G/PM files,
lot 68 D 349, “Use Policy, 1950–1955”
Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)1
secret
Washington, 6 February 1952.
- Subject:
- Department of Defense Interest in the Use of Atomic Weapons.2
- 1.
- I have asked the Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to deliver
by hand the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the above subject,
with which I concur.
- 2.
- These views are being forwarded to you at the President’s direction
with the request that the Special Committee of the National Security
Council on Atomic Energy provide him with recommendations on action to
be taken in this connection.3
[Page 864]
Enclosure
Statement of the Views of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on Department of Defense Interest in the Use of
Atomic Weapons
- 1.
- It is United States policy on atomic warfare that, in the event of
hostilities, the Department of Defense must be ready to utilize
promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including
atomic weapons, in the interest of national security and must
therefore plan accordingly.* The Joint Chiefs of Staff have
a statutory responsibility to act as the principal military advisers
to the President, the National Security Council, and to the
Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority and direction of the
President and the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
are charged with the preparation of strategic plans and provision
for the strategic direction of United States military forces.†
- 2.
- The steadily increasing quantity of completed atomic weapons has,
among other things contributed to a broad and far-reaching evolution
in United States military concepts in the fields of strategy and
tactics as well as in the size, nature, mission, training, and
equipment of our armed forces for war. The Strategic Air Command
(SAC), as now constituted and
equipped, has to a large extent developed around the atomic weapon.
Furthermore, developments now underway in the Tactical Air Command
(TAC) and in Naval and Marine
aviation are pointed toward full exploitation of their capabilities
in this field. The acquisition by the United States of its foreign
bases has been dictated largely by atomic weapon considerations. The
atomic weapon now influences, among other things, the configuration
of all aircraft which are to be capable of carrying the atomic
weapon, the design and modification of aircraft carriers, the
mission and equipment of guided missile units, and the development
of guidance systems, bombing systems, and certain special types of
artillery. It must be recognized, therefore, that the atomic weapon
has become such an integral part of our plans and preparations for
the conduct of a major war that it constitutes a vital element in
the attainment of full military preparedness on the part of the
United States.
- 3.
- It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, who are charged with the actual employment of a major weapon
in combat, must possess the requisite freedom of action to conduct
military operations in an emergency with maximum effectiveness. It
is essential that such military operations be properly planned; that
appropriate steps be taken to provide physical facilities for their
support; and that other necessary measures be arranged for the swift
execution of such plans under adequate security precautions. In face
of a military emergency, any arrangement which inhibits military
freedom of action to meet such an emergency will expose the United
States to unreasonable and unnecessary risk of mistake, confusion,
and failure to act with the speed and precision which the
circumstances require. The Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot, therefore,
agree to any other agency interposing itself between them and the
President in submission to him of recommendations for a military
course of action; nor could they agree to any such other agency
having a voice in determining how, when and where such military
operations are to be conducted.
- 4.
- In light of all the foregoing, it is apparent that responsibility
for those aspects of atomic weapons which involve military
operations or have a serious impact on such operations must, subject
to the authority and direction of the President, rest with the
Department of Defense. Conversely, responsibility for production of
fissionable or fusionable material and for scientific research and
development of atomic weapons rests with the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC). The philosophy is
that the latter agency is a producer; the former, the
consumer.
- 5.
- In consonance with the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommend the following specific areas of responsibility of the
Department of Defense, including their relationship to those of the
AEC, in the atomic weapon field:
- a.
- Atomic Weapons Requirements
- (1)
- The basic development of requirements for complete
weapons which in turn establishes the production
program, including the production goals and
production rates of fissionable material, has its
genesis in war plans and is therefore a
responsibility of the Department of Defense. This
declaration of responsibility, however, is not
intended to preclude a review of the statement of
requirements to determine the impact of the program
on the national economy. Actually such a procedure
may be an appropriate step in arriving at the best
possible statement of requirements. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff perceive no objection, therefore, to a
review of proposed programs for the attainment of
production requirements and comment thereon by the
Special Committee on Atomic Energy of the National
Security Council prior to the presentation of the
statement to the President;
- (2)
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff look to the AEC for vigorous efforts
in the fields of research and development of atomic
weapons, of production of fissionable materials, and
of fabrication of atomic weapons. The ideas and
suggestions of the AEC are welcomed on new weapons,
improvements to available weapons, and any technical
considerations affecting their employment. In this
connection, the Department of Defense is now
exploring how it may more effectively assist the
AEC in developing
new types of weapons. The decision, however, as to
whether such weapons, or the modifications of such
weapons affecting yields, quantities, or
deliverability, best fill military needs must remain
a responsibility of the Department of Defense. It
follows that the Department of Defense must be
responsible for finally establishing the desired
military and technical characteristics of atomic
weapons;
- (3)
- In summation, it is a unilateral responsibility of
the Department of Defense to determine how many and
what types of atomic weapons are needed for the
defense and security of the United States. The
present arrangement is to state these requirements
in terms of weapons three years in advance, and
thereafter as production objectives in terms of
annual rates of production of fissionable material.
This should be adequate for long-range production
programming on the part of the AEC.
- b.
- The Delivery Methods to be Used.
The particular method of delivery of an atomic weapon on a
selected target must be related to the nature of the target,
the depth of penetration required to reach it, the strength
of its defenses, as well as to innumerable other factors of
the military situation which bear upon the execution of the
mission. An evaluation of these military factors will
determine the Service to which is assigned the delivery
role: The Army by artillery; the Navy by carrier-based
aircraft, Marine aircraft, or antisubmarine aircraft; or the
Air Force by aircraft of SAC
or TAC. Eventually it may be
possible for all three Services to employ guided missiles as
a delivery vehicle. Basic budgetary considerations of the
Armed Services include the provision of these delivery
vehicles for atomic weapons. The decisions as to the
particular atomic weapon and vehicle to be used and the
precise nature of the method to be employed in its delivery
are purely military in character, and hence the
responsibility for making them must reside in the Department
of Defense.
- c.
- The Military Determinations of Where and
How
- (1)
- United States policy states clearly that the
decision as to the initial employment of atomic
weapons in the event of war is to be made by the
President when he considers such decision to be
required.‡ The Joint Chiefs of Staff are
fully in accord with this policy;
- (2)
- The statutory responsibility of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff for the strategic direction of the armed
forces requires them to make the military
determinations concerning the use of atomic weapons
once the President has directed the initiation of
atomic warfare. Atomic weapons, as do other military
weapons, constitute an integral part of the means by
which war is waged. Therefore, the decision as to
where, how, in what numbers, and in what types
atomic weapons will be employed must be made by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the President as the
Commander in Chief of the armed forces; and
- (3)
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff are charged by law with
the responsibility of advising the President on
military matters, including the use of atomic
weapons. They believe themselves fully prepared to
furnish such advice as may be necessary to meet the
requirements of the President. Moreover, they feel
that the Department of Defense possesses competence
in the realms of both the military and the technical
considerations involved in the use of atomic weapons
and should therefore constitute the principal source
of advice to the President on this subject.
- d.
- Security
- (1)
- Physical Security. Under
current agreements, the AEC bears the initial cost of
construction of all Zone of Interior storage site
facilities within the security areas required for
surveillance, maintenance, assembly, and storage of
atomic weapons. The Department of Defense bears the
cost of all operation, maintenance, and security of
the sites except salaries of the small number of
AEC personnel
involved and certain tools and equipment required
for testing and assembly work. Physical security
should, therefore, be a military responsibility and
is presently provided by the military. In any event,
the stockpile has grown to such proportions that
problems of surveillance, maintenance, and security
are beyond the present capabilities of the AEC;
- (2)
- Communication of Restricted Data
to Another Nation.
- (a)
- Exchange of information in the scientific
and technical fields should be accomplished
through the Combined Policy Committee (CPC),4 the
imparting of each item of information being
contingent upon the unanimous approval of the
American members of the CPC (who include the Chairman of the
AEC) and final
specific approval by the President. The
information should be limited to carefully
circumscribed scientific and technical data, the
area of which has been the subject of precise
definition, and these data must not be capable of
expansion to include weapons information or
information of direct benefit to any nation in its
weapons fabrication program; and
- (b)
- Communication to another nation of such
information on atomic weapons as is essential for
the conduct of combined operations with that
nation as an active and important ally of
[Page 868]
the United
States, and for the actual exchange of fissionable
material or weapons material to the extent
necessary to further such combined operations,
should be accomplished through the medium of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff with the approval of the
President as the Commander in Chief of the armed
forces; and
- (3)
- Security of Weapon
Deployments. The present system of divided
responsibility for the storage, surveillance,
maintenance, and security of the stockpile of atomic
weapons is inimical to the best interests of the
United States. This arrangement results in a basic
division of authority and responsibility between two
coequal agencies for the provision of a military
weapon in operating condition for war use. It is not
now possible to implement operations involving
atomic weapons without transmitting information
pertaining to the nature and direction of those
operations through nonmilitary channels and through
the hands of numerous individuals whose
participation in the operations is unnecessary. In a
recent readiness measure of great sensitivity,
knowledge of the matter became alarmingly
widespread, leading to the conclusion that under the
present system deployments cannot be made without
many individuals in the Department of State and in
the AEC, including
storage site and even contractor personnel, becoming
aware of them. This dangerous security situation
will persist so long as custody of atomic weapons
remains vested in the AEC. Until such time as the President
sees fit to direct the transfer of full custodial
responsibility from the AEC to the Department of Defense, this
security hazard may largely be overcome, and at the
same time military readiness and operational
flexibility increased, by the establishment of a
reservoir of finished weapons in the complete
custody of the military. Such a state of improved
“readiness to use” atomic weapons should not be
confused with “authority to use”. The redeployment
of any of these weapons, as desired by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in support of current war plans,
would be subject, of course, to the approval of the
President.
National policy concerning the authority to employ atomic weapons would
not thus be prejudiced in the slightest degree, the Department of
Defense seeking by this measure only to improve the mechanism by which
this powerful and possibly decisive weapon may be brought swiftly and
securely to bear against an enemy after the President has issued a
directive that its use be initiated.
