Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, “L’Panel”

Draft Memorandum by R. Gordon Arneson to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] September 29, 1952.

The Problem

To explore means of exploiting forthcoming thermonuclear developments to the advantage of the United States.

Facts Bearing on the Problem

1. On November 19, 1949 the President designated the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission as a Special Committee of the National Security Council to advise him whether the United States should proceed with the construction of “super” atomic weapons.² The President stated that he wished the Committee to analyze all phases of the question including particularly “The technical, military and political factors” and “to make recommendations as to whether and in what manner the United States should undertake the development and possible production of ‘super’ atomic weapons.”

2. The Special Committee completed the study assigned to it on January 31, 1950.³ It made the following recommendations to the President:

• “a. That the President direct the Atomic Energy Commission to proceed to determine the technical feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, the scale and rate of effort to be determined jointly by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense; and that the necessary ordnance developments and carrier program be undertaken concurrently;
• “b. That the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union;
• “c. That the President indicate publicly the intention of this Government to continue work to determine the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, and that no further official information on it be made public without the approval of the President.”

3. The considerations which led to recommendation b above are set forth in the Special Committee report as follows:

“It must be considered whether a decision to proceed with a program directed toward determining feasibility prejudges the more fundamental decisions (a) as to whether, in the event that a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, such weapons should be stockpiled, or (b) if stockpiled, the conditions under which they might be used in war. If a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, the pressures to produce and stockpile such weapons to be held for the same purposes for which fission bombs are then being held will be greatly increased. The question of use policy can be adequately assessed only as a part of a general reexamination of this country’s strategic plans and its objectives in peace and war. Such reexamination would need to consider national policy not only with respect to possible thermonuclear weapons, but also with respect to fission weapons—viewed in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union. The moral, psychological, and political questions involved in this problem would need to be taken into account and be given due weight. The outcome of this reexamination would have a crucial bearing on the further question as to whether there should be a revision in the nature of the agreements, including the international control of atomic energy, which we have been seeking to reach with the USSR.”

4. By letters dated January 31, 1950 to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense,⁴ the President directed “the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union.”

5. Concerning the international control of atomic energy, NSC 68, prepared in response to this Presidential directive, states in part

“At least a major change in the relative power positions of the United States and the Soviet Union would have to take place before an effective system of international control could be negotiated. The Soviet Union would have had to have moved a substantial distance down the path of accommodation and compromise before such an arrangement would be conceivable. This conclusion is supported by the Third Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, May 17, 1948, in which it is stated that ‘… the majority of the Commission has been unable to secure … their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field.… As a result, the Commission has been forced to recognize that agreement on effective measures for the control of atomic energy is itself dependent on cooperation in broader fields of policy.’

“In short, it is impossible to hope that an effective plan for international control can be negotiated unless and until the Kremlin design has been frustrated to a point at which a genuine and drastic change in Soviet policies has taken place.”⁵

6. Subsequent NSC studies concerned with U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union have periodically reaffirmed the basic theses of NSC 68.

7. By action of the PSB of July 26 [June 26 ?], 1952⁶ an ad hoc panel was established under the chairmanship of a representative of the Department of State “to formulate a policy for the political and psychological exploitation in the U.S. national interest of thermonuclear developments, both U.S. and Soviet.” Its tasks were broken down into three parts as follows:

• “a. To make recommendations with respect to the desirability, timing and manner of publicly reporting the thermonuclear test scheduled for the Autumn of 1952.
• “b. To formulate contingency guidance to minimize the political and psychological disadvantages which might accrue from Soviet thermonuclear developmental successes.
• “c. To formulate recommendations, as feasible, concerning the exploitation of thermonuclear developments subsequent to the Fall test.”

The Panel addressed itself first to a. The Panel’s recommendations of August 19, 1952 with respect to the public reporting of the tests this Fall have been approved by the agencies concerned. These recommendations were as follows:

“A. The general operating plan for the public reporting of the Ivy tests, assuming that there is no real or fake USSR announcement of its own thermonuclear tests before the first Ivy shot, be as follows:

• “(1) In the period before the first detonation:
  • “(a) In the late Summer make a terse announcement by the Department of Defense and the AEC stating that Joint Task Force 132 will conduct a series of weapons developmental tests in the Autumn months of 1952 (Appendix A).
  • “(b) Make no other announcement having any possible relation to the tests during this period unless it appears strongly likely that Soviet propagandists will make their own announcement and interpretation regarding the tests.
  • “(c) In the case that it does appear likely that Soviet propaganda will speak out on the subject, make our own announcement, putting the fact of the tests in the light which offers the best promise of undercutting the effects of the probable Soviet propaganda announcement.
  • “(d) In the case that without advance knowledge on our part a Soviet propaganda attack on the tests is unleashed, what the United States should say can be determined with finality only at the time and in the light of the nature and circumstances of such Soviet attack. The Panel should continue to give consideration to this contingency.
• “(2) In the period after the first detonation:
  • “(a) In the case that visible or otherwise detectable phenomena have become widely known and news stories and comment of a speculative sort are being published, issue a statement by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission immediately after the detonation of general content such as that in Appendix B.^*
  • “(b) In the case that the phenomena or activities are not widely detected and there are few or no speculative news accounts, hold announcement until the conclusion of the test series. At that time issue announcement by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of general content such as that in Appendix C.^†
  • “(c) There should be no Washington press conference for the task force Commander and other DOD and AEC officials; the press announcement and news conference for purposes of distributing credit and kudos to the various elements of the task force should be sited at Honolulu.
  • “(d) The several interested Government Agencies and Departments should take steps to ensure that official comment on the test results does not go beyond what is issued by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Appendix A and B or C).”⁷

8. The announcement set forth in Appendix A was issued on September 9, 1952.

9. During this period the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission had been giving considerable thought to the question whether the Ivy test series should be postponed until some time after the election. By action of the President dated September 10, 1952, on the recommendation of the Special Committee, the release was authorized of the requisite amounts of fissionable and fusionable material for tests scheduled to take place in early November 1952. It was understood that the question of exact time should continue under review.

10. By action of the Executive Secretary of NSC on September 17, 1952,⁸ inasmuch as the Ad Hoc Panel of PSB had been dissolved, further political and psychological exploitation of thermonuclear developments was assigned to the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy.

11. Throughout the course of the developments listed above, particularly in recent months, arguments have been advanced from various quarters that the forthcoming thermonuclear test may well represent a point of no return, that once the test is successfully conducted and becomes known the chances of bringing about effective international control of atomic energy will become hopeless, and that therefore, some means be found whereby negotiations be undertaken afresh with the Soviet Union to see whether some acceptable arrangement could be found which would avert the descent into the Maelstrom. In this connection, representatives of the Department and the AEC have recently had a series of discussions with the two representatives from the French AEC, Dr. Francis Perrin and Dr. Bertrand Goldschmidt, who were sent over at the behest of M. Jules Moch⁹ to examine the possibilities of devising an international control system based on “continuous inspection”. Confining their consideration to scientific and technical aspects of control only, the French participants felt that a technically adequate system could be devised short of the UN plan. (See Appendix D for a record of the conversations.¹⁰) The attached letter from the Atomic Energy Commission (Appendix E)¹¹ raises the question whether the forthcoming test might be utilized to “reactivate” negotiations with the USSR. Subsequent inquiry has revealed that the AEC has no specific proposals to suggest in this connection.

12. A different manner of approach has also been suggested. It is argued that the forthcoming thermonuclear test by itself or coupled with the possession of thermonuclear weapons at a later date (one year to 18 months at the earliest) should be used in some way to moderate the aggressiveness of the Kremlin’s behavior and to build therefrom toward acceptable settlements including the international control of atomic energy.

Analysis

1. In examining various alternative courses of action it is essential to keep in mind one fundamental point. The Soviet Union is not likely to accept any settlements which the West seeks whether it be the international control of atomic energy or other settlements of a more political nature unless it is confronted with a situation where failure to accept such settlements leaves it with less acceptable alternatives. In retrospect it seems plain that there are two main reasons why the Soviet Union has not to date accepted effective international control of atomic energy. The first obviously is that effective control requires a serious and irreparable breach of the iron curtain. The second is that the Kremlin does not find the absence of international control an unacceptable situation. A similar calculus would appear to apply to the other settlements which the West seeks to attain.

2. If the foregoing point is valid, there would not appear to be much point in a course of action which seeks to water down the requirements of international control in the hope that the Soviet Union would agree. Attempts to devise a looser control system are destined to break on the following dilemma: a system acceptable to the Soviet Union is without value as a control system and is, accordingly, unacceptable to the West. The key to effectiveness, whatever the words used, is the opening up of the Soviet Union. The West cannot settle for less. The Soviet Union cannot permit this vital blow to their system.

3. We must examine then whether any hope can be found in looking at the problem from another point of view. Unless it is judged that the Kremlin design has been frustrated to a point where a genuine and drastic change in Soviet policies has taken place or is imminent, no control system of the requisite effectiveness to the West can be negotiated with the Soviet Union. The question then remains whether forthcoming thermonuclear event could be used as a means to force the Kremlin to bring about a drastic change in its policies or to accelerate the time when such change would take place.

4. In the consideration that was given by the Ad Hoc Panel of the PSB to the question of what should be publicly reported concerning the tests this fall, the underlying thesis was that the event should be somewhat underplayed rather than exaggerated. This was done in view of the fact that for some time after the test the United States would not possess a thermonuclear capability in being. It is estimated that at least a year, perhaps 18 months, will be required before thermonuclear weapons of a deliverable character will begin to go into stockpile. In such circumstances, it was felt that it would be most unwise to exaggerate the importance of the event in the view of the lively possibility that our bluff might be called. This same consideration would appear to have a bearing on the question whether the tests this fall could be used to bring pressure on the Kremlin to accommodate itself to an open world. It would appear that if pressure is to be brought seriously to bear it must await not only the acquisition by the United States of a thermonuclear capability but also the requisite build-up of NATO and other forces.

5. One might consider, however, whether it would be possible to plant a seed, warning the Kremlin of the shape of things to come. Such an operation would require the most meticulous consideration and a decision taken only at the highest level. It might be useful, however, to sketch in most general terms an operation that might be considered. While holding firm in the UN negotiations, neither putting forward new proposals nor retreating from the old, plans could be laid for a direct approach to the Kremlin. In considering the timing of the approach it would appear unwise to attempt to do this prior to the test. To do so would only lead the Kremlin to believe that we were engaging in a policy of bluff.^‡ A more propitious timing would appear to be after the tests had been completed and have become publicly known. The approach outlined below might be made during the incumbency of President Truman or might become one of the first acts of the incoming President. The approach would be to point out to Stalin that U.S. progress in the thermonuclear field has interjected a new element in the international scene and will have an important bearing on the attitude the United States will take toward those actions of the Soviet Union which are aggressive in nature, inimical to the interests of the Western world, and might bring about global conflict. It might be desirable not to mention thermonuclear developments in the approach but simply to stress the growing build-up on all fronts, leaving the event of a thermonuclear test to speak for itself. An approach along either of these lines should be cast in such a way as not to take on the attributes of an ultimatum but rather should stress that this attitude would be the inevitable reaction in the minds of the American people to inexorable developments. Such an approach should not in the first instance include any specific proposals for settlement but it should be left that the United States would be pleased to hear any proposals for settlement that the Soviet Union might wish to make. Unless the Kremlin evidenced a genuine interest in securing settlements acceptable to the West, specific proposals by the West to this end would not appear worthwhile.

7. The approach outlined above might in some ways be more effective and run less danger of being interpreted as an ultimatum if it were done in the name of the outgoing President. By reason of his “emeritus” status President Truman could very properly appear in the role of an interpreter of the will of the American people while at the same time, in view of the fact that he will soon be relieved of responsibility as President of the United States, it would be clear that his approach could not be construed as an ultimatum. His doing it would help to enhance the sense of inevitableness of the course of events and the response of the American people thereto. If this approach were taken, it would, of course, be absolutely essential that the President-elect be fully aware of it and approve of it. As to timing, it would appear that the approach should not be made immediately after the test but perhaps should be left until the very end of President Truman’s term, such as late December or early January.

8. If the approach suggested were to be undertaken at the instance of the new President, the warning would have a more foreboding quality inasmuch as it would come from the responsible head of the Government, presumably at the very peak of his support from the national electorate. This being so, in order to avoid the quality of an ultimatum, the approach might have to be considerably more gentle and would require even greater stress on the theme of inevitability.

9. Whether the foregoing suggestion commends itself or not as an action to be undertaken in the near future, it would seem that any attempt in the future to break the impasse between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States and the rest of the Western world on the other, should be on a bilateral basis rather than through any UN Town Meeting approach. A bilateral approach does, of course, raise a thorny problem as to whether and in what manner the subject should be handled with Allies. Whether an early approach to the Soviet Union is indicated as a result of forthcoming thermonuclear events will require much careful study, but it would appear that in any event this Government should address itself most seriously to the question as to the form, content and timing of bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union to see whether any modus vivendi can be arrived at. Concurrently, in order to increase the deterrent value of these developments and to enhance our position of strength, civil defense measures along the lines laid down in the Project East River¹² reports should be pressed with all vigor.

Appendix “A”

Joint Release

Department of Defense–Atomic Energy Commission¹³

The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission today announced Joint Task Force 132 will conduct tests in the autumn months of this year looking toward the development of atomic weapons. The tests will be held at the Commission’s Pacific Proving Grounds on Eniwetok Atoll of the Marshall Islands in the Pacific. They will be conducted under full security provisions of the Atomic Energy Act. Only official observers of the United States Government and members of the task force will be present at the tests. The organization of Joint Task Force 132 under the command of Maj. General Percy W. Clarkson¹⁴ was announced February 18, 1952.

Appendix “B”

Statement by the Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

In recent days Joint Task Force 132, operating for the Department of Defense and the United States Atomic Energy Commission has detonated an experimental device at Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands. This detonation was one in our 1952 series which, like the 1951 series, looks toward further development of various types of weapons releasing the energy resulting from fission of heavy elements or fusion of light elements. The tests are being conducted under the full security restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act and no further facts on them will be issued.

1. No subsequent version of this memorandum has been found.
2. For President Truman’s letter to Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Sidney W. Souers, dated Nov. 19, 1949, establishing the Special Committee, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. i, p. 587.
3. The “Report by the Special Committee of the National Security Council to President Truman,” Jan. 31, 1950, is printed ibid., 1950, vol. i, p. 513.
4. For text of the letter from President Truman to Secretary Acheson, Jan. 31, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. i, p. 141.
5. For the complete text of NSC 68, “U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security,” Apr. 14, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. i, p. 234.
6. See footnote 1, p. 989.
7. In the event that the thermonuclear test is partially or wholly unsuccessful the statement in Appendix B would presumably not be necessary but a statement along the general lines of the statement in Appendix C should be used. [Footnote in the source text. Appendix C is not printed. A slightly revised text was issued by the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission on Nov. 16, 1952; for text of the press release, see p. 1042.]
8. In the event that the thermonuclear test is partially or wholly unsuccessful the statement in Appendix B would presumably not be necessary but a statement along the general lines of the statement in Appendix C should be used. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. For a copy of the full ad hoc panel report of Aug. 19, 1952, see G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, “L’Panel”.
8. Executive Secretary Lay’s action was transmitted in a memorandum of Sept. 17 to the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. (G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, “L’ Panel”)
9. Moch was French Representative on the Disarmament Commission and a member of the French Delegation to the Seventh Session of the General Assembly.
10. Appendix D, attached to the source text, is not printed. Detailed minutes of the conversations with the French representatives, which occurred on Sept. 9 and 11, are in Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, “Chron”.
11. Appendix E is not attached to the source text and has not been found. However, there is attached to the source text an “Addendum”, dated Oct. 2, presumably by Arneson, entitled “Timing of the Approach” which summarizes, in two pages, arguments for and against approaching the Soviet Union prior to the test.
12. For further analysis of the problem of timing see Addendum (opposite). [Footnote in the source text. Reference to the Addendum is presumably to the same document mentioned in footnote 11 above.]
12. See footnote 2, p. 20.
13. This press release was issued on Sept. 9, 1952.
14. Maj. Gen. Percy W. Clarkson, Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Armed Forces, Pacific.