Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 132d Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, February 18, 19531
[Extracts]
eyes only
Present at the 132nd meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding, the Vice President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters, the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations, the Military Liaison Officer, the Executive Secretary, NSC, and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
[Page 1107]There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.
. . . . . . .
3. Armaments and American Policy (Memo for Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 4, 1953)2
The President inquired of the other members of the Council as to whether they had read the report of the Panel of Consultants on the subject, and said that he expected them all to do so and to be thoroughly familiar with the conclusions and recommendations. The President himself expressed a high opinion of the report, but queried one of the conclusions, to the effect that it was bad psychologically to continue our talk about disarmament in the United Nations. Perhaps it was, and in any case he wanted the views of the members as to whether it was really wise to disengage from such discussions.
Secretary Wilson said it seemed to him that we needed a new approach to the problem. It was no longer possible to continue to talk out of both sides of our mouths at the same time, on the one hand urging an increase in the level of armament for the defense of the free world, and on the other urging the virtues of arms limitation. In any case, Secretary Wilson felt that it would be most desirable to outline what kind of a peace we should seek to impose in the event that we could not avoid war with the Soviet Union.
The National Security Council:3
- a.
- Noted the oral comments by the President regarding the report by the Department of State Panel of Consultants on Disarmament circulated via the Senior NSC Staff by the reference memorandum.
- b.
- Agreed to consider the report at the meeting of the Council on February 25.
4. Formulation of a United States Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments (Progress Report, dated January 19, 1953,4 by the Under Secretary of State on NSC 112; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 17, 1953)5
After Mr. Cutler had explained the Progress Report, Secretary Dulles stated that the position which the United States would take [Page 1108] at the forthcoming UN General Assembly on this subject would be in the nature of a temporizing position. He was not yet prepared to adopt a policy of disengagement from discussions of limitation of armaments, and still believed it to be good propaganda at least to continue these discussions. He asked General Bradley’s view of this position, and General Bradley responded by saying that he saw no objection to a continuation of the discussions as long as the program for verification of armaments went hand-in-hand with any program for their limitation.
Secretary Dulles emphatically agreed with this, and repeated that the U.S. position was essentially a delaying tactic calling for a new report at the General Assembly next September.
The Vice President inquired whether it might not be possible to make some kind of sensational offer on the disarmament side, which the Soviets would of course not accept, and which would therefore put them on the spot. If it were possible to make such an offer, the Vice President believed that the effect on world opinion would be very favorable to the United States.
Secretary Dulles replied that earnest thought should certainly be given between now and September to the Vice President’s suggestion. It was obvious to him, he said, that we had squeezed all the juice out of our last proposal.
Mr. Stassen warned that the USSR was certainly going to react in the near future to this and to other policies of the new Administration. This might take the form of renewed pressure on Berlin or Macao, but it was most likely to take the form of a new peace offensive. We must be ready to deal with this when it occurred.
The National Security Council:6
- a.
- Discussed the subject in the light of the references and of the oral remarks of the Secretary of State, which set forth the proposed U.S. position on disarmament at the forthcoming meeting of the UN General Assembly.
- b.
- Agreed to explore, between now and the next UN General Assembly meeting in September, the possibility of a new U.S. proposal on this subject.
5. Breaches of Security
At this point in the discussion the President said that he desired to introduce a problem not on the agenda but which had greatly disturbed him. This was the loss of a vitally important report prepared by the technical staff of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. This consisted of a summary of a report on the development of the H-bomb which had not only been prepared by [Page 1109] this technical staff, but classified “Secret” instead of “Top Secret” by this same staff and accordingly sent by registered mail to a college professor at Princeton. There were only three people who could have let it out, and the President said that had they been in the armed forces they should have been shot. In any case, the security problem has got to be licked. It was his understanding that the present technical staff of this Committee will be abolished when a new chairman is finally chosen, but this was simply to lock the barn door after the horse had been stolen. The President confessed that he was frankly frightened, and did not know how to proceed.
Various members of the Council expressed doubt as to whether the loss of this paper could conceivably be attributed merely to carelessness, and thought rather that this was an indication of espionage and treason.
The Vice President suggested that every member of the present Joint Committee staff should immediately undergo a complete FBI check.
The President inquired whether the members of the Joint Committee could be persuaded to ask Mr. J. Edgar Hoover to take custody of the files of the technical staff before any more papers were lost or dispersed when that staff was abolished.
The President suggested that the Vice President talk to Messrs. Cole and Hickenlooper to this end, without, however, revealing the precise paper that had been lost.
The National Security Council:7
Noted the President’s reference to a serious breach of security which had been reported to him by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the President’s firm insistence that action be taken to prevent such breaches of security from occurring in the future.
. . . . . . .
- Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Feb. 19. A briefing memorandum from Assistant Secretary Hickerson to Secretary of State Dulles, Feb. 16, drafted in anticipation of Council discussion of disarmament matters at this meeting, is in S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, NSC 112.↩
- Lay’s memorandum transmitted to the NSC Senior Staff the Report by the Panel of Consultants, p. 1056.↩
- Paragraphs a–b constitute NSC Action No. 716. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Actions”)↩
- Ante, p. 1091.↩
- See footnote 1, p. 1103.↩
- Paragraphs a–b constitute NSC Action No. 717. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Actions”)↩
- The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 718. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Actions”)↩