129/1. This paper indicates that “we should seek to use the social and economic tools available to us in ways that will reduce the explosive power of forces pressing for revolutionary change to the point where necessary changes can be accomplished without uncontrollable instability…. As new leadership groups emerge, we should also work to associate their interests with our own and, if and when they gain power, cooperate with them in working out programs that will assist them to attain constructive objectives—a course of development which will tend to give a measure of moderation and stability to their regimes…. Maximum results, at least in the next several years, will be assured by programs directed towards meeting certain aspirations of urban groups, which include both the leadership and principal supporters of the new political movements in this area.”
With regard to our actions outside of the United Nations, it is clear that complete and lasting Arab-Asian cooperation cannot be “bought” by military or economic aid programs.
In some of the countries included in the Arab-Asian group, it is impossible to ignore the importance of the role of certain personalities and equally dangerous to neglect a study of the psychology of such personalities and their peoples in order to determine what kinds of measures they will find appealing. It is a commonplace that aid programs do not, in general, engender such a strong sense of gratitude that this alone brings the countries to our side. In many instances, the local view is that we are under an obligation to share our wealth and instead of gratitude we are reproached for not doing more.
The conclusion is that actions by the United States which appeal to the special characteristics of the peoples or governments of certain [Page 62] countries and which in themselves seem to us rather intangible and perhaps insignificant, may be among the effective actions we could take. For example, operation “Magic Carpet” in taking the pilgrims to Mecca may well have proved more valuable in building up good will in the Arab states than all the money and effort we have put into the problem of settling the Arab refugees. But it has also been pointed out that memories are short and we need to have recalled constantly such favorable factors as our liberation of the Philippines and our help in establishing the independence of Indonesia.
It must be recognized that the execution of such policies by the United States will be more difficult if the French and more especially the British attitudes are at variance with ours. The same observation applies to colonial areas, in Central Africa for example. Persistent effort to overcome the antagonism of the metropolitan powers to what they consider unrealistic American idealism will be required.
It is beyond the scope of this memorandum to carry further the consideration of these broad problems although their relevance to the specific issues which confront us in the United Nations is clear.