Eisenhower Library, “Project Clean Up, AEC—General”
Thomas E. Murray, Member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, to Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dear Bobby: I didn’t think it appropriate to join in the discussion of NSC 140/1 at the Council meeting on June 4th since the Commission was not represented on the Subcommittee which prepared the document.1 However, I thought it might be useful if I passed on to you a few thoughts which struck me in going over the basic paper and listening to the Council discussion.
I think it is agreed that enemy attack capabilities are largely dependent on atomic energy considerations. So, it worries me to see the Administration apparently relying on analyses prepared without any responsible Atomic Energy Commission participation. Observer status or ad hoc participation by Atomic Energy Commissioners is a far cry from responsible sharing by technically competent Atomic Energy Commission people in the staff work leading to Presidential review and perhaps decision of matters which have direct atomic energy bearing. Present Atomic Energy Commission observation of the Planning Board sessions does not answer this [Page 1178] problem, if for no other reason, because of the statutory prohibition against discussion of restricted data with non-Q cleared people.
A few instances of atomic energy items which bear on NSC 140/1 may highlight the point. The only reference to Russian thermonuclear capacity appearing in any papers which I saw in connection with the NSC discussion was the Subcommittee opinion that the Russians would not have a thermonuclear weapon delivery capability by mid 1955. It strikes me that the validity of the conclusions of the basic paper depend in no small degree upon the accuracy of this assumption. To my mind the assumption is not justified in fact. Less than three years ago we were being told that the United States might be able to develop a successful thermonuclear device in ten to fifteen years. Yet it was only a little more than a year after the conceptual development that the “Mike” device was successfully detonated at Eniwetok. The Russians have the materials necessary for a thermonuclear device and I think it would be very dangerous to assume anything but that they also have the information contained in the lost Joint Committee document. And it should be remembered that the Russian’s idea of a delivery capability for thermonuclear weapons may differ entirely from our idea of a delivery capability.
On the score of vulnerability of atomic energy production installations to sabotage, not enough recognition seems to have been given to the fact that all U–235 is now processed through one part of the Oak Ridge complex which is most vulnerable to sabotage and this will be the case until the completion of the Portsmouth plant.
The basic paper refers to the time requirement for SAC to mount a retaliatory strike. It should be clearly understood that this delay is in no manner attributable to civilian custody of atomic weapons. On a number of occasions the Commission has pointed out to the Department of Defense the possibilities of improved readiness if further nuclear deployments to the military were effected.
I hope that these few examples provide some justification for concern about the relegation of the Atomic Energy Commission to a secondary role in the top Executive Branch decisional machinery. Beria’s2 assignment to manage the Russian program indicates their appreciation of the need for atomic energy representation at the highest level. Since the national security is so closely tied up with atomic energy considerations, it would seem to me only the part of prudence to bring men with atomic energy backgrounds and understanding directly into the work of the Security Council [Page 1179] which under your good guidance has become such an important part of the Executive process.
Sincerely,
- For the text of NSC 140/1, May 18, see p. 328. For the pertinent portion of the memorandum of discussion at the 148th meeting of the National Security Council, June 4, see p. 367.↩
- Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beriya, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union.↩