700.5611/10–952
Memorandum for the Files by R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs
Meeting of the Special Committee of the National Security Council Held in the Office of the Secretary of State
Thursday, October 9, 1952, 4 p.m.
- Present:
- Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson
- Secretary of Defense, Mr. Lovett
- Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Dean
- James Lay, Executive Secretary, National Security Council
- Paul Nitze, Director, Policy Planning Staff
- R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to Secretary of State
Mr. Acheson felt that the Special Committee should examine the question whether there was any action the United States might wish to take vis-à-vis the Soviet Union on the occasion of, or as a result of the forthcoming thermonuclear test. No specific proposals had been formulated, and, indeed, he was not inclined himself to advocate an approach, but he thought that the forthcoming event was of sufficient significance to warrant taking the time of the Special Committee to consider whether there were any actions which should be taken. His own view in thinking about the problem was that the Soviet Union had not in the past been under any compulsion to agree to effective international control of atomic energy: they had been quite content with a situation of no control. He had not been able to discover any new element in the forthcoming event which would change this situation. He felt that when the United States possessed a thermonuclear capability the Soviet Union would not be particularly troubled but would simply work toward the day when it, too, would have thermonuclear weapons in its arsenal and thereby in a position to inflict great damage on the United States in the event of war. While a thermonuclear test would represent a significant event, he did not feel that the possession of thermonuclear weapons in the hands of both the United States and the USSR would radically alter the damage that might ensue in the event of war. To be sure, the same damage could be done perhaps with fewer sorties but that no new order of magnitude of devastation was necessarily involved. While his own conclusions were along the lines he had indicated, he felt nevertheless the problem should be brought to the attention of his colleagues. He asked Mr. Nitze to expand somewhat further on the possibilities that had been thought about.
Mr. Nitze said that one of the suggestions that had been heard was that an attempt should be made to get an agreement from the Soviet Union to have a moratorium on further tests. It took only superficial analysis to conclude that such a proposal would not be to the advantage of the United States inasmuch as in all probability even if the Soviet Union were to agree to such a moratorium they would doubtless proceed in every way possible short of tests to improve their thermonuclear as well as atomic position against the day they were prepared to violate the moratorium. This would put the United States at a distinct disadvantage inasmuch as it would, [Page 1035] in all probability, live up to the terms of the moratorium. A rather more complicated possibility was then examined. Perhaps the moratorium idea could be coupled with an agreement for disclosure and verification along the lines that had been advanced in the United Nations. An examination of this possibility indicated that such an arrangement would be to the advantage of the United States inasmuch as the moratorium would then have teeth in it and could be presumably enforced, or at minimum, notice of violation could be had. However, when one examined the chances of Soviet acceptance of such a proposal, the likelihood seemed very dim indeed. In this connection Mr. Nitze said one then had to analyze whether the chances of Soviet acceptance would be better if the approach were made before or after the test. He had found it difficult to see that there would be any net advantage one way or the other. Moreover, an attempt to negotiate this proposition out prior to a test ran the very serious danger that the Soviets would stall indefinitely thereby delaying our thermonuclear tests. In conclusion, therefore, an analysis along the lines indicated would appear to make any proposal for an approach to the Soviet Union at this time or in the near future highly dubious. The Department felt, however, that the matter should be discussed.
Mr. Lovett responded most energetically to the matter that had been raised. He felt that any such idea should be immediately put out of mind and that any papers that might exist on the subject should be destroyed. He was deeply troubled that this was the kind of thing that might very well be traced back to fellows like Dr. Oppenheimer whose motivations in these matters were suspect. He thought it would be most unfortunate if any word of this subject leaked out and if Oppenheimer’s name were linked with it in any way because he was afraid that there might soon be some adverse developments with respect to Oppenheimer. He stated that he and Mr. Dean had recently been discussing the doubts that had arisen about Oppenheimer’s motivations and what to do about it.
Mr. Dean felt that the forthcoming test was a very significant event and felt that it might be used as an occasion to renew our efforts to secure international control of atomic energy and regulation and reduction of armaments generally. In response to a question from Mr. Nitze, Mr. Dean acknowledged that such a move would be designed primarily for propaganda purposes.
Mr. Arneson expressed the view that any proposal for an approach to the Soviets had to be viewed in the light of the basic analysis of NSC–68 which had been periodically reaffirmed in subsequent NSC studies. That analysis stated that it was unlikely that meaningful negotiations could be had with the Soviet Union unless and until the Soviets found that failure to agree to settlements [Page 1036] placed them in an untenable position. As regards international control of atomic energy, it was clear that the Soviets had refused effective international control for two basic reasons: (1) effective control would exact too high a price, i.e., would cause an irreparable breach of the iron curtain, and (2) the Soviets did not find the absence of international control an unacceptable situation. It did not appear that a forthcoming thermonuclear test would in any way change the negotiating situation. One might consider whether negotiations could be more favorably considered when the United States had thermonuclear weapons in being and an effective deliverability capability.
Mr. Dean referred to the recommendations that had been made by the PSB concerning public announcements of the Ivy series. He felt that the proposal not to say anything about the first test in the series unless forced to by imminence of a leak was unrealistic and that it probably would be necessary to volunteer some statement concerning this first test as soon as it was over. Mr. Lovett, on the other hand, expressed opposition to saying anything about the thermonuclear aspect of the Ivy series and stated he was not in agreement with the recommendations of the PSB. Mr. Acheson stated that it was evident that this matter required reconsideration and that this should be done. Mr. Lay agreed that he would call together the appropriate representatives from the three agencies to take another look at the problem.
The meeting rose at 4:45 p.m.