Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

330.13/3–352

The United States Atomic Energy Commission to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

secret

Washington, March 3, 1952.

Dear Mr. Hickerson: The Commission has received your letter to Dr. Smyth of February 18, 1952, with the attached document identified as DAC D–1/1, with annexes.¹

We have particularly noted Annex II, entitled Proposed Stages of Disclosure and Verification, Atomic Armaments, as developed by an informal interdepartmental working group.

There are a few observations and a few suggested changes in Annex II which we feel should be considered by the Department of State and the Department of Defense. We are transmitting herewith a copy of a revised Annex II containing these changes.

It is our feeling that the present Stage IV should be broken into two stages. A new Stage IV which would be limited to (a) of the present Stage IV, namely, “Details of design and operation, including past and present output of all those atomic energy establishments and installations concerned with the fabrication of atomic or radioactive weapons for fissionable or other materials.”

We would then suggest a new Stage V which would embrace the present (b) Stage IV, namely, “Location, numbers, and types of atomic and radioactive weapons on hand.”

We feel very strongly that there should be consideration given to the compelling need to achieve complete agreement on an effective plan for the international control of atomic energy prior to entering into Stages III, IV and V.

A final observation is that the accumulation of fissionable material by the Soviet Union and the United States in the past several years makes it increasingly difficult to provide assurance by purely technical methods that a country such as the Soviet Union has disclosed and reported accurately the stocks of fissionable material produced. This observation does not affect the adequacy of the present U.N. plan for the international control of atomic energy but it does suggest that complete assurance cannot be gained from purely technical methods utilized in the verification and inspection process.

Sincerely yours,

United Atomic Energy Commission

Gordon Dean

Chairman

[Enclosure]

Revised Draft Prepared by the United States Atomic Energy Commission

secret

[Washington, undated.]

Annex II

Proposed States of Disclosure and Verification

stage i

Disclose

(a) Location of all installations directly concerned with atomic energy, or the product of which is primarily useful in the production of atomic energy. Also manpower employed, physical dimensions, and power input of each installation. (Excluding weapon storage sites.)

(b) Uses or functions of these installations. This should be confined to a statement giving the input material, the product material and the process used in each instance.

Verify

(a) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and physical dimensions of installations. (Inspectors will have access to entire national territory to the extent necessary to determine through such means as aerial survey, inspection of water and railways and power lines, that all atomic energy installations have been declared.)

(b) Uses and functions insofar as revealed by external examination of all structures and unhoused equipment. Detailed interior inspection shall take place in subsequent stages, the particular stage in which it will take place depending upon the function of the plant. (Verification of (a) above will be of value as partial verification of plant use or function.)

stage ii

Disclose

(a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output, of all those installations or parts of installations concerned with preparation of atomic energy raw or feed materials (and such auxiliary materials as graphite, heavy water and beryllium), from mines up to but not including reactors, isotope separation plants, and similar nuclear conversion devices used to produce fissionable or fusionable material.

Verify

(a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stage I.

stage iii

Disclose

(a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output of all those atomic energy installations, or parts of installations, concerned with the conversion of feed materials to fissionable or fusionable materials or with the preparation of radioactive materials in large quantities.

(b) Amounts and types of fissionable or fusionable material on hand or in process; amounts and types of radioisotopes on hand or in process.

(c) General design and operational characteristics of research laboratories involving reactors operating at a power level of 1 MW or more, including amounts of radioactive, or fissionable or fusionable materials produced.

Verify

(a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stages I and II.

(b) By direct and detailed inspection of fissionable or fusionable material, or radioactive materials, installations for production thereof, and appropriate records.

(c) By survey of facilities associated with reported reactors, by detailed inspection of reactors themselves.

stage iv

Disclose

(a) Details of design and operation, including past and present output of all those atomic energy establishments and installations concerned with the fabrication of atomic or radioactive weapons from fissionable or other materials.

Verify

(a) By direct and detailed inspection of installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stages I, II and III.

stage v

Disclose

(a) Location, numbers, and types of atomic and radioactive weapons on hand. Weapon storage sites.

Verify

(a) By direct inspection. Cross checks with Stages I, II and III and (a) above.

1. The letter from Hickerson to Commissioner Henry D. Smyth is not printed. (330.13/2–1852) Draft paper DAC D–1/1 of Feb. 15, dealing with disclosure and verification, is not printed. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, “DAC”) The final agreed U.S. proposal on this subject was submitted to the Disarmament Commission on Apr. 5 as “Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments,” UN doc. DC/C.2/1. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. i, pp. 346–356.

   Documents bearing the indicator “DAC” were prepared by the Interagency Working Group on Preparations for the Disarmament Commission, which first met on Jan. 21, 1952, and subsequently met nine times in 1952 and 1953. Bernhard G. Bechhoefer of UNP was Chairman of the Working Group, which included representatives of State, Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Documentation generated by the Working Group is in Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, “DAC”.